About the Work
This volume, published in 1799 in Northumberland, Pennsylvania, represents the mature comparative work of Joseph Priestley, the celebrated theologian, scientist, and political controversialist. The full title announces an ambitious program: A Comparison of the Institutions of Moses with those of the Hindoos and other Ancient Nations; with Remarks on Mr. Dupuis’s Origin of all Religions, The Laws and Institutions of Moses Methodized, and An Address to the Jews on the present state of the World and the Prophecies relating to it. Priestley, writing under the epigraph “Trutina ponantur eadem” from Horace, dedicates the work to the Duke of Grafton, praising him for maintaining Christian profession in an age of widespread infidelity and religious indifference.
The book emerges from Priestley’s conviction that a fair comparison between the religions of antiquity and the revelation contained in scripture would decisively establish the divine origin of the latter. He had previously published discourses on ancient heathen religions and on Mahometanism, and this work fulfills his promise to examine the institutions of those nations admired for early civilization, particularly the Hindoos, alongside those of Moses. The work is substantially indebted to materials supplied by Dr. Andrew Ross, lately of Philadelphia and returned to Scotland, whose firsthand knowledge of Eastern religions and whose sincere attachment to Christianity Priestley regards as a circumstance of considerable weight. Priestley also appends remarks on Dupuis’s theory of the origin of all religions, noting that this had been attempted before by Mr. Estlin of Bristol, and includes an address to the Jews prompted by the extraordinary state of the political world and the interest Jews have in scriptural prophecies.
The preface reveals much about Priestley’s circumstances and scholarly methods. He quotes authorities with exactness, seldom departing from each writer’s spelling of Hindoo words, and provides lists of synonyms for Hindoo deities and fuller titles of books quoted. He had originally intended to print a methodical arrangement of Moses’s laws at full length with notes, but expense deterred him. The work also reflects the turbulence of his personal history: he mentions the destruction of his manuscripts in the Birmingham riots, including a nearly completed new translation of the Hagiographa, and responds to accusations from Mr. Robison’s Proofs of a Conspiracy that he preached the detestable doctrines of Illuminatism. Priestley’s situation in America, unable to send manuscripts to England without correcting the press himself, lends the work an air of exile and perseverance.
Context
Priestley writes at a particular moment in the history of European engagement with Eastern religions. The late eighteenth century had seen a remarkable flowering of Orientalist scholarship, with Sir William Jones’s Dissertations relating to Asia and his translation of the Institutes of Menu making Hindoo sacred literature available to European readers for the first time. French scholars such as Mr. Langles, translator of the Hitopades, were advancing bold theories about the priority of Indian civilization and religion, claiming that the Egyptians and Jews had merely copied from the Hindoos. Langles asserted that the five books of Moses were an abridgment of Egyptian books whose original still existed in India, where literature was cultivated long before Egypt was made habitable. Such claims threatened the unique authority of scripture, and Priestley’s work is in large part a response to this intellectual challenge.
The book also reflects the theological controversies of Priestley’s age. He engages with Mr. Dupuis’s work on the origin of all religions, which sought to explain all religious systems as variations on solar mythology and natural phenomena. He recommends Mr. Estlin’s refutation of Dupuis and his tract against Paine’s Age of Reason, indicating the broader apologetic context in which he writes. The French Revolution and the European war had intensified millennial speculation, and Priestley acknowledges that his mind may be too strongly impressed by present appearances regarding the fulfilment of prophecy. His address to the Jews, appended to a defence of their religion, grows from his conviction that the extraordinary state of the political world heralds the near approach of events prophesied in scripture.
Priestley’s personal circumstances give the work additional poignancy. He writes from Northumberland, Pennsylvania, having fled England after the Birmingham riots destroyed his home, library, and manuscripts. He had been a prominent figure in English intellectual life, known for his scientific discoveries and his Unitarian theology, and his emigration to America marked the end of a turbulent career. The preface reveals his continuing engagement with projects interrupted by violence, including a new translation of scripture and his Church History, which he had brought down to the present times. He seeks encouragement to print without more expense than he can afford, and expresses resignation to whatever appears to be the order of providence, even the total suppression of his labours.
Structure of the Book
The work is organized into a series of sections examining different aspects of Hindoo religion and its comparison with the institutions of Moses. The opening sections establish the ground of comparison: the antiquity of the Hindoo nation and religion, points of resemblance between the religions of the Hindoos and other ancient nations, and the character of the Veda’s and other sacred books. Priestley then examines the agreement between Hindoo principles and traditions and those of scripture, considering the creation narrative, the flood, and other patriarchal histories. Subsequent sections treat Hindoo polytheism and idolatry, the religion of Egypt, and the religion of the Schamans.
The middle portions of the work examine the social and religious institutions of the Hindoos in detail. Sections on the different casts among the Hindoos and on the Bramins expose the hierarchical system that Priestley finds so objectionable, while sections on the prerogatives of kings and the situation of women reveal the political and domestic consequences of Hindoo principles. The work then turns to the practical expressions of religion: the devotion of the Hindoos, their restrictions regarding food, their austerities, penances, and superstitions. Sections on licentious rites, charms and fortunate times, trial by ordeal, and various kinds of superstition complete the catalogue of Hindoo religious practice.
The work concludes with sections on the devotion of the modern Jews, the Hindoo doctrine of a future state, and concluding reflections. Priestley then appends separate treatises: an argument concerning the being of a God, a discussion of the age of the world, an examination of the history and institutions of the Hindoos, and a section on Christianity. The volume also includes a methodized arrangement of the laws and institutions of Moses, divided into parts treating laws relating to idolatry, criminal and civil laws, precepts of morality, rules relating to food and defilement, festivals and fasts, first fruits, the tabernacle, offerings, priests and Levites, Nazarites, vows, laws of war, miscellaneous articles, and exhortations to obedience. The whole is prefaced by an address to the Jews on the present state of the world and the prophecies relating to it.
Inside the Book
Title Page and Dedication
The book opens with its full title page, indicating that this copy was held by the Boston Public Library under a shelf mark referencing John Adams. The complete title announces a wide-ranging comparison of the institutions of Moses with those of the Hindoos and other ancient nations, along with remarks on Mr. Dupuis’s theory of the origin of all religions, a methodized arrangement of Mosaic laws, and an address to the Jews. The author is identified as Joseph Priestley, L.L.D. F.R.S., with an epigraph from Horace. The work was printed for the author by A. Kennedy in Northumberland in 1799.
