A Philosophical and Practical Framework for What Human Beings Are Actually Able to Do and to Be
Chapter 1: A Woman Seeking Justice
Locate: This opening chapter grounds the entire work in a concrete human story, introducing the real-world problems that the capabilities approach is designed to address.
Present: The chapter opens with the story of Vasanti, a woman in her early thirties living in Ahmedabad, India. Vasanti was married at a young age to a man who was physically abusive, emotionally neglectful, and gambled away the family’s money. Her father had to undergo a hernia operation and spent money meant for her dowry, so her husband used this as a pretext to demand more money from her family. When they could not pay, he became violent. Vasanti endured this abuse for years, trapped because she had no independent income and no legal recourse. She could not leave, because she had nowhere to go and no means to support herself.
The author then contrasts Vasanti’s story with that of Jayamma, a woman from Kerala who worked as a brick carrier for decades. Jayamma earned less than men for the same work, was denied opportunities for promotion to better-paying jobs, and was expected to cook for her male co-workers after her long shifts. At home, she was required to serve her sons first and eat only what remained. When her husband died, she was left with nothing, and her sons refused to support her. The author writes that these two women’s experiences “are not simply tales of individual suffering, but symptoms of pervasive social injustice.”
Nussbaum then explains that philosophers and economists have long debated what constitutes a just society, but many approaches focus narrowly on wealth, utility, or resources. She argues that none of these adequately captures what is at stake in the lives of women like Vasanti and Jayamma. The capabilities approach, which she has developed over two decades with economist Amartya Sen, offers a different starting point. Instead of asking, “How much money do people have?” or “How satisfied do they feel?”, the approach asks: “What are people actually able to do and to be?”
The author introduces the core idea that every person should be treated as an end, not merely as a means to the ends of others. This is the principle of each person as an end. She writes that “the capabilities approach is a species of the human rights approach, but it is more explicit about what is needed to make human rights effective.” The chapter closes by framing the task ahead: to articulate a set of central capabilities that any decent society must secure for all its citizens, and to show how this framework can guide real-world policy and legal reform.
Clarify: This chapter does not merely describe suffering; it establishes a moral starting point. By beginning with specific women’s lives, Nussbaum forces the reader to see that abstract theories of justice have concrete consequences. The contrast between Vasanti and Jayamma demonstrates that different forms of injustice — domestic violence, workplace discrimination, unequal inheritance — all stem from the same failure: treating women as less than full persons. This sets the stage for a theory that refuses to measure well-being by aggregates or averages, but insists on the dignity of each individual.
Chapter 2: The Central Capabilities
Locate: Having established the problem, the author now presents the positive core of her theory: a list of ten central capabilities that constitute the minimum requirements for a life worthy of human dignity.
Present: Nussbaum begins by distinguishing her approach from simpler measures of quality of life. She writes that “the capabilities approach is not about what people actually do, but about what they are able to do and to be.” This distinction between functionings (what people actually do) and capabilities (what they are free to do and be) is crucial. A society should not force people to function in any particular way — it should provide the conditions under which they have the real freedom to choose.
The author then introduces her list of ten central capabilities, which she describes as “a set of fundamental entitlements” that every government should guarantee to all citizens. The list is:
1. Life: Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely. 2. Bodily Health: Being able to have good health, adequate nutrition, and adequate shelter. 3. Bodily Integrity: Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and choice in matters of reproduction. 4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought: Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason — educated by adequate education, including literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training; being able to produce works of one’s own choice; being able to have pleasurable experiences. 5. Emotions: Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love, grieve, experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger; not having one’s emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. 6. Practical Reason: Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s own life. This is described as “a form of freedom that is essential to the dignity of a human being.” 7. Affiliation: (A) Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; (B) Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. 8. Other Species: Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature. 9. Play: Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 10. Control over One’s Environment: (A) Political — being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; (B) Material — being able to hold property, to seek employment on an equal basis with others, and to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.
Nussbaum emphasizes that these capabilities are not ranked in a fixed hierarchy. However, she argues that practical reason and affiliation have a special role: they “organize and pervade all the others” because a life that lacks either the capacity to choose or the capacity to relate to others is not fully human.
Clarify: The list is deliberately detailed and explicit. Nussbaum rejects the idea that justice can be defined by a single metric like GDP or utility. By specifying ten distinct domains, she ensures that different forms of deprivation — such as being well-fed but denied political participation, or being educated but sexually assaulted — are each recognized as fundamental injustices. The list also serves as a benchmark for constitutional law and public policy, providing a concrete standard against which to measure progress.
Chapter 3: A Necessary Counter-Theory
Locate: Here Nussbaum defends the capabilities approach against influential rival theories, showing why they fail to capture the full range of human dignity and deprivation.
