The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians: Origins, Interests, and the Unfolding of a Conflict
Foreword
LOCATE: The Foreword establishes the context and the stakes of the inquiry that follows, positioning the book as an intervention into a debate that has been systematically distorted by powerful interests in the United States.
PRESENT: Chomsky opens by stating that the “special relationship” between the United States and Israel is one of the most contentious issues in American political discourse, yet it is also one of the most poorly understood. He writes that mainstream discussion is confined within a narrow range of permissible opinion, where the fundamental premises of U.S. policy are rarely questioned. The book’s purpose, he explains, is to break through this restricted framework by examining the actual historical record and the strategic interests that have shaped U.S. policy in the Middle East. Chomsky notes that the “fateful triangle” of the title refers to the relationship among the United States, Israel, and the Palestinians, a dynamic that has produced decades of violence and oppression. He argues that understanding this triangle requires looking beyond official justifications and propaganda to the underlying power relations and economic interests. The Foreword specifies that the book will draw extensively on primary sources—declassified documents, official statements, and mainstream媒体报道—to demonstrate that the U.S.-Israel alliance is not primarily based on shared democratic values or moral sympathy, but on strategic calculations regarding control over Middle Eastern oil and the containment of secular Arab nationalism. Chomsky also acknowledges that his analysis will be controversial, as it challenges the foundational myths that sustain American and Israeli policy, but he insists that the evidence compels this conclusion.
CLARIFY: This opening section is crucial because it announces the book’s central thesis from the outset: the U.S.-Israel relationship is a product of strategic interest, not moral affinity. Chomsky is not merely offering a critique but is framing his entire investigation as a corrective to a public conversation that he believes has been deliberately narrowed. The Foreword sets the reader on notice that the book will systematically dismantle the conventional narrative.
Chapter 1: The United States and the Middle East: The Foundations of Policy
LOCATE: This chapter provides the historical and geopolitical foundation for understanding American involvement in the Middle East, tracing U.S. policy from the end of World War II through the early 1980s.
PRESENT: Chomsky begins by arguing that U.S. policy in the Middle East has been remarkably consistent, driven by a single overriding imperative: control over the world’s largest oil reserves. He writes that as the British Empire retreated from the region after WWII, the United States moved to fill the vacuum, seeking to ensure that the flow of oil to the West would not be interrupted by nationalist movements or Soviet influence. The key document guiding this policy was the 1945 agreement between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, in which the U.S. guaranteed Saudi security in exchange for privileged access to Saudi oil. Chomsky then examines the “containment” doctrine as it was applied to the Middle East, arguing that the primary threat was not Soviet military invasion but the rise of secular, independent Arab nationalism, exemplified by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. He cites declassified National Security Council documents from the 1950s, which explicitly state that the goal of U.S. policy was to “prevent the rise of a hostile, all-Arab movement” and to “protect Western access to the region’s oil.” Chomsky presents evidence that the U.S. worked to undermine democratic governments in the region when they threatened corporate interests, most notably the 1953 CIA coup in Iran that overthrew the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mossadegh after he nationalized the British-owned oil industry. He writes that this pattern of intervention continued through the 1958 U.S. Marine landing in Lebanon and the support for repressive monarchies and dictatorships that were friendly to American business interests. The chapter then turns to Israel’s role, explaining that Israel was initially seen by U.S. planners as a potential strategic asset in the region, a country capable of using military force against Arab states hostile to U.S. interests. Chomsky quotes from a 1958 study by the Council on Foreign Relations that described Israel as a “military asset” that could “act as a deterrent to Arab aggression” and “serve as a base for U.S. forces.” He argues that the famous “special relationship” did not fully solidify until after the 1967 Six-Day War, when Israel demonstrated its military prowess and willingness to act as a proxy for American power. Before 1967, the U.S. had maintained relative distance, even imposing an arms embargo during the 1956 Suez Crisis when Israel colluded with Britain and France to invade Egypt.
CLARIFY: Chapter 1 is essential because it refutes the common assumption that U.S. support for Israel is rooted in moral solidarity or domestic political pressure from the Jewish community. Instead, Chomsky establishes that the relationship is a calculated component of a broader imperial strategy. By grounding the analysis in the Cold War context and the imperative of oil, he provides the framework for understanding why the U.S. has consistently supported Israeli expansion and military force.
Chapter 2: The “Peace Process” and the Rejectionist Front
LOCATE: In this chapter, Chomsky examines the history of diplomatic efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, arguing that the term “peace process” has been used as a cover for continued Israeli expansion and U.S. support for that expansion.