Priestley dedicates the volume to the Duke of Grafton, not primarily for his political rank but for his genuine attachment to Christianity in an age when many distinguished persons either neglect religion, openly abandon it, or profess it without any real sense of its value. Priestley observes that not being ashamed of Christ in such circumstances is no small merit, though it counts for little among those who gain worldly advantage from their profession or face no real temptation to infidelity. True sincerity is proven by suffering in the cause, where loss of general estimation is considerable, and such sufferers will be acknowledged by Christ as his good and faithful servants when he comes to receive his kingdom. Priestley believes that day is now near at hand, and he assures the Duke that supporting those who labour for Christian truth, especially those exposed to odium, will be considered as showing favour to disciples and will not lack reward. The dedication is signed at Northumberland on November 1, 1799.
Preface and Preliminary Remarks
In the preface, Priestley argues that a fair comparison of ancient heathen religions with the system of revelation would establish the evidences of the latter, since revelation’s superiority in sentiment and practice over anything the most enlightened minds have devised cannot be rationally explained except by supposing it had a truly divine origin. He had previously given a general view of ancient heathen religions in the first volume of his Discourses delivered at Philadelphia, and a detailed account of Mahometanism in the second. He had promised to draw out a comparison of the institutions of the Hindoos and other ancient nations admired for early civilization with those of Moses, with which they were contemporary.
Priestley was chiefly furnished with materials through the friendship of Dr. Andrew Ross, lately of Philadelphia but returned to Scotland, who showed great zeal in promoting the undertaking. Priestley considers it a circumstance of weight that a person who has seen much of the world and knows the principles and effects of religion in all parts of the East is sincerely attached to Christianity. Ross declares that Christians are better people than Mahometans or Hindoos, miserably as Christianity is corrupted in the Turkish dominions. Priestley has not confined himself to the religion of the Hindoos but gives an account of the religion of the Egyptians and other ancient nations. Since general principles and customs continue long unchanged, especially in the East, we are sufficiently acquainted with religion in the time of Moses from the commencement of polytheism and idolatry. The comparison will suggest gratitude that readers were born in a Christian country, for the religion of the most enlightened heathens was absurd and despicable, while revelation was from the beginning rational and favourable to virtue.
Priestley adds remarks on Mr. Dupuis’s work on the origin of all religions, noting this had been done before by Mr. Estlin of Bristol in his Discourse on the Nature and Causes of Atheism, which he recommends along with Estlin’s tract on the evidences of revealed religion noticing Mr. Paine’s Age of Reason. Priestley is proud of having had such a pupil. An Address to the Jews seemed proper to subjoin to a defence of their religion, given the extraordinary state of the political world and the interest Jews have in scripture prophecies. Priestley acknowledges his mind may be too strongly impressed by present appearances regarding the fulfilment of prophecies, and he advances little more than in his Fast Sermon for 1794, though events in the European war have favoured his apprehensions.
Priestley states he quotes authorities with exactness, seldom departing from each writer’s spelling of Hindoo words, and provides a list of synonyms with different names of Hindoo deities. He originally intended to print the methodical arrangement of Moses’s laws at full length with notes, but expense deterred him; the notes will appear among those on all books of scripture. His Church History is brought down to the present times and will make about five volumes. He seeks encouragement to print without more expense to himself than he can afford, and he cannot send manuscripts to England without correcting the press himself, so must wait for a more promising state of things. Whatever appears to be the order of providence, even total suppression of his labours as at the riots in Birmingham, will not be just complaint. Before those riots, Priestley was engaged with friends in a new translation of the scriptures, having nearly finished the Hagiographa, which was destroyed; he publishes the Plan of that undertaking. Since writing this, Priestley met Mr. Robison’s work on a conspiracy against all religions and governments, in which Robison charges Priestley with preaching the detestable doctrines of Illuminatism, subversive of all religion, morality, and regular government.
Introductory Remarks on Hindoo Writings
Priestley hopes for an English version of certain books of curiosity, but meanwhile notes that other works composed by Hindoos contain faithful accounts of everything important in them, allowing examination without danger of consequential mistake, though more direct authorities may later be produced from the Vedas themselves. He then turns to European admirers of the Hindoos. Mr. Holwell says Hindoos have from the earliest times been the ornaments of creation. Mr. Langles, French translator of the Hitopades, calls Hindoo religion’s authors venerable institutors who delivered precepts of the soundest morality and a system of metaphysics truly sublime, hid under an ingenious veil of allegory. Langles claims that in Hindoo religion, despite alterations, we distinguish in its morals, doctrines, and ceremonies those of Egyptians and Jews, who have done nothing but ape the latter, of the Chinese, Greeks, Romans, and even Christians. He says the five Vedas seem the prototype of the five books of Moses, who have only copied Egyptian works originally from India, and he considers the Pentateuch an abridgment of Egyptian books whose original still exists in India. Moses, educated at the court of Pharaoh, made use of this to form laws for a small horde of slaves whose escape he favoured.
Priestley responds that Jews and Christians must consider what relation their institutions bear to those from which they are said to derive. Langles promised to do this in another work, but Priestley has not heard of its execution. He is under no apprehension of the institutions of Moses losing any part of the respect that has hitherto been paid to them from fair comparison with those of the Hindoos. He is persuaded the wisdom of Mosaic laws will appear to such advantage that, given Moses’ limited opportunity for superior knowledge, the origin of his institutions cannot but be concluded to have been divine. He doubts the five books of Moses could have been composed from the five Vedas, noting only three Vedas are mentioned in the oldest Hindoo writings, a fourth added afterwards.
The Institutions of Menu and the Antiquity of the Hindoos
Next in authority to the Vedas are the Institutions of Menu. Sir William Jones, who translated it, says it is a system of despotism and priestcraft, both limited by law but artfully constructed to give mutual support with mutual checks.
The Hindoo Doctrine of Creation and Fallen Spirits
The narrative turns to a peculiar account of the origin of evil, as reported by Mr. Holwell. According to this version, a portion of the angelic host rebelled against God and was driven from his presence. At the intercession of the faithful angels, the divine sentence was softened, and a course of purgation was instituted for the offenders. This was intimated to them by the deity Birmah, and while the common fallen spirits received the news with gratitude, their leaders reasserted their influence and confirmed the rest in their delinquency. The system looks forward to a final redemption when the deity Bouannee Drugah will descend to earth to destroy the chief rebel, Moifafoor, and his adherents. These fallen spirits are said to animate the bodies of men, animals, and vegetables.
The author, however, dismisses both this account and the claim of Mr. Dow that the author of the Bedang maintained the world was created out of nothing. These narratives, he argues, differ from the more recently translated Hindoo writings, which represent creation as an emanation from the deity’s own substance. The account of fallen angels is peculiar to Mr. Holwell and cannot be reconciled with the more authoritative texts. From the idea that both male and female principles were necessary for production, the Hindoos, like the Egyptians, formed an indecent representation of the creative power. Quoting La Croze, the author explains that this power, containing all principles and the reality of both sexes, separated them within himself. Under the figure of the lingam, representing the male and female organs, they denote the creator, and it is to this form—specifically as the third person of their trinity, the destructive power—that their most solemn worship is directed.