Present: The author begins by acknowledging that the capabilities approach is one among many theories of justice, and she must show why it is preferable. She takes on three main alternatives: utilitarianism, the resource-based approach (associated with John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin), and welfarist economics.
Against utilitarianism, which aims to maximize total or average happiness, Nussbaum makes several points. First, utilitarianism aggregates — it adds up satisfactions across people, allowing the suffering of some to be offset by the satisfaction of others. This violates the principle of each person as an end, which requires that each individual’s entitlements be secured. Second, utilitarianism focuses on subjective mental states, but people often adapt their preferences to their circumstances. Vasanti may not report herself as “dissatisfied” because she has never known anything different — what Sen calls adaptive preferences. Third, the utilitarian focus on pleasure ignores the qualitative differences between distinct forms of human functioning.
Against the resource-based approach, Nussbaum argues that what matters is not what resources people have, but what they can actually do with them. Two people with identical resources may have very different capabilities — a pregnant woman needs more nutrients than a man; a person in a wheelchair needs different resources than someone who can walk to achieve the same mobility. The author writes: “Resources are not good in themselves; they are good only insofar as they promote the functioning of persons.” This is the conversion problem: people differ in their ability to convert resources into actual capabilities.
Against welfarist economics, which measures well-being by revealed preferences (what people actually choose in markets), Nussbaum argues that this approach ignores both adaptive preferences and the constraints of poverty, discrimination, and lack of information. People may choose poorly not because they prefer those choices, but because they have no real alternatives. Moreover, markets alone cannot supply many of the capabilities on her list, such as emotional development or affiliation.
The chapter also addresses the charge that the capabilities approach is paternalistic. Nussbaum responds by emphasizing that her approach offers capabilities, not functionings. People are free to choose whether to use their capabilities. The state does not force anyone to be healthy or to participate politically; it ensures that the option is truly available. She writes: “The choice of whether to act on that capability is left to the citizen.”
Clarify: This chapter serves as a philosophical justification for the whole project. By systematically showing the weaknesses of existing approaches — their aggregation problems, their neglect of conversion factors, their susceptibility to adaptive preferences — Nussbaum clears the ground for her own theory. The response to the paternalism objection is particularly important: it distinguishes the capabilities approach from more authoritarian versions of welfare policy and aligns it with liberal traditions that value freedom and choice.
Chapter 4: Fundamental Entitlements
Locate: The author now moves from philosophical defense to a deeper examination of what it means for the ten capabilities to be fundamental entitlements that a just society must guarantee.
Present: Nussbaum begins by stating that the central capabilities are not merely desirable goods but fundamental entitlements that should be enshrined in a nation’s constitution. She draws on the tradition of constitutional social and economic rights found in many democratic nations, such as India and South Africa, which include the right to education, health care, and decent working conditions. The capabilities approach provides a philosophical grounding for these rights, specifying what a minimally just society must provide.
The author insists that these entitlements are thresholds. Below a certain level, a person cannot be said to be living a life worthy of human dignity. The goal of public policy should be to bring every citizen above this threshold in each of the ten capabilities. The threshold is not absolute but minimal — it leaves room for societies to aim higher and for individuals to choose different paths beyond the minimum. She writes: “The idea of a threshold is important because it expresses the thought that there is a minimum level of each capability beneath which a life is so impoverished that it is not a life worthy of human dignity.”
Nussbaum then addresses a crucial question: who is responsible for providing these entitlements? Her answer is that the state bears the primary responsibility. This is not a matter of charity or voluntary assistance; it is a matter of justice. Each person has a claim on the state to secure these capabilities. The state must act not only through direct provision (schools, hospitals, courts) but also by regulating markets, redistributing resources, and eliminating discrimination.
The author also distinguishes her approach from the human rights framework. She argues that the capabilities approach is more concrete and operational. Human rights declarations often remain abstract and hard to enforce, whereas the capabilities approach “specifies a list of concrete goods that people have a right to claim, and it gives a clear account of how to measure whether those claims are being met.” The capabilities approach does not replace human rights but gives them substance.
Finally, Nussbaum discusses the universality of the list. She acknowledges that different cultures may implement the capabilities differently — for example, the capability of affiliation may be expressed through diverse religious or cultural practices. But the list itself, she argues, is universal: it applies to all human beings everywhere, because it is derived from a conception of human dignity that transcends cultural boundaries. She writes: “The capabilities in my list are not just good for some people; they are good for all people, anywhere, who are striving for a life that is fully human.”