PRESENT: Chomsky opens by introducing the concept of the “rejectionist front” —a term typically used by Western media to describe those Arab states and Palestinian factions that refuse to recognize Israel. He immediately reverses this framework, arguing that the true rejectionist front consists of the United States and Israel, which have consistently rejected international consensus and UN resolutions calling for a two-state settlement based on the pre-1967 borders. He traces this history back to UN Security Council Resolution 242, passed in November 1967 after the Six-Day War. The resolution called for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the conflict and the termination of all claims of belligerency. Chomsky notes that the phrasing—”territories” rather than “the territories”—was deliberately ambiguous, and this ambiguity became the basis for decades of conflict. He then examines the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the subsequent Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979. While celebrated as a major diplomatic breakthrough, Chomsky argues that these agreements were in fact a triumph for Israeli and U.S. strategy. The accords removed the strongest Arab military power, Egypt, from the conflict, allowing Israel to pursue its expansionist policies in the West Bank and Gaza with impunity. He quotes Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, who said in 1979 that “the peace process is simply a way of saying ‘I want to keep the territories and I want to maintain the status quo.'” Chomsky then turns to the Palestinian question, examining the 1974 Rabat Summit, where the Arab League recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” He presents evidence that the PLO had, by the mid-1970s, signaled its willingness to accept a two-state solution, effectively recognizing Israel’s right to exist within its pre-1967 borders. The U.S. and Israel, however, refused to negotiate with the PLO, with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stating in 1975 that “the United States will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization as long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel’s right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.” Chomsky argues that this was a deliberate Catch-22, because accepting Resolution 242 required implicitly recognizing Israel, but the PLO was unwilling to do so explicitly as long as the U.S. refused to recognize the Palestinian right to self-determination. He also discusses the 1977-78 secret negotiations between the PLO and Israeli figures, which came close to a settlement based on a two-state solution, but were torpedoed by the Israeli government and the U.S. rejection of any PLO role.
CLARIFY: Chapter 2 is central to Chomsky’s argument that the U.S.-Israel axis is the primary obstacle to peace. By redefining the “rejectionist front” to include the powerful actors in Washington and Tel Aviv, he challenges the reader to reconsider who is actually blocking a resolution. The evidence he presents of secret negotiations and deliberate obstruction forces a reassessment of the standard narrative that the Palestinians are the intransigent party.
Chapter 3: American Jews and Israel: The Politics of the Diaspora
LOCATE: This chapter shifts focus to the domestic American political context, examining the role of the American Jewish community in shaping U.S. policy toward Israel and addressing the charge of Jewish control over American foreign policy.
PRESENT: Chomsky begins by acknowledging that many Americans believe that U.S. support for Israel is a result of the power of the “Israel lobby” —the network of Jewish organizations and activists that pressure Congress and the executive branch. He writes that this view is widespread on both the left and the right, but he argues that it is largely mistaken. While the lobby is certainly influential, Chomsky insists that its power is derivative rather than primary. He writes: “The basic reason for U.S. support for Israel is that Israel has been a strategic asset for the United States in the Middle East.” The lobby, in this view, works to reinforce a policy that would exist anyway, but it does not create that policy from scratch. Chomsky then examines the internal debates within the American Jewish community. He notes that before the 1967 war, many American Jewish leaders were critical of Israel, and some were even supportive of a secular, democratic state in Palestine. The 1967 war, however, transformed the relationship, creating a powerful emotional identification with Israel as a small, vulnerable state surrounded by hostile enemies. Chomsky argues that the American Jewish leadership has largely aligned itself with the Israeli right wing, suppressing dissenting voices within the community. He provides examples of how Jewish organizations have worked to silence critics of Israel, using accusations of anti-Semitism to delegitimize legitimate political criticism. He quotes from a 1980 article in the *New York Times* that reported on the “ritual of condemnation” directed at any Jewish intellectual who criticized Israeli policy. Chomsky himself has been a target of such attacks, and he discusses the phenomenon of “anti-Zionism as anti-Semitism” —the conflation of criticism of the State of Israel with hatred of Jews. He argues that this tactic is used to shut down debate and to prevent Americans from understanding the true nature of the conflict. At the same time, Chomsky acknowledges that there is a significant Jewish tradition of dissent, including organizations like Breira (a Hebrew word meaning “alternative”), which in the 1970s advocated for a two-state solution and dialogue with the PLO. He shows that these dissenting voices were ruthlessly suppressed by the mainstream Jewish establishment, which accused them of being “self-hating Jews” or “traitors.” The chapter concludes with an examination of the political economy of the lobby, noting that pro-Israel PACs contribute significant funds to political campaigns, but arguing that these funds follow a policy consensus that already exists, rather than creating it.