The author argues that even without inspiration, Moses’s system is superior to this creature of imagination. It is concise, not built on arbitrary suppositions, and represents the Supreme Being producing all things from nothing with ease, directly from himself, without dividing into three parts or substituting other beings. If Mr. Langles finds sublimity in the Hindoo system, there must be more in Moses’s, which is equally great in effect but simpler in cause and operation. The Hindoos believe there is more dignity in the Supreme Being doing nothing himself, employing inferior agents; the bramins of Malabar told Mr. Lord that it did not become God’s majesty to demean himself to make creatures when he could use ministers. The author counters that a prince who could do all business himself with ease would give a higher idea of his power, and such conduct would suggest benevolence, not meanness. He calls the bramins’ reasoning that of little minds.
The Doctrine of Successive Revolutions and Time
The author quotes the Institutes of Menu on the subject of successive revolutions: “He whose power is incomprehensible, having thus created both me, and this universe, was again absorbed in the Supreme spirit… When that power awakes, then has this world its full expansion; but when he numbers with a tranquil spirit, then the whole system fades away.” This immutable power revives and destroys in eternal succession by waking and reposing. From the same authority, the author gives the division of time: a month of mortals is a day and night of the Pitris (patriarchs inhabiting the moon); a year of mortals is a day and night of the gods. Twelve thousand divine years is the age of the gods, and a thousand such years is a day of Brahma, with his night of equal duration. The age of the gods multiplied by seventy-one constitutes a menwantara, or the reign of a Menu. The Supreme Being performs all this as if in sport.
According to Mr. Dow, the Bedang teaches that when the four jugs have revolved, Rudder, with ten spirits of dissolution, will roll a comet under the moon, involving all things in fire and reducing the world to ashes. God will then exist alone, matter being annihilated. The author of Neadirsen maintains the world is subject to successive dissolutions and renovations, dividing them into lesser and greater. The lesser happens at the end of a revolution of the jugs, with the world consumed by fire and elements jumbled. After a thousand lesser dissolutions, a Mapherky, or great dissolution, occurs, reducing elements to their original purmans, or atoms. God will then restore hijliejh, or plasticity, and a new creation arises. The author states that for this scheme, the learned bramins are silent; it is mere fancy. Overlooking this, there is more dignity in scripture, which represents the Divine Being as never slumbering or sleeping, with creation forever progressive, advancing from imperfect to perfect, its object being the happiness of the universe, not the creator’s sport.
The author notes that different accounts from different bramins are not extraordinary, so the veracity of travellers giving different representations should not be hastily questioned. According to Mr. Lord, the first human pair had four sons, each destined to a different profession, with their wives having a separate creation. After their posterity became wicked, the Supreme Being destroyed them by a universal deluge. Then from the sides of Brahma, who experienced parturition pains, issued another man, Manou, and a woman, who had three sons and three daughters, from whom the world was peopled anew. The author sees evident traces of Noah and his three sons. He also suggests Western nations probably derived their idea of two principles in man from the Hindoos, quoting the Institutes of Menu on the distinction between the eschetraynja or jevatman (vital spirit) and the body.
The Inadequacy of Greek and Roman Religion
The narrative shifts to the popular religion of the Greeks and Romans, which the author presents as a system incapable of elevating the mind or purifying morals. The Greek gods took different sides in the Trojan War, some supporting the Greeks and others the Trojans. Their passions are as violent and their language as intemperate as those of any men. They deceive and circumvent one another, personally engage in battles, and one female deity is wounded. Over many ages, the Greeks and Romans acquired no better principles from this monstrous and long-established system. Ultimately, it was not the instruction of philosophers but the preaching of a carpenter and fishermen that overthrew it.
The Defence of Hindoo Polytheism Examined
The author turns to those who defend the Hindoos from the charge of polytheism. Mr. Langles says we must take care not to charge the Hindoos with polytheism. Mr. Holwell severely censures modern writers for representing them as gross idolaters, saying he is amazed that we should so readily believe the people of Indostan a race of stupid idolaters. Mr. Dow gives the same favorable idea, insisting that whatever the external ceremonies of religion may be, the same infinite Being is the object of universal adoration. The author argues this principle would exculpate all heathen nations. While Hindoos acknowledge one Supreme Being from whom all power derives, they suppose the immediate government of the world is placed in other hands. Prayers and religious services are addressed to these inferior deities, and this worship is encouraged in their sacred books.
The author finds Mr. Dow’s claim extraordinary—that veneration for different objects as portions of God arises among common Indians to an idea of subalternate intelligences, but learned Bramins deny inferior divinities.
Penances and Unequal Justice
Priestley turns first to the Brahminical code of penances, which he finds strikingly disproportionate. If a Brahmin kills a man of the sacerdotal class without malice, the slayer—being superior to the slain in good qualities—must dwell in a forest hut for twelve years, subsisting on alms and keeping near him the skull of the deceased. The penance for the three lower classes escalates to twenty-four, thirty-six, and forty-eight years respectively. A military-class slayer may instead expose himself to archers or cast himself headlong into blazing fire. The punishments for vice are equally unequal: a Brahmin who copulates with a cow is fined eighty gold crowns, a Cheteree or Bice five hundred pieces of cowries, while a Sooder is put to death. Even theft is punished inversely to rank—the fine of a Sooder being eightfold, a Vaifya sixteenfold, a Cheteree thirty-two, and a Brahmin sixty-four or a hundredfold. Priestley contrasts this with the ancient Germans, among whom priests alone held the power of inflicting penalties, and the haughty submitted to blows and death from the pontiff as from an angry deity.
The Degradation of the Sudras
The condition of the Sudras, Priestley observes, is one of perpetual and hereditary servitude. A Brahmin may compel a man of the servile class, bought or unbought, to perform servile duties, for the Sudras were created by the self-existent for serving Brahmins. Even an emancipated Sudra is not released from servitude—”of a state which is natural to him, by whom can he be diverted?” A Sudra must marry only his own class and must amass no superfluous wealth, since a rich servant becomes proud and gives pain to Brahmins. The value of a Sudra’s life is so low that killing by design a cat, ichneumon, frog, dog, lizard, owl, or crow requires the same penance as killing a Sudra. Territory inhabited by Sudras, overwhelmed with atheists and deprived of Brahmins, must speedily perish. Yet a Sudra who performs lawful acts of the twice-born without censure may gain exaltation, and one distressed for subsistence may sojourn wherever he pleases.