Clarify: This chapter transforms the philosophical list into a political demand. By framing the capabilities as constitutional entitlements, Nussbaum moves from abstract theory to concrete institutional obligation. The concept of a threshold establishes a clear minimum standard that can guide policy, while the insistence on state responsibility makes justice a matter of legal and political accountability, not private charity or cultural variation.
Chapter 5: The Role of Religion
Locate: This chapter confronts a major objection to the capabilities approach: that it is incompatible with religious freedom and cultural diversity, particularly regarding the role of religion in shaping conceptions of the good life.
Present: Nussbaum acknowledges that many religious traditions have historically opposed certain liberal values, such as gender equality or freedom of expression, and that the capabilities approach’s commitment to these values might appear to impose a secular, Western worldview. She argues, however, that the capabilities approach is not hostile to religion but rather supports religious liberty as a central entitlement. The key is the distinction between functioning and capability: the approach does not require anyone to actually practice a religion or hold certain beliefs; it only ensures that each person has the capability to do so if they choose. This means that religious communities can flourish within a capabilities framework, provided they do not violate the core capabilities of others—especially vulnerable members like women and children.
A crucial passage reads:
“The capabilities approach does not insist that people actually function in certain ways, only that they have the capability to do so. This means that people who prefer a traditional religious life are not forced to abandon it; they are simply guaranteed the option of choosing something else.”
Nussbaum then addresses the tension between religious traditions and gender equality. She acknowledges that many religions have patriarchal structures, but she insists that the capabilities approach is not about abolishing religion; it is about ensuring that women have the capability to choose their own path. For example, a woman raised in a conservative religious community might choose to follow its norms, but that choice must be authentic—not coerced by lack of alternatives or fear of reprisal. The state’s role is to preserve a pluralistic framework where diverse religious and secular conceptions of the good can coexist, while enforcing a minimum threshold of capabilities for all citizens, regardless of religion. She writes, “The state must ensure that all citizens have the capabilities that are essential for a life worthy of human dignity, even if some religious groups would prefer to deny some of those capabilities to their members.”
The chapter also discusses equal liberty of conscience as a fundamental capability, which includes the right to change one’s religion or to hold no religion at all. Nussbaum notes that this is often threatened by religious majorities or by state-imposed religious orthodoxy. The capabilities approach, she argues, provides a robust defense of this liberty without undermining the legitimate role of religious communities in public life. She distinguishes between establishment (state endorsement of a particular religion) and accommodation (allowing religious groups to practice freely), arguing that the approach favors accommodation over establishment, but only when accommodation does not harm third parties or violate the capabilities threshold.
Clarify: This chapter demonstrates that the capabilities approach is not a secularizing ideology but a framework for protecting pluralism. By separating capability from functioning, Nussbaum allows for deep religious commitment while safeguarding individual autonomy. The argument matters because it shows that the approach can accommodate cultural and religious diversity without sacrificing its universalist commitments—provided those commitments are defined as capabilities, not mandatory lifestyles.
Chapter 6: The Role of the Family
Locate: This chapter examines the family as a social institution that both nurtures capabilities and can be a site of injustice, asking how the capabilities approach should treat this intimate sphere.
Present: Nussbaum begins by noting that the family is often seen as a private realm beyond state intervention, but she argues that from a capabilities perspective, the family is a public institution shaped by laws, norms, and economic structures. She writes: “The family is not a ‘natural’ institution; it is a human creation that has been shaped by law, custom, and economic arrangements in ways that have often been unjust.” The central insight is that the family can be a source of love, care, and development, enabling children to grow into capable adults, but it can also be a site of domination, abuse, and inequality—particularly for women and girls.
Nussbaum identifies several ways the family has historically violated capabilities: through domestic violence, unequal distribution of resources, denial of education to girls, and forced marriages. She insists that the capabilities approach cannot treat the family as an inviolable private sphere; instead, it must hold families accountable to the same threshold of capabilities that applies in public life. This does not mean abolishing the family or dictating its internal structure; rather, it means ensuring that all family members—especially the vulnerable—have the capabilities for life, health, bodily integrity, education, and political participation. She draws a key distinction: “The state should not prescribe the internal arrangements of the family, but it should ensure that no member of a family falls below the threshold in any central capability.”
A critical passage reads:
“Domestic violence is not a ‘private matter’; it is a violation of the most basic entitlements of the person, including life, bodily integrity, and emotional health. The capabilities approach insists that the state has a responsibility to prevent such violations, even when they occur within the family.”