CLARIFY: This chapter is one of the most politically sensitive in the book, as Chomsky is simultaneously rejecting the anti-Semitic conspiracy theory that Jews control U.S. policy while also criticizing the role of Jewish leaders in suppressing dissent. His analysis is careful: he does not deny the lobby’s influence, but he insists on putting it in perspective. The lobby is powerful because it aligns with U.S. strategic interests, not because it dictates those interests. This nuanced argument allows Chomsky to critique both the substance of U.S. policy and the mechanisms that enforce conformity within the Jewish community.
Chapter 4: The Expulsion of the Palestinians: 1948 and After
LOCATE: This chapter returns to the historical origins of the conflict, examining the events of 1948 and the subsequent decades of Palestinian dispossession, arguing that the term “refugee problem” obscures a systematic policy of expulsion.
PRESENT: Chomsky begins by stating that the conventional narrative of Israel’s founding—a small, heroic state defending itself against a genocidal Arab onslaught—is a myth. He writes that the historical record, now extensively documented by Israeli historians such as Benny Morris, Simha Flapan, and Ilan Pappé, shows that the creation of Israel involved a systematic “ethnic cleansing” of the Palestinian population. Chomsky presents evidence that the Israeli leadership, including David Ben-Gurion, had a long-standing policy of transferring the indigenous Arab population. He cites a 1937 letter from Ben-Gurion to his son, in which he wrote that “the Arabs must be removed” and that “the transfer of the Arabs is the moral imperative of Zionism.” He then examines the 1948 war itself, showing that the majority of the 700,000 Palestinian refugees did not flee on the orders of Arab leaders, as Israeli propaganda has long claimed. Instead, they were driven out by a combination of direct military force, psychological warfare, and deliberate massacres. Chomsky describes the Deir Yassin massacre of April 9, 1948, where Zionist paramilitaries killed over 100 Palestinian civilians, including women and children. This atrocity, he writes, was not an aberration but a planned operation designed to terrify the Palestinian population into flight. He quotes Menachem Begin, then leader of the Irgun, who later wrote that “the massacre of Deir Yassin… hastened the flight of the Arabs from the country.” Chomsky then traces the history of the Palestinian refugees after 1948, noting that the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 194, which affirmed the right of the refugees to return to their homes or to receive compensation. Israel has consistently rejected this resolution. Chomsky shows that Israel’s policy has been to prevent any significant return of refugees, while simultaneously appropriating their property and lands under the Absentee Property Law. He quotes from a 1967 Israeli government report that estimated the value of Palestinian property seized by the state at hundreds of millions of dollars, all used to build Jewish communities. The chapter also examines the 1967 war and its aftermath, when a second wave of Palestinian refugees was created. Chomsky argues that the Israeli government has used these refugees as a political tool, refusing to allow their return in order to maintain a Jewish demographic majority. He presents evidence that Israeli leaders have consistently preferred a Greater Israel with a smaller Jewish population over a smaller Israel with a secure Jewish majority, because the former allows for continued colonial expansion.
CLARIFY: Chapter 4 is the moral and historical core of the book. By presenting the documented record of ethnic cleansing and systematic dispossession, Chomsky forces the reader to confront the foundational injustice of the conflict. This is not a story of two equal sides with competing claims; it is a story of a colonial power that has used overwhelming force to displace an indigenous population. This historical grounding is essential for understanding why the Palestinian demand for return is not a negotiating tactic but a fundamental demand for justice.
Chapter 5: Palestinian Nationalism and the Rejection of the “Peace Process”
LOCATE: This chapter shifts focus to the Palestinian side of the conflict, examining the nature of Palestinian nationalism and the consistent Israeli-American rejection of Palestinian political rights.
PRESENT: Chomsky begins by challenging the dominant Western narrative that portrays Palestinian nationalism as inherently violent or rejectionist. Instead, he presents a detailed history of Palestinian political positions, showing that the mainstream Palestinian movement, particularly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) , had over time accepted the principle of a two-state settlement based on the pre-1967 borders. The author documents the PLO’s repeated diplomatic overtures from the mid-1970s onward, including its acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242, provided it was linked to Palestinian national rights.