Laws Relating to Both Classes
The laws governing intercourse between the classes are brutal. A once-born man insulting a twice-born one should have his tongue slit, for he sprang from the lowest part of Brahma. If he mentions their names with contumely, a red-hot iron style shall be thrust into his mouth; if he presumes to instruct priests, hot oil is dropped into his mouth and ear. If a Sudra sits on a Brahmin’s carpet, the magistrate thrusts red-hot iron into his buttock, brands him, and banishes him; if he spits on a Brahmin, his lip is cut off; if he urinates on him, his penis; if he breaks wind upon him, his fundament. Pulling a Brahmin’s ear or beard costs both hands. Giving much molestation to a Brahmin is death. No Brahmin may beg from a Sudra, lest he be born a Chandala in the next life. The Chandala and Suapaca must live outside town, their wealth being dogs and asses, their clothes the mantles of the deceased, their dishes broken pots. They must roam continually, carry out corpses of those dying without kindred, and kill those condemned by law. Priestley finds it difficult to solve how one part of a community keeps another in such wretched servitude, even if Sudras were originally war-captives, since that effect would cease in generations. He accounts for it partly by the deliberate ignorance in which this order is kept—legal provisions for perpetual ignorance unknown in any other country. Mr. Langles, encomiast of this system, calls Brahmins “faithful guardians of the sacred trust confided to them,” but Priestley notes the restrictions on reading the Veda: only a Brahmin may explain it, and Sir William Jones’s own Brahmin reader refused to read on forbidden days or without prescribed ceremonies, while the pundits of Benares unanimously refused to procure a Persian translation.
The Character of Women
Priestley expresses wonder that Frenchmen’s professed respect for the female sex did not lower Mr. Langles’s high opinion of Hindoo institutions, since nothing is more humiliating than the light in which women are always represented. Langles himself says that according to the Vedas, the souls of women, as well as those of all inferior casts, are condemned to continual transmigrations till regenerated in the bodies of men. The Hitopades declares that “faithlessness, violence, falsehood, extreme avarice, a total want of good qualities, and impurity, are vices natural to the female sex.” The Institutes of Menu say, “It is the nature of women in this world to cause the seduction of men, for which reason the wise are never unguarded in the company of females.” Women have no business with the texts of the Veda, and sinful women must be as foul as falsehood itself. The Gentoo laws list six qualities of women: incredible desire for jewels and fine furniture, immoderate lust, violent anger, deep resentment, envy of another’s good, and the committing of bad actions. Priestley reasons that women’s souls must have been very much depraved in a prior state to correspond to their character in this world, yet Mr. Holwell supposes women are animated by the most benignant of the apostate angels. Given this opinion, little regard is paid to their evidence in courts—a man untainted with covetousness has more weight than many women, because the female understanding is apt to waver. The birth of a female is no cause of rejoicing; a husband may cease to cohabit with a wife who bears only daughters, and may supersede a wife who speaks unkindly. Women must always be under the absolute control of men, never fit for independence, never mistress of her own actions. A faithful wife must do nothing unkind to her husband, living or dead, must rise before him but never eat with him, must macerate her body, and though a husband be devoid of good qualities, she must constantly revere him as a god. Much more is required: she must be burned alive with his corpse, and whether she does this or not, she must not marry again, for the marriage of a widow is never named in the text and is reprehended as fit only for cattle. In one case only may a woman dispose of herself: after three years of waiting, a damsel may choose for herself a bridegroom of equal rank.
The Superiority of Hebrew Institutions
Priestley argues that if one reads all the books of Moses with a prejudiced eye, nothing like the ridiculous observances of the Hindoos will be found. Though certain forms were prescribed in Hebrew sacrifice to prevent confusion, nothing in them is so apparently absurd that it could not have had a good reason at the time of its institution. Their mere opposition to the absurd customs of the heathen world would alone justify any particular rite. The great object of Hebrew religion was to preserve and diffuse the knowledge and worship of the true God, counteracting the polytheism that universally prevailed. Priestley asks how this one inconsiderable nation escaped the universal contagion, concluding it was not from natural propensity but that the control of that propensity must have come from God.
Offerings to the Dead and Hebrew Countermeasures
Priestley examines the Hindoo practice of offering food to the manes, or spirits of ancestors, quoting extensively from the Institutes of Menu to show the elaborate scale of gratification these offerings supposedly secure. A month of satisfaction comes from flesh, rice, barley, and various roots and fruits given with prescribed ceremonies; two months from fish; three from venison; four from mutton; and so on through a graded list of animals, culminating in the flesh of the long-eared white goat, which yields twelve years of satisfaction. Certain items—the pot herb calafaca, the fish mahafalca, honey, and forest grains—are said to give satisfaction without end, especially when offered with honey on the thirteenth day of the moon under the asterism magha. The manes themselves are quoted as wishing for descendants who would give milky food with honey and pure butter on that day.
Priestley suggests these superstitions explain certain Mosaic laws meant to counteract heathen customs. The references in Moses to “sacrifices of the dead” likely point to such oblations to the manes, which appear among Hindoos and Chinese but never among Hebrews. The prominence of honey in these Hindoo rites may explain why honey was wholly forbidden in the Hebrew ritual, with salt alone being used. He then denies any parallel between Hindoo purification doctrines and Mosaic institutions, contra Mr. Langles. All Mosaic purifications concern involuntary offences or non-moral impurities. For real crimes, David declares that God desires not sacrifice but a broken spirit, and Ezekiel states that if the wicked turn from sin and walk in the statutes of life, he shall surely live. Repentance and reformation constitute the only Hebrew atonement, and it was effectual.
No austerities are prescribed in Moses’ books. The Nazarite vow—drinking no wine and not cutting hair for a self-fixed time—is the only countenanced practice. Hebrews had one prescribed fast day annually without particular austerity, but three annual festivals of some continuance, plus the Sabbath considered a festival. Lands rested every seventh year, with a promised double harvest the preceding year, so no risk was run; after the Babylonian captivity, no inconvenience was reported. This reminded Israelites that God gave them their country. The foundation of sacrifice expressed acknowledgment that all comes from God by giving back part. Spontaneous produce of the sabbatical year went to the poor; what was given them was considered given to God. Circumcision, prescribed to Abraham and performed on eight-day-old children, served as an indelible flesh-mark reminding individuals of their extraction and prospects, with little inconvenience compared to the Egyptians, Arabs, and Mahometans who practice it voluntarily at more inconvenient ages.
The Veneration of the Cow
Priestley finds it hard to account for the excessive Hindoo veneration of the cow, since sheep are nearly as useful yet receive no such regard, and the origin is too remote to trace. Veneration of fire and water as divine elements is easily accounted for, since fire purifies metals and water purifies other things, making them emblems of purification generally. But these considerations do not explain cow-worship. Mr. Holwell says the cow is respected because it is the last of eighty-seven stages of purgation for fallen spirits, immediately preceding transmigration into a human body—but then the preceding form should receive proportional respect, which is not the case. Ancient Egyptians considered the cow the image of Isis, and Apuleius describes the cow as the fruitful image of the goddess, mother of all. Aelian reports a heifer or cow was adored at three Egyptian cities, and Syrians also revered the cow. Modern Parfis, following ancient Persians, never kill or eat cows or bulls; cow urine is a great purifier—they wash in and sometimes drink it. Priestley quotes the Institutes of Menu on penances involving cows: atonement for stealing what might be eaten or ripped, a carriage, bed, seat, roots, flowers, or fruit, may be made by swallowing the five pure things from a cow—milk, curds, butter, urine, dung. The penance Santapana involves eating cow dung and urine mixed with curds.