Nussbaum also addresses the tension between parental rights and children’s capabilities. Parents often have strong interests in raising their children according to their own values, but the capabilities approach asserts that children are future citizens with their own entitlements, which must be protected. For example, parents may want to deny their daughter education due to religious beliefs, but the state must ensure she receives enough schooling to develop her capabilities for practical reason and affiliation. Similarly, early marriage or genital cutting violates a girl’s bodily integrity and must be prohibited, even if it is a longstanding cultural practice.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of care and emotional development. Nussbaum acknowledges that the family is the primary site where children learn love, trust, and empathy—capabilities essential for affiliation. She argues that the state should support families through policies like parental leave, childcare, and health care, enabling parents to provide care without sacrificing their own capabilities. She writes, “A just society will not only protect children from harm but will also create conditions in which families can flourish as spaces of love and mutual respect.”
Clarify: This chapter forces the reader to see the family not as a natural given but as a political institution subject to justice. Nussbaum’s approach does not aim to destroy the family but to make it just from within, using the capabilities threshold as a minimum floor. This is important because it shows that the capabilities approach applies to all spheres of life, including the most intimate, and that true freedom requires both protection from harm and support for care.
Chapter 7: The Role of the State
Locate: This chapter outlines the specific responsibilities of the state in implementing the capabilities approach, moving from philosophical theory to practical governance.
Present: Nussbaum argues that the capabilities approach assigns the state a positive duty to ensure that all citizens reach the threshold level of each central capability. This is not a minimalist state that simply refrains from violating rights; it is an active state that must take deliberate steps to promote capabilities through legislation, public policy, and institutional design. She writes: “The state is not merely an umpire that keeps people from harming one another; it is an agent of human development whose task is to create the conditions under which each person can live a life worthy of human dignity.”
The chapter identifies several key domains of state action. First, constitutional law must enshrine the central capabilities as fundamental entitlements, making them judicially enforceable. Nussbaum uses the example of India’s constitution, which includes a right to education and a right to health, though she acknowledges that enforcement remains a challenge. Second, economic policy must address material deprivation, including poverty, malnutrition, lack of housing, and inadequate health care. The state must redistribute resources where necessary, not merely ensure formal equality. Third, education is a priority because it develops capabilities for practical reason, affiliation, and political participation. The state must provide universal, high-quality education that cultivates critical thinking and democratic citizenship.
A crucial section addresses global justice and the responsibilities of wealthy states. Nussbaum argues that the capabilities approach applies globally: “The capabilities of all persons, wherever they live, are of moral concern, and the institutions that affect them must be designed to promote those capabilities.” This means wealthy nations have obligations to assist poorer nations through foreign aid, fair trade policies, and reforming global institutions like the World Bank and IMF. She acknowledges that this is controversial but insists that the moral logic of the approach cannot stop at national borders.
The chapter also discusses implementation challenges. Nussbaum recognizes that states may lack resources, face corruption, or be constrained by political opposition. She argues that the capabilities approach does not demand perfection but rather a progressive realization: states should move as rapidly as possible toward the threshold, with clear benchmarks and accountability mechanisms. She writes: “We should not demand the impossible, but we should demand that governments show in good faith that they are doing everything they can to make the central capabilities available to all.”
Clarify: This chapter makes clear that the capabilities approach is not a theory of minimal rights but a theory of positive, state-led human development. It transforms abstract philosophical commitments into concrete political obligations, including for global justice. The emphasis on progressive realization provides a realistic path for implementation while maintaining moral urgency.
Chapter 8: The Role of Individuals and Communities
Locate: This chapter shifts from the state to the role of individuals, communities, and civil society in promoting capabilities, emphasizing that justice is not solely a governmental task.
Present: Nussbaum begins by acknowledging that while the state has primary responsibility for ensuring capabilities, it cannot do the entire job alone. Individuals, families, religious communities, and voluntary organizations all play crucial roles in creating the conditions for human flourishing. She writes: “The state sets the floor, but the building of a fully human life is the work of individuals and communities.” However, she warns that decentralized efforts must still be held accountable to the capabilities threshold: communities cannot be allowed to violate the capabilities of their own members in the name of tradition or autonomy.
The chapter explores women’s movements and grassroots organizations as vital agents of capability promotion. Nussbaum draws on examples from India, where women’s self-help groups have successfully advocated for education, health care, and economic opportunities. These groups often emerge because the state fails to deliver, but they also pressure the state to fulfill its duties. She argues that democratic participation is itself a capability—the capability for political affiliation—and that fostering such participation is essential for sustainable development. She writes: “The voices of the poor and marginalized must be heard in the design of development policies; they are not passive recipients of aid but active agents of their own lives.”
