Overview
Selected Philosophical Studies is a collection of eleven essays by Willard Van Orman Quine, accompanied by an appendix by Rudolf Carnap. The essays range across ontology, the philosophy of logic and language, modality, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of science. A unifying thread is Quine’s engagement with logical positivism—especially Carnap’s views on analyticity, ontology, and logical truth—and his development of a naturalistic, extensionalist approach to philosophical problems. The volume is not a systematic treatise but a gathering of independent papers that together display the main lines of Quine’s thought.
“A Logistical Approach to the Ontological Problem”
Quine frames the ontological question—what is there?—as a question about the commitments of a formalized theory. On his “logistical” approach, the ontology of a theory is given by the range of its bound variables: to be is to be the value of a variable. The essay distinguishes the question of what a theory says there is from the question of whether to adopt the theory, and it considers nominalist and Platonic alternatives. The ontological problem is thus tied to the choice of a logical notation and a conceptual scheme rather than to a direct inspection of reality.
“On Carnap’s Views on Ontology”
Quine examines Carnap’s distinction between internal questions, asked within a linguistic framework, and external questions, which concern the adoption of a framework. Carnap treats external questions as practical rather than theoretical. Quine argues that the distinction is less tidy than it appears: the choice of a framework can itself be assessed by theoretical standards, and the analytic-synthetic distinction on which Carnap relies is not secure. The essay presses Quine’s doubts about conventionalism and about the idea that ontological disputes can be dissolved by linguistic legislation.
“On Mental Entities”
Quine considers whether mental entities—pains, beliefs, thoughts—should be admitted as a separate kind of entity. He argues for a physicalist or behaviorist treatment: mental talk can be construed as talk about states and dispositions of physical bodies. Mental entities are not eliminated outright but are naturalized as posits within a physicalistic framework. The essay reflects Quine’s broader view that ontology should be decided by the needs of scientific theory, not by introspective intuition.
“Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory”
This essay responds to P. F. Strawson’s criticism that formal logic distorts ordinary language. Strawson had argued that the truth-functional conditional, the treatment of universal statements, and the formal account of entailment fail to capture ordinary usage. Quine defends formal logic as a regimentation of language for scientific purposes rather than a description of everyday discourse. He argues that ordinary language is not a tribunal for logic; the choice of a logical system is a matter of clarity and utility, and Strawson’s appeal to ordinary usage conflates logical form with grammatical form.
“Three Grades of Modal Involvement”
Quine distinguishes three ways in which modal notions can be incorporated into a language. In the first grade, necessity is a predicate of sentences, as in “‘9 is greater than 7’ is necessary”; this is metalinguistic and relatively unproblematic. In the second grade, modal operators attach to sentences, as in “Necessarily, 9 is greater than 7”; this raises questions about the nature of propositions. In the third grade, modal operators attach to open sentences or attributes, yielding quantified modal logic and Aristotelian essentialism—the view that objects have some properties essentially and others accidentally. Quine argues that the third grade is unintelligible, since it requires a notion of essence that cannot be made clear, and that quantified modal logic is therefore incoherent.
“Carnap and Logical Truth”
Quine scrutinizes Carnap’s claim that logical truths are true by virtue of linguistic rules or conventions. He argues that the distinction between logical and descriptive signs is not given independently of a choice of logical vocabulary, and that the conventionalist account of logical truth is circular: conventions cannot generate logical truths unless some logical truths are already presupposed in the derivation. The essay also presses Quine’s general skepticism about the analytic-synthetic distinction and about the “linguistic doctrine of logical truth.” It is one of his most sustained engagements with Carnap’s philosophy of logic.
“Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes”
Quine analyzes sentences that quantify into belief contexts, such as “There is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy.” Such sentences are ambiguous between a notional reading (“Ralph believes that someone is a spy”) and a relational reading (“There is a specific person whom Ralph believes to be a spy”). The relational reading seems to require a relation between Ralph and an object, but belief contexts are referentially opaque: substituting co-referential terms can change truth value. Quine explores how to represent propositional attitudes in a formal language and why the logic of belief is problematic.
“The Scope and Language of Science”
Quine presents a naturalistic picture of science as continuous with common sense and as the final arbiter of what there is. Science refines ordinary language into a canonical notation with quantifiers, predicates, and set theory. Physical objects, forces, and other theoretical entities are posits whose value is measured by their role in predicting experience. Quine emphasizes the web of belief: no statement is immune to revision, and theory choice is constrained by experience but not uniquely determined by it. The essay is a compact statement of his naturalism and holism.
“The Philosophical Bearing of Modern Logic”
Quine surveys the ways in which modern logic, from Frege and Russell onward, has changed philosophy. The theory of descriptions serves as a model of philosophical analysis; the theory of classes clarifies the paradoxes; formalization sharpens ontological questions; and the logic of relations and quantification provides tools for understanding language. Quine argues that logic supplies a canonical notation that can clarify, though not by itself solve, philosophical problems. The essay is both a defense of formal methods in philosophy and a caution against expecting logic to replace philosophical reflection.
“Posits and Reality”
Quine develops a pragmatic account of ontology. Physical objects are posits, comparable in principle to the gods of Homer or the forces of physics; they are admitted because they help organize experience and predict future observations. The question of what is real is thus a question of which conceptual scheme to adopt, and the answer is judged by its utility rather than by a direct confrontation with reality. Quine does not conclude that physical objects are unreal; rather, he treats reality as internal to a theory. The essay illustrates his naturalized epistemology and his willingness to compare scientific posits with myth.
“On Simple Theories of a Complex World”
Quine asks why simplicity is a virtue in scientific theories. The world is complex, yet simple theories are preferred. Quine explores whether simplicity is a matter of economy, aesthetic preference, or a guide to truth. He does not offer a definitive answer but suggests that simplicity functions as a methodological constraint in the selection among empirically adequate theories. The essay is brief and programmatic, reflecting Quine’s interest in the norms of theory choice.
Appendix: Rudolf Carnap, “W. V. Quine on Logical Truth”
Carnap’s appendix responds to Quine’s essay. Carnap defends the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths and the linguistic doctrine of logical truth. He argues that logical truths are true by virtue of the rules of a language and that Quine’s objections rest on a misunderstanding of how conventions work. Carnap also defends the principle of tolerance: the choice of a linguistic framework is a practical matter, and different frameworks can be adopted for different purposes. The appendix gives the reader a direct sense of the debate between the two philosophers.
Taken together, the essays in Selected Philosophical Studies display Quine’s characteristic methods: attention to formal logic, suspicion of intensional notions, and a naturalistic willingness to treat philosophy as continuous with science. The volume is not a unified work but a record of Quine’s engagements with Carnap, Strawson, and the tradition of logical positivism. Its central concerns—ontological commitment, analyticity, modality, and the language of science—are among the defining problems of analytic philosophy.