The Single Place of Worship and False Criticisms
The discussion turns to the purpose of a single place of worship among the Hebrews: it was for preserving national unity and national worship, facilitated by the country’s small extent. This worship was not superstitious because it was not always at the same place. In the wilderness, the place was a movable tabernacle; in Palestine, first at Shiloh, then at Jerusalem, the latter being most convenient as the metropolis. Priestley then criticizes Mr. Sonnerat for asserting that the Jews ascribed divine virtue to a “fountain of youth,” noting Sonnerat gives no authority and does not say where it was, suggesting he confused the Arabian Tales with the Bible. Next, Mr. Boulanger is criticized for claiming religion made the fountain of Siloe respectable because kings were consecrated near it. Priestley notes the only king consecrated near that place was Solomon, and no fountain or water is mentioned. The text only says they went to Gihon; maps show both a hill and a fountain there, the fountain supposed to be the same elsewhere called Siloe. Solomon was anointed with oil, but no sacredness of the place is indicated. Priestley suggests they left the city only to keep the act secret from Adonijah and his friends, returning in a princely cavalcade; any other place would have served. He concludes that on such slight foundations do unbelievers base objections to Hebrew religion, seeking false similarity with heathen absurdities, when the two are perfect contraries.
Licentious Rites of the Hindoos and Other Ancient Religions
Priestley argues that erroneous metaphysical principles had serious practical consequences. Since male and female powers concur in producing living creatures, ancient peoples supposed nature’s productive powers had both qualities. Egyptians held this idea, making some principal deities both male and female, and represented these powers by figures of the parts of generation. Constant exhibition of these figures led to lewdness, first as religious acts, then in common life. Thus ancient heathen religions contained opposite extremes: severity and cruelty in some, indecency and sensual indulgence in others. This was true in Egypt, “mother of religion and science.” Priestley cites Herodotus on women’s acts before the bull Apis, the goat worshipped at Mendes, the indecent carrying of phalli in processions, and behavior in boats on the Nile. Christian writers testify the Nile was worshipped with obscene rites, even sodomitical practices. Plutarch is quoted: many Egyptian solemnities were mournful, with austerity, eating raw flesh torn with nails, fasting, smiting breasts, and filthy words during sacrifices. In festivals, most acted ludicrous things with wicked and lewd words, even about the gods. Bacchus’s festivals were extravagant and indecent; the same people who sacrificed men and children had places for prostitution of both sexes adjoining temples, the profits being temple revenues.
The Hindoo religion is little less exceptionable. Mr. De la Croze says nothing is more revered than the “lingam”; most solemn worship is presented in this form. Lighted lamps burn before it in inner temples, surrounded by seven-branched lamps like the Hebrews’. Small ones of stone or crystal are hung on necks and fastened on heads; to these they address prayers and have them buried with them.
Concluding Reflections on Revelation’s Evidence
The passage opens by concluding an argument about Jesus Christ—that he willingly surrendered to his enemies, underwent a public crucifixion that left no reasonable doubt of his death, and rose again at a time he had himself fixed, to the full satisfaction of hundreds who could not have been mistaken about his person and who had no expectation of the event. The author refers to his own “Discourse on the Resurrection of Jesus,” where he claims to have shown that this most important fact was so circumstanced that its evidence could not have been stronger at this distance of time under any supposed change of circumstances, according to the fairest rules for estimating testimony. By contrast, the Hindoo doctrine is both highly incredible in itself and destitute of all external evidence.
Section XXIV then begins with concluding reflections on comparing Moses’ institutions with those of the Hindoos and other ancient nations, offering general observations on revelation’s evidence suggested by the state of knowledge and religion in early ages. The first observation is that the Hindoo religion is “a perfectly baseless fabric.” Proper evidence of truth beyond natural human powers must come from beings knowing more than man, and the only evidence of supernatural information is proper miracles—works only beings superior to man can perform. No such thing is pretended by the Hindoo system’s advocates. It is merely asserted on Brahmin authority that their religion was dictated by Brahma, agent of the Supreme Being, but no evidence is offered. The doctrine of pre-existent souls sent into mortal bodies for prior offences is something a man may imagine but cannot know.
Moses is then compared favorably. The Hindoo sacred books are ancient, probably as old as Moses’ writings, but antiquity proves no divine origin. Moses did what the Hindoo author did not: his law’s promulgation was accompanied by numerous stupendous miracles witnessed by millions, on so large a scale no imposition was possible. The history was written and published while events were recent, and no person in the whole nation appears to have doubted them from that time to the present. Yet this nation had no predilection for these institutions, as shown by their frequent rejection of them for their neighbours’. Several Mosaic articles lack satisfactory reasons, but this is unsurprising given their antiquity and adaptation to remote manners and circumstances. The author compares this to the system of nature, where many particulars cannot be fully explained yet are acknowledged to come from God. Better understanding reveals more reason to admire both.
The Hindoos had rudiments of most arts and sciences, especially astronomy, while the Hebrews made no scientific discoveries—yet Hebrews had a perfectly rational religion and Hindoos an absurd one. This is an internal argument for the Hebrew religion’s divine origin, almost as irresistible as miracles. The second observation is that all acknowledge an early period free from polytheism and idolatry. Mr. Holwell says this was the case with Hindoos; it was so with Northern European nations; Clavigero reports Mexican horrid rites were not adopted many centuries before the Spaniards arrived. Men could not have had more knowledge naturally in early ages—their observation and experience being more confined, they must have known less than posterity. Therefore mankind must have had supernatural instruction, then lost sight of it, corrupting purer tenets received from ancestors. They then contemplated the sun, moon, stars, and earth as immediate causes of good and evil, imagining their necessary influences were voluntary, animating these objects as beings like themselves, leading to attempts to gain favour and avert displeasure.
The third observation is that polytheism and superstitious rites were natural consequences of this train of thinking. Only deeper insight into natural causes than could possibly be gained could have corrected false judgments. Greeks and Romans, the most enlightened ancients, never attained such insight. The more men speculate on false principles, the farther they wander from truth. Hence came divination, auguries, oracles, human sacrifices, and licentious rites. Men judged their gods by human experience, even resorting to violence—beating sacred animals in Egypt, statues of Greek gods, and popish saints’ images. A few more enlightened persons would likely have become atheists rather than return to worship of one Supreme Being, and could never have discovered a future state from nature. Without revelation, the most intelligent heathens—Egyptians, Greeks, Hindoos—erred most widely. North American and Negro religions are preferable to those of civilized nations, Mexicans, and Peruvians. True religion must derive from revelation. The world would never by its own wisdom attain true knowledge of God; only the gospel brought life and immortality to light.