Nussbaum also addresses the role of ethical education in forming citizens who care about justice. She argues that families and schools should cultivate a sense of empathy, compassion, and respect for others—what she calls the affective infrastructure of citizenship. This is not indoctrination but education in the skills of democratic deliberation, including the ability to see things from other perspectives and to challenge injustice. She draws on the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey, emphasizing that a just society requires citizens who are not only capable but also committed to justice.
A critical passage reads:
“The capabilities approach is not a recipe for passivity; it demands that all people become active agents in shaping their own lives and the lives of their communities. This requires both individual initiative and collective action, and it requires a society that supports both.”
The chapter concludes with a reflection on the role of love and friendship. Nussbaum argues that while the capabilities approach focuses on justice, it does not ignore the importance of personal relationships. Love, friendship, and compassion are capabilities—forms of affiliation—that are essential for a flourishing life. The state cannot command love, but it can create conditions in which love can thrive: through family support policies, freedom of association, and protections against discrimination. She writes, “The truly just society will not only guarantee rights but will also nourish the bonds of fellow-feeling that make human life worth living.”
Clarify: This chapter completes the picture by showing that the capabilities approach is not a statist theory that ignores individual agency or community life. It insists that everyone has a role to play in building a just society, from grassroots activism to ethical education. At the same time, it holds all actors—including communities—accountable to the capabilities threshold, preventing any group from using its autonomy to harm its weakest members.
Chapter 9: The Role of the Body
Locate: This chapter addresses a fundamental challenge to the capabilities approach—the objection that bodily functions, needs, and dependencies are not properly part of a theory of justice but belong instead to the private realm of medicine, charity, or personal fortune.
Present: Nussbaum begins by confronting what she calls the “problem of the body” head-on. Many political theories, she notes, have treated bodily needs as pre-political or sub-political matters. The social contract tradition from Locke through Rawls typically imagines citizens as “free, equal, and independent” adults who enter into agreements from positions of rough equality. This picture, Nussbaum argues, systematically excludes the reality that human beings are born, grow, decline, and die—that we are all, at various points in our lives, profoundly dependent on others for our most basic functioning.
She writes:
“The body is not just an instrument of the person; it is part of the person. Bodily needs are not merely instrumental to other activities; they are themselves an integral part of a fully human life.”
The capabilities approach, unlike contractarian theories, begins from the fact of human embodiment. Nussbaum lists the bodily capabilities included in the list of central capabilities: Bodily Health (being able to have good health, including reproductive health, adequate nourishment, and shelter), Bodily Integrity (being able to move freely, to be secure against violent assault, to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction and choice in matters of reproduction), and Senses, Imagination, and Thought (which requires adequate nutrition and the absence of debilitating pain). These are not supplementary to the theory; they are foundational.
Nussbaum then examines the concrete implications of taking the body seriously. She discusses disability as a test case. Traditional theories of justice that assume symmetrical, independent citizens must treat disability as an exception or an afterthought. The capabilities approach, by contrast, sees disability as part of the normal human variation that any adequate theory must address from the start. A person with a physical or cognitive impairment is entitled to the full set of capabilities; the society must arrange its institutions, spaces, and supports to make that possible. Nussbaum insists that this is not a matter of charity but of justice.
She also addresses aging and mortality. The fact that all human beings age and eventually die means that any just society must structure its basic institutions to support people through the entire life cycle. Nussbaum critiques societies that marginalize the elderly, treat their care as a private burden, or fail to provide the capabilities for continued participation and dignity in old age. She connects this to the broader point that human life is characterized by asymmetry—we are not equally capable at all ages, and a just society must account for this.
The chapter further explores the relationship between the body and the emotions. Nussbaum argues that emotions such as grief, love, and fear are not merely mental states but are fundamentally embodied. Bodily health, pain, and pleasure shape our emotional lives, and the capabilities approach recognizes that emotional development requires material and social support. A child who is malnourished or chronically ill cannot develop the full range of emotional capabilities; an adult who lives in constant fear of violence cannot exercise emotional freedom.
Nussbaum takes up the specific case of hunger and nutrition. She notes that the capabilities approach treats adequate nutrition not as a commodity to be distributed but as a threshold condition for functioning. A society that allows chronic malnutrition, even if it provides formal legal equality, has failed its citizens at the most basic level. She cites the work of Amartya Sen on famines, which shows that famines do not occur in democracies with free press and political accountability—demonstrating that the capability to be adequately nourished is a political, not merely economic, matter.
She also addresses reproductive health and bodily autonomy. Nussbaum argues that women’s reproductive capabilities—the ability to choose whether and when to have children, to have access to prenatal care, to be free from forced pregnancy or forced sterilization—are not optional extras but core requirements of justice. She critiques traditions, including religious traditions, that seek to control women’s bodies in the name of cultural or religious values. The capabilities approach insists that bodily integrity and reproductive choice are non-negotiable entitlements, not matters for majoritarian or traditional determination.
Clarify: This chapter performs a crucial theoretical move: it anchors the entire capabilities approach in the inescapable fact of human embodiment. By refusing to treat the body as a secondary or private concern, Nussbaum differentiates her theory from those that privilege abstract rationality or formal equality. The body is not an obstacle to justice but its starting point—and any theory that ignores bodily needs, dependencies, and variations is inadequate from the outset. The chapter thus provides a powerful rebuttal to critics who might dismiss the capabilities approach as overly materialist or insufficiently attentive to “higher” goods: Nussbaum insists that attending to the body is precisely what justice requires.
Chapter 10: The Role of Global Institutions
Locate: Nussbaum extends the capabilities approach beyond the nation-state to the international arena, arguing that justice cannot stop at national borders and that global institutions must be held to the same capabilities standards as domestic ones.
Present: Nussbaum begins by acknowledging a central tension: the capabilities approach was initially developed as a theory of domestic justice, focused on what a single nation owes its citizens. But she immediately argues that this scope is insufficient. In a world of massive global inequality, of transnational corporations, of international financial institutions, and of shared environmental challenges, the question of global justice can no longer be postponed. She writes:
“The human development approach insists that all human beings, wherever they are born, are entitled to the full range of capabilities. This is a universal claim, not one that stops at the border.”
Nussbaum examines the current structure of global institutions—the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and various regional bodies. She argues that these institutions are currently shaped by a combination of economic neoliberalism and state sovereignty, neither of which adequately addresses human development. The World Bank and IMF, for example, have historically imposed structural adjustment programs that required poor nations to cut spending on health, education, and social welfare—directly undermining the capabilities of their most vulnerable citizens. The WTO’s trade rules, meanwhile, have often protected the interests of wealthy nations and corporations at the expense of poor farmers and workers.
The capabilities approach, Nussbaum argues, provides a normative standard for evaluating these institutions. They are legitimate only to the extent that they promote the central capabilities of all people, especially the poorest and most marginalized. She calls for a “global capability threshold”—a minimum level of each capability that must be secured for every human being, regardless of nationality. This is not a demand for equal outcomes across the globe, but a demand that no one falls below a basic threshold of human functioning.
Nussbaum then addresses the question of national sovereignty. She acknowledges that nations have legitimate interests in self-determination and that imposing external standards can be imperialistic or disrespectful. But she insists that sovereignty cannot be a shield for injustice. When a nation systematically fails to provide its citizens with basic capabilities—when it allows mass starvation, denies education to girls, or subjects minorities to violence—the international community has a responsibility to intervene. This responsibility, however, must be exercised through legitimate, transparent, and accountable institutions, not through unilateral action by powerful states.
She discusses the specific case of global health. The capabilities approach demands that every person have access to basic healthcare, adequate nutrition, and clean water. Currently, millions of people die each year from preventable diseases because they live in countries without functioning health systems or because they cannot afford treatment. Nussbaum argues that global institutions, including pharmaceutical companies and international health organizations, must be restructured to prioritize the capabilities of the poor. She supports policies such as differential pricing of medicines, compulsory licensing, and increased funding for global health infrastructure.
The chapter also takes up migration and borders. Nussbaum challenges the common assumption that nations have an unlimited right to control their borders. While she does not advocate for completely open borders, she argues that immigration policies must be assessed by their impact on capabilities. A nation that closes its borders to refugees fleeing persecution or destitution, or that treats migrant workers as disposable labor without rights, has failed to respect their human dignity. She calls for a “capabilities-based approach to migration” that would prioritize family reunification, protect refugees, and ensure that all migrants have access to basic capabilities including healthcare, education, and legal protections.
Nussbaum also examines global environmental justice. Climate change, resource depletion, and pollution disproportionately affect the world’s poorest people, who have contributed least to the problem. The capabilities approach requires that global institutions address environmental harms in ways that protect the capabilities of the most vulnerable, both now and in the future. She calls for international cooperation to reduce emissions, transfer clean technology to developing nations, and compensate those who suffer from climate-related disasters.
She does not, however, propose a single institutional blueprint. Nussbaum acknowledges that different problems may require different institutional responses. Some capabilities may best be secured through global governance, others through regional cooperation, still others through national or local action. The key is that the capabilities threshold provides the standard—any institution, at any level, is legitimate only insofar as it promotes the central capabilities of all affected people.