Cicero is quoted at length from his treatise on the Nature of the Gods: the question of gods’ nature is most interesting yet peculiarly difficult; opinions are various and discordant; Protagoras doubted, Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene held there are none; the principal difference is whether gods govern the world; if they take no care of human affairs, piety and religion have no foundation; Carneades has advanced much against those thinking gods made for men’s use. Among the latest heathen improvements before Christianity abolished them was the taurobolium, criobolium, or cegibolium—according as the victim was bull, ram, or goat. No mention appears before the sons of Constantine; the most particular description is in Prudentius, who lived in Theodosius’s reign. The author disagrees with Mr. Van Dale that it bore relation to Christianity. It was purely heathen—mystical purification or renovation in sacrifice to the mother of the Gods.
The Power of Religion and Divine Interposition
The author argues that God has power to accomplish any proper purpose, including bringing all persons and the whole human race back onto the stage of existence. If the Supreme Being has signified in an intelligible way that he will do this, its accomplishment cannot be doubted. The end is worthy of the benevolent father of all. Given present knowledge, this end can only be achieved through the resurrection of mankind at a future period, since the doctrine of an immaterial soul thinking independently of the body is now exploded. Whether God has made such a declaration to any of our race can be ascertained by proper evidence, since facts observable by the senses can be confirmed by human testimony. What is needed is a credible account of miracles, which are above human power and can only be performed by God’s power or permission—the only seal of a divine commission. If the history of Jesus in the Evangelists’ writings is true, this has been done in the fullest manner. The evidence of facts in the gospel history and Acts of the Apostles should be subjected to rigorous examination by rules for estimating human testimony; a man not feeling deep interest in this inquiry is debased and ranks himself with brutes that perish.
Point 5 states that the Hindoo institution shows the actual power of religion on minds, since only firm persuasion of unseen realities could make Hindoos submit to dreadful austerities, exposing themselves to torturing deaths, as has been their custom from time immemorial. Point 6 states that accounts of divine interpositions do not necessarily appear incredible to men. The Hindoos believe their god Vichnou has appeared in various forms and will appear in others. The people of Lystra took Barnabas to be Jupiter and Paul to be Mercury upon seeing something above human power performed by them. The bulk of mankind in all ages has believed in invisible agency in human affairs. Battles, though evidently owing to human power and skill, have so often reversed expectations that men have depended on divine aid as much as on troops or commanders; the god of battles has always been worshipped with peculiar devotion.
Dupuis and the Apocalypse
Priestley turns his attention to Mr. Dupuis, whose largest field for displaying ingenuity is the Book of Revelation. Dupuis claims that both Bossuet and Sir Isaac Newton failed to interpret it, but that its true meaning was his own discovery, maintaining, as no person did before him, that it is a Phrygian work. Dupuis argues that all its fictions derive from oriental mystagogues, that the repetition of the same number relates to divisions of astrology, and that it is composed from scraps of Ezekiel and Daniel, appearing the fruit of a raised imagination given to religious delirium. He further claims it was a religious curb to preserve morals falling into decay, awakening superstitious fear in ignorant ages. Priestley asks whether, if these scheme-inventors acted wisely in checking vice, Dupuis and other unbelievers can act wisely in throwing down this barrier. Dupuis also broadly claims that Christians have nothing peculiar to themselves—not only mysteries and theology but religious practices, ceremonies, and festivals.
The History of Christ as Legend
Dupuis calls the imagined history of Christ a sorrowful legend rather than an ingenious poem, more wonderful than amusing. Priestley counters that it is a plain, unadorned narrative of facts. Dupuis says fabricators made Jesus born among Jews, subjected him and his mother to Jewish practices, and connected events to Judea, the age of Augustus and Tiberius, and Pontius Pilate, whom they brought upon the scene near a hundred years after his death. Dupuis describes the romantic story of the god of light born of a virgin on December 25th, triumphing over darkness on March 25th at the vernal equinox. He delineates the heavens at Christ’s supposed birth, placing the virgin in the East with her rising son, Capricorn in the Nadir, the ram in the West, and the ass and manger of Cancer in the Zenith, with Janus at the virgin’s feet and the three kings of the Magi above the lamb. Priestley asks what astrologer was present at Jesus’s birth, noting the evangelists say nothing of the season, and doubts Jesus was born in a stable. He notes his death was at the Jewish passover near, not exactly at, the vernal equinox, and that the triumph over darkness is Dupuis’s arbitrary comment.
On the Apostles, Stephen, and Festivals
Dupuis says the twelve apostles equal the Zodiac’s signs and the twelve great Roman gods, with their chief having the ship and keys of time like Janus, on whom St. Peter was modelled. Seventy-two disciples is consecrated in solar allegory, and the number seven is everywhere consecrated in the Christian Mythriac religion. Dupuis says the constellation Stephanos became St. Stephen, first festival after Christ’s birth, followed by the eagle of St. John. Priestley replies that the New Testament says nothing of these festivals, constellations, or the eagle—they are later inventions by persons knowing little of astronomy.
Historical Evidence and Testimony
Priestley argues that vindicating Christianity’s promulgation is like vindicating Roman history under Augustus. Dupuis is unfortunate dating the invention near a hundred years after Pilate’s death, since Justin Martyr and Irenaeus—real persons Dupuis quotes—must have known the truth. The inventors must have been profoundly learned, yet left no trace of themselves. Priestley asks how the Apocalypse could pass unnoticed except by Christians construing it as symbolical prophecy, and how the secret remained undiscovered until Dupuis. Five original apostles were writers: Matthew, Peter, James, John, and Jude, and there is more evidence for their writings than that Sallust, Cicero, or Caesar wrote theirs. Peter quotes Paul’s epistles as well-known, and both suffered martyrdom at Rome under Nero. The Acts of the Apostles ends with Paul’s confinement at Rome, about A.D. 62. Priestley corrects Dupuis’s account of Tacitus, who wrote that Christians had their name from Christ, put to death under Tiberius when Pontius Pilate was procurator of Judea; Tacitus was born near Claudius’s end or Nero’s beginning, dying about seventy years after Christ’s death, not nearly 120 years after.
Remarks on Boulanger’s History of St. Peter
Priestley continues his examination of Boulanger’s allegorical interpretation of St. Peter, who argues Peter is identical with the Roman god Janus because keys are given to Peter and he repented at a cock’s crowing. Boulanger observes Peter’s history abounds with references to gates or doors, and claims Janus’s prerogative is to open the day. He calls Peter “our modern Janus,” son of John, deriving Cephas from Hebrew words meaning to deliver or to bind. Priestley interjects that Cephas has precisely the same meaning in Hebrew that Peter has in Greek—perfectly synonymous. Boulanger finds allegory in Peter’s profession and town, and derives from Peter/Petra a Phoenician word meaning to open, yielding Baal Peor. Priestley summarizes that Boulanger has shown old Annacus, Æneas, Hermes, and Janus, and Enoch, Noah, Baal Peor, Elijah, and Jonah were all the same person as Peter, all representing the sun. Priestley sarcastically suggests Boulanger might add Pharaoh and Alexander the Great, asking what Christian credulity is compared to that of unbelievers. Boulanger concludes that when mankind changed paganism for Christianity, gods themselves changed, urging attacking the chiefs of these beatified idols. Priestley calls this miserable rhapsody, asserting no history has more marks of natural character than Peter’s, and that Peter’s existence is better authenticated than Boulanger’s own.
The Laws and Institutions of Moses Methodized
The Hebrew religion’s great object was preserving knowledge of God’s unity and administration, opposing polytheism and idolatry. Hebrew rites opposed heathen customs to guard against idolatry, though many things were shared with other nations. A fixed ritual was necessary to prevent superstition, but God’s observances had no particular virtue without moral virtue. God entered covenant with the Hebrew nation, marked by circumcision. God spared Israel’s firstborn when Egypt’s were destroyed, claiming every firstborn and accepting Levi’s tribe instead, showing God would have no human sacrifices. The nation was under God’s immediate direction as first magistrate, with judges and kings as God’s vicegerents. This relation continues to this day; their dispersed state was foretold by Moses, as was future restoration.
An Address to the Jews: Promises and Prophecies
Priestley addresses the Jewish people directly, acknowledging their present dispersion and suffering, but noting the same writings containing prophecies of suffering also contain express promises of restoration. He quotes Isaiah 54, describing God as husband and redeemer, promising to gather Israel with great mercies after a small moment of wrath, comparing the covenant of peace to the waters of Noah. Restoration from present dispersion will be more extraordinary than deliverance from Egyptian bondage, as Jeremiah 16 states. Priestley notes Jews have wisely ceased exact computation of when these events occur, but sees evident symptoms of deliverance being at hand—though not within twenty or thirty years. He turns to Daniel’s prophecies, interpreting Nebuchadnezzar’
Main Arguments
Priestley’s central argument is that a fair comparison between the institutions of Moses and those of the Hindoos and other ancient nations establishes the divine origin of the former. He contends that the superiority of revelation in sentiment and practice to anything the most enlightened heathens have devised cannot be rationally accounted for except by supposing it had a truly divine origin. The religion of the most enlightened heathens was absurd and despicable, while revelation was from the beginning rational and favourable to virtue. This argument depends on demonstrating the actual character of heathen religions, which Priestley does through copious extracts from Hindoo sacred books and the testimony of credible travellers.
Against the claims of European admirers of Hindoo religion, Priestley argues that the system is not the sublime and moral religion his opponents describe. He engages directly with Mr. Langles, who had called the Hindoo religion’s authors “venerable institutors” who delivered “precepts of the soundest morality” and “a system of metaphysics truly sublime,” and who claimed that Egyptians and Jews had merely copied from the Hindoos. Priestley responds that the wisdom of Mosaic laws will appear to such advantage, given Moses’ limited opportunity for superior knowledge, that the origin of his institutions cannot but be concluded to have been divine. He doubts that the five books of Moses could have been composed from the five Veda’s, noting that only three Veda’s are mentioned in the oldest Hindoo writings.
Priestley finds an ally in Sir William Jones, whose judgment on the Institutes of Menu he quotes at length: it is “a system of despotism and priestcraft, both indeed limited by law, but artfully constructed to give mutual support, though with mutual checks,” filled with “strange conceits in Metaphysics, and Natural Philosophy, with idle superstitions, and with a scheme of theology most obscurely figurative,” abounding “with minute and childish formalities, with ceremonies generally absurd, and often ridiculous.” Priestley entirely agrees with this unfavorable judgment, though he rejects Jones’s qualification that “a spirit of sublime devotion, of benevolence to mankind, and of amiable tenderness to all sentient creatures, pervades the whole work.” The general character of Hindoo devotion, Priestley insists, is that of a debasing superstition, and their tenderness for animals is chiefly superstition and weakness derived from their doctrine of transmigration.
The argument concerning the antiquity of the Hindoos is central to Priestley’s comparative project. He acknowledges that the Hindoos, like the Egyptians, boast extravagant antiquity, but he contends that the oldest accounts of the Hindoo nation go no farther back than the deluge mentioned in Moses’ books. Following Sir William Jones, he notes that the Institutes of Menu were composed about 1280 years before Christ, and the Veda’s about 1580 B.C., about one hundred years before Moses. The similarity between Hindoo and other systems is too great for coincidence, proving the great antiquity of the general outline of the Hindoo religion, prior to the general dispersion of mankind. However, such an extensive, complex system with abstruse metaphysics could not have been completed very early; it required reflection and leisure, subsequent to the rudest ages. Priestley concludes it could not have originated long before the time of Moses, and whether Moses knew this system or not, he derived no advantage from it.
Key Concepts
The doctrine of transmigration emerges as the foundation of much Hindoo practice that Priestley examines. The Hindoos’ tenderness for animals, their dietary restrictions, and their elaborate penances all derive from the belief that souls pass through successive bodies, including those of animals. This doctrine explains why the killing of any creature is regarded with horror, why the Sudra is confined to servitude, and why women are condemned to continual transmigrations until they are regenerated in the bodies of men. Priestley repeatedly traces what might appear to be benevolent or moral practices back to this superstitious foundation.
The system of casts, or cajls, constitutes another key concept in Priestley’s analysis. He observes that the Hindoos confine every separate employment to certain tribes or families, making most unnecessary and unjust distinctions. The origin of this system is “not a little fanciful”: the bramins, Ckatirya, Vaijfya, and Sudra proceeded from the mouth, arms, thighs, and feet of Brahma respectively. Priestley argues that this system confines men’s faculties, since nature fits them for one employment while the system confines them to another. He notes that the distinction is carried much farther among the Hindoos than among the Egyptians, where it was rather a civil institution, whereas among the Hindoos it forms an important part of religion.
The lingam, representing the male and female organs of the creative power, exemplifies the indecent representations that Priestley finds throughout Hindoo religion. He explains that from the idea of the necessity of male and female principles for production, the Hindoos, like the Egyptians, formed an indecent representation of the creative power. Under this figure they denote the creator, and their most solemn worship is presented to him under this form. Priestley argues that since this system is a creature of imagination, Moses’s system, even without inspiration, is superior: it is concise, not built on arbitrary suppositions, and represents the Supreme Being producing all things from nothing, with ease, directly from himself.