Clarify: This chapter extends the moral universalism of the capabilities approach to the global level, insisting that justice does not end at national borders. Nussbaum avoids both naive cosmopolitanism (which would erase national differences) and amoral realism (which would treat power as the only standard). Instead, she offers a principle-based framework for evaluating and reforming global institutions. The chapter is crucial because it shows that the capabilities approach is not merely a philosophy for the domestic welfare state but a comprehensive theory of global justice with practical implications for international law, trade, health, migration, and environmental policy.
Chapter 11: The Role of Democracy and Public Deliberation
Locate: This chapter addresses the process by which capabilities are identified, prioritized, and implemented, arguing that democratic deliberation is essential to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the capabilities approach.
Present: Nussbaum begins by acknowledging a potential tension in her own theory. She has presented a list of ten central capabilities, which she claims are universal human entitlements. But how is this list to be justified? Who decides what belongs on it? And how can the list be applied across different cultures and contexts without being imperialistic? She writes:
“The list of central capabilities is not something that can be handed down from on high. It must be arrived at through a process of public deliberation and democratic debate.”
Nussbaum distinguishes her approach from two alternatives. The first is pure proceduralism, which holds that any outcome is just if it emerges from a fair procedure, regardless of its content. Nussbaum rejects this because it could legitimate outcomes that violate basic human capabilities—for example, a democratic vote to deny education to girls. The second is paternalism, which would impose capabilities from above without consulting the people affected. Nussbaum rejects this because it violates human dignity and autonomy.
Instead, she advocates for deliberative democracy as the appropriate process. The capabilities must be debated, argued for, and refined through inclusive public discussion. The list is not fixed for all time; it is open to revision as human understanding evolves and as new challenges emerge. But the deliberation must meet certain conditions: it must include all affected voices, especially the most marginalized; it must be free from domination and coercion; and it must be informed by accurate information and genuine argument.
Nussbaum discusses the role of experts in this process. She argues that expertise—in economics, in public health, in education—is valuable and should inform democratic deliberation. But experts do not have the final say. Citizens must be able to understand, question, and contest expert claims. The capabilities approach thus requires public education and accessible information as prerequisites for meaningful deliberation.
She also addresses the challenge of cultural difference. Critics have charged that the capabilities approach is Western or liberal in its assumptions and cannot be applied to non-Western societies. Nussbaum responds by arguing that the capabilities approach has been developed and refined through dialogue with people in many different countries and cultures. The list of capabilities is deliberately general and abstract; it leaves room for multiple concrete specifications. A society that values communal solidarity over individual autonomy, for example, might implement the capability for affiliation in a different way than a more individualistic society. But no society may legitimately deny any person any of the capabilities—there is a threshold below which no cultural justification can reach.
Nussbaum provides examples of successful democratic deliberation about capabilities. She discusses the Indian experience, where the capabilities approach has influenced public policy and constitutional interpretation. She notes the role of civil society organizations, women’s groups, and grassroots movements in pushing for capability-based policies such as the Right to Food campaign and the Right to Information Act. These examples show that the capabilities approach is not a top-down imposition but a framework that can be taken up and used by citizens themselves.
She also addresses the role of opposition and dissent. A democratic society using the capabilities approach must allow citizens to challenge existing policies, to propose alternative lists, and to argue that certain capabilities have been neglected. This means protecting freedom of speech, assembly, and association as non-negotiable elements of the democratic process. It also means creating institutional mechanisms—such as human rights commissions, ombudsmen, and constitutional courts—that can hear and respond to grievances.
Clarify: This chapter resolves a potential objection to the capabilities approach: that it is an undemocratic imposition of a philosopher’s list. Nussbaum insists that the list is a starting point for democratic deliberation, not a final decree. The capabilities approach is not opposed to democracy; it requires democracy as the process through which capabilities are identified, debated, and implemented. At the same time, democracy is not merely procedural; it is constrained by the capabilities themselves. A democracy that votes to deny basic capabilities to some of its members is not truly democratic, because it excludes the voices and interests of those affected. This chapter thus integrates normative substance with democratic process, showing that the two are interdependent rather than in tension.
Chapter 12: What Is Required (The Future of the Capabilities Approach)
We are in the concluding chapter of the work, where Nussbaum consolidates the practical and political demands of the capabilities approach and outlines the minimal requirements for a just society.
The chapter opens by stating that the capabilities approach, as presented throughout the book, is not a complete theory of justice but rather a partial theory — it specifies a minimum threshold of central capabilities that any decent society must secure for all its citizens. Nussbaum writes: “The capabilities approach is not a complete theory of justice. It is a partial theory, focused on the protection of a threshold level of the ten central capabilities.” This partiality is deliberate: the approach leaves room for societies to pursue additional goals — such as economic growth, efficiency, or cultural preservation — provided they do not violate the threshold. However, the approach is also imperialistic in one specific sense: it insists that any nation that falls below the threshold in any of the ten areas is failing its citizens, regardless of cultural or political excuses. Nussbaum rejects the relativist claim that different cultures have fundamentally different ideas of human dignity. The central capabilities are, she argues, universally valid because they are rooted in the pre-political fact of human embodiment and vulnerability.
From this partial universality, Nussbaum derives a set of constitutional essentials that any just society must embed in its fundamental law. These include the right to life, liberty, and bodily integrity; the right to political participation and free speech; the right to adequate nutrition, shelter, and health care; the right to education; and the right to nondiscrimination on grounds of race, sex, religion, or sexual orientation. She insists that these are not merely aspirational goals but enforceable entitlements — citizens must be able to sue the state if these entitlements are not provided. The capabilities approach therefore demands constitutional or statutory guarantees, not just policy preferences. Nussbaum acknowledges that different nations may implement these guarantees differently (through different forms of healthcare systems, for example), but the threshold itself is non-negotiable.
“The capabilities approach insists that all citizens are entitled to all the capabilities on the list, up to the threshold level. If a nation fails to secure any one of them, it is not a fully just nation, no matter how well it does on the others.”
Nussbaum then turns to the question of priority among the ten capabilities. She argues that all ten are individually essential — you cannot trade off one capability for another. A society that provides excellent health care but denies political participation is unjust, because political participation is independently required by human dignity. Similarly, a society that guarantees free speech but allows widespread malnutrition is unjust. The capabilities are not a menu from which a society can select; they are a package deal. However, Nussbaum acknowledges that in resource-constrained settings, trade-offs may be necessary in the short term. The task of a just society is to move all citizens above the threshold on all ten dimensions, even if this requires progressive realization over time. The key is that the state cannot permanently sacrifice one capability for another; it must demonstrate a plan and timeline for closing the gap.
The chapter also addresses the relationship between the capabilities approach and economic growth. Nussbaum explicitly argues that growth is not an end in itself; it is only valuable insofar as it supports the central capabilities. A nation that achieves high GDP but leaves its citizens unhealthy, uneducated, and disenfranchised is not succeeding — it is failing. She points to the example of South Africa under apartheid, which had a relatively high GDP per capita but systematically denied basic capabilities to the majority of its population. The capabilities approach thus serves as a critical standard against which economic policies must be measured. Nussbaum calls for new measures of national success that go beyond GDP, such as the Human Development Index, which incorporates life expectancy, education, and income. These measures, she argues, are closer to the spirit of the capabilities approach, even though they still fall short of capturing the full complexity of each central capability.
In the final pages of the chapter, Nussbaum turns to the role of international obligations. She argues that the capabilities approach is not limited to nation-states; it imposes duties on all agents — from international organizations to corporations to individual citizens — to help secure the central capabilities for all people worldwide. This is not a utopian demand for world government but a practical recognition that many causes of capability deprivation are global in nature: multinational corporations exploit labor in poor countries; global financial institutions impose austerity policies that undermine health and education; climate change disproportionately harms the global poor. Nussbaum calls for global standards that hold all actors accountable, including binding treaties, international courts, and monitoring mechanisms. She acknowledges that enforcement is weak, but insists that the moral force of the capabilities approach is not dependent on current political feasibility. The approach provides a normative framework for critique and activism, even when immediate compliance is lacking.
“The capabilities approach is not just a theory for one nation; it is a theory for the whole world. The central capabilities are entitlements of every human being, anywhere, and the failure to secure them is an injustice that demands a response.”
Nussbaum concludes by reiterating the whole and overlapping nature of the ten capabilities. They are not a checklist to be ticked off one by one; they are an interlocking system. Improving health without education is hollow; securing political participation without bodily integrity is incomplete. The goal is a society in which every person can live a life worthy of human dignity — and that requires all ten capabilities, for all people, up to the threshold. The capabilities approach is, in the end, a vision of justice that is at once modest in its minimalism and radical in its demands. It does not ask for perfect equality or utopian abundance; it asks for what is required for a life to be human.
CLARIFY: This chapter synthesizes the entire argument of the book into a clear set of practical requirements. The emphasis on enforceability, constitutional guarantees, and non-negotiable thresholds gives the capabilities approach its political teeth. Nussbaum does not shy away from the radical implications: that many prosperous nations are failing their citizens, that economic growth is no substitute for justice, and that global obligations are real and binding. The chapter closes the book by affirming that the capabilities approach is not a philosophical exercise but a call to action — a demand that we measure every institution, every policy, and every law by whether it enables every human being to flourish.