The distinction between the Supreme Being and the subordinate deities who govern the world is crucial to Priestley’s refutation of those who deny that the Hindoos are polytheists. While the Hindoos acknowledge one Supreme Being from whom all power derives, they suppose that the immediate government of the world is placed in other hands. Prayers and religious services are addressed to these inferior deities, and this worship is encouraged in their sacred books. Priestley dismisses the claim that the Hindoos worship only the invisible being represented by their images, noting that the same claim is made by intelligent persons everywhere, but that in practice these powers have become distinct persons to worshippers, addressed differently with different rites.
The division of time into successive ages or jugs, with the periodic dissolution and renovation of the world, represents the Hindoo cosmology that Priestley contrasts with the scriptural narrative. He quotes the Institutes of Menu on the waking and sleeping of the Supreme Being, through which the world expands and fades away in eternal succession. He notes the division of time into divine years, days of Brahma, and menwantaras, or reigns of a Menu. Against this scheme, Priestley argues that scripture represents the Divine Being as never slumbering or sleeping, with creation forever progressive, advancing from imperfect to perfect, its object being the happiness of the universe, not the creator’s sport.
Themes
A persistent theme throughout the work is the contrast between simplicity and complexity in religious systems. Priestley repeatedly argues that the Mosaic system is superior because it is concise and direct, representing the Supreme Being as producing all things from nothing, with ease, without dividing into three parts or substituting other beings. The Hindoo system, by contrast, multiplies deities, ceremonies, and restrictions to an absurd degree. The Hindoos believe there is more dignity in the Supreme Being doing nothing himself and employing inferior agents, but Priestley counters that a prince who could do all business himself with ease would give a higher idea of his power. The Bramins’ reasoning he calls that of little minds.
The degradation of women in Hindoo society provides Priestley with some of his most damning evidence against the system. He quotes the Institutes of Menu and the Code of Gentoo Laws at length to show that women are represented as naturally vicious, faithless, and impure, that they must always be under the absolute control of men, and that a wife must revere her husband as a god even when he is devoid of good qualities. The requirement that a widow be burned alive with her husband’s corpse, and the prohibition of remarriage for widows, represent the extreme consequence of this view of women. Priestley expresses wonder that Frenchmen’s professed respect for the female sex did not lower Mr. Langles’s high opinion of Hindoo institutions, since nothing is more humiliating than the light in which women are always represented in them.
The relationship between priestcraft and ignorance is another recurring theme. Priestley accounts for the permanent degradation of the Sudra class partly by the deliberate ignorance in which this order is kept, noting that legal provisions for perpetual ignorance are unknown in any other country. The restriction of Veda reading to the twice-born classes, and the prohibition of explaining scripture to others, serve to maintain the power of the Bramins. Priestley notes Sir William Jones’s experience: the Brahmin who read him the Institutes of Menu requested his name be concealed, would not read on a forbidden day of the moon, nor without prescribed ceremonies, and the pundits of Benares positively and unanimously refused to procure a Persian translation of their laws.
The theme of divine providence in history runs through the work, particularly in its concluding sections. Priestley sees the preservation of the Jewish people and their religion as evidence of divine intervention, since their history shows no natural propensity to resist the polytheism and idolatry that universally prevailed. He asks how this one inconsiderable nation escaped the universal contagion, concluding that the control of that propensity must have come from God. The address to the Jews grows from his conviction that the extraordinary state of the political world heralds the near approach of events prophesied in scripture, and that the day of Christ’s kingdom is now at no great distance.
The Author’s Conclusions
Priestley concludes that the comparison between the institutions of Moses and those of the Hindoos and other ancient nations decisively establishes the divine origin of the former. The religion of the most enlightened heathens was absurd and despicable, while revelation was from the beginning rational and favourable to virtue. The wisdom of Mosaic laws appears to such advantage that, given Moses’ limited opportunity for superior knowledge, the origin of his institutions cannot but be concluded to have been divine. The great object of Hebrew religion was to preserve and diffuse the knowledge and worship of the true God, counteracting the polytheism and idolatry that universally prevailed, especially in nations famed for wisdom.
Priestley finds that the Hindoo system, far from being the sublime and moral religion its European admirers claim, is a debasing superstition. He agrees with Sir William Jones that the Institutes of Menu present a system of despotism and priestcraft, filled with strange conceits, idle superstitions, and absurd ceremonies. The degradation of the Sudra class, the oppression of women, the indecent representations of the creative power, and the multiplication of deities all demonstrate the inferiority of Hindoo religion to the Mosaic revelation. Even where the Hindoos appear to show benevolence, as in their tenderness for animals, Priestley traces this to superstition and weakness derived from the doctrine of transmigration.
The work closes with reflections on the present state of the world and the prophecies relating to it. Priestley believes that the day of Christ’s kingdom is now at no great distance, and that supporting those who labour for Christian truth, especially those exposed to odium, will be considered as bestowing favours on disciples and will not lack reward. He acknowledges that his mind may be too strongly impressed by present appearances regarding the fulfilment of prophecies, but he advances little more than he had in his Fast Sermon for 1794, though events in the European war have favoured his apprehensions. The concluding reflections affirm his confidence in the truth of Christianity and his hope for its eventual triumph over the superstitions and errors he has catalogued.
Significance
This work represents a significant moment in the history of comparative religion and Christian apologetics. Priestley engages seriously with the Hindoo sacred texts that had recently become available to European readers through the labors of Sir William Jones and other Orientalists, and he attempts a systematic comparison between the Mosaic institutions and those of the Hindoos, Egyptians, and other ancient nations. His method of quoting authorities with exactness and providing copious extracts from the sources allows readers to judge the evidence for themselves, even when they might disagree with his conclusions.
The work also illuminates the intellectual controversies of the late eighteenth century, particularly the debates over the origin and authority of religion provoked by writers such as Dupuis and Paine. Priestley’s response to Langles’s claim that the Jews and Egyptians copied from the Hindoos represents an important early engagement with what would later be called the “panbabylonian” or “Indian origins” theories of religion. His insistence on the priority and superiority of the Mosaic revelation anticipates later apologetic arguments, while his detailed examination of Hindoo institutions contributed to the growing body of European knowledge about Indian religion and society.
Priestley’s personal circumstances lend the work an additional historical interest. Written in American exile after the Birmingham riots destroyed his library and manuscripts, the book reflects the theological and political controversies that shaped his career. His response to Robison’s accusations of Illuminatism, his millennial expectations, and his address to the Jews all reveal the distinctive cast of his mind and the concerns that animated his later years. The work stands as a monument to his scholarly industry and his unwavering commitment to the rational defence of Christianity, even in the face of personal loss and political persecution.