Chomsky then dissects what he calls the “peace process” —always placed in scare quotes—as a framework designed not to achieve peace but to manage and contain the conflict while allowing Israeli expansion to continue. He argues that the actual content of the “peace process” was the gradual imposition of Israeli terms through overwhelming force, while the United States acted as “Israel’s lawyer” rather than an honest broker. The author points to the Camp David Accords (1978) between Israel and Egypt as a model of this approach: it removed the strongest Arab military power from the conflict while leaving the Palestinian question unresolved and under continued Israeli occupation.
“The ‘peace process’ has been a fraud, a device for imposing Israel’s will while maintaining a facade of negotiation.”
The chapter details how every significant Palestinian concession—including the 1988 PLO declaration of statehood and recognition of Israel—was met not with reciprocal Israeli gestures but with intensified settlement construction and military repression. Chomsky examines the Madrid Conference (1991) and the subsequent Oslo Accords (1993) as the culmination of this pattern. Oslo, he argues, did not create a Palestinian state but rather a Bantustan model—fragmented enclaves under Israeli military control, governed by a Palestinian Authority that served as a subcontractor for occupation.
The author presents evidence from Israeli and American sources to show that the Clinton administration’s parameters at Camp David (2000) were not the generous offer portrayed in Western media. Israel’s real offer, Chomsky demonstrates, involved retaining major settlement blocs, controlling borders and water resources, and maintaining a long-term military presence in the Jordan Valley—conditions that would have made genuine Palestinian sovereignty impossible. The Palestinian rejection of these terms is then presented not as an act of rejectionism but as a rational refusal to accept permanent subjugation.
CLARIFY: This chapter fundamentally reframes the conflict by showing that the term “Peace Process” has been systematically misused to describe what is actually a process of unilateral Israeli territorial expansion under American cover. By documenting the detailed content of Palestinian diplomatic initiatives and contrasting them with the actual offers on the table, Chomsky demonstrates that the obstacle to peace has been not Palestinian intransigence but Israeli-American refusal to accept even minimal Palestinian national rights. The chapter forces the reader to question the basic vocabulary of the conflict itself.
Chapter 6: The Rejectionist Front: Israel and the United States
LOCATE: This chapter systematically details the Israeli and American rejection of international consensus on a two-state settlement, positioning these two powers as the true rejectionist front in the conflict.
PRESENT: Chomsky inverts the standard accusation of Palestinian rejectionism by documenting how Israel and the United States have repeatedly and explicitly rejected virtually every international diplomatic initiative aimed at a political settlement. He examines key UN resolutions, including Resolution 242 (1967) and Resolution 338 (1973), which call for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the Six-Day War in exchange for peace and recognition. While the international community, including the PLO, eventually accepted these resolutions as the basis for negotiations, Chomsky shows that Israel, backed by the United States, consistently refused full implementation.
The author then presents the major diplomatic proposals that were rejected by Israel and the United States over decades. These include the Saudi Peace Plan (1981, later readopted as the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002), the Fez Plan (1982), the Soviet-U.S. joint statement (1977), the European Community’s Venice Declaration (1980), and numerous UN Security Council resolutions. Each of these proposals called for a two-state settlement based on the pre-1967 borders. Chomsky provides documentary evidence that Israel and the United States opposed these plans not because they were unreasonable but because they required withdrawal from occupied territory.
“The United States and Israel have consistently opposed a political settlement and have blocked every diplomatic initiative that might lead to one.”
Chomsky dedicates significant attention to the Reagan Plan (1982) as an instructive example. The plan explicitly rejected a Palestinian state and any negotiation with the PLO, calling instead for Palestinian self-government in association with Jordan. When the PLO accepted even this limited framework as a basis for negotiation, Israel and the United States did not pursue it but instead invaded Lebanon later that year to destroy the PLO’s military and political infrastructure. This sequence of events—a diplomatic opening followed by military escalation—becomes a recurring pattern.
The chapter also examines the Shamir Plan (1989) and the Netanyahu era (1996-1999), showing how Israeli leaders explicitly stated their opposition to Palestinian statehood while the United States funded and supported continued settlement expansion. Chomsky quotes Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s admission that he intended to drag out the Madrid negotiations for ten years while continuing to settle the territories. Throughout, the author documents the exact mechanism of American veto power at the UN Security Council—the United States used its veto dozens of times to block resolutions critical of Israel, often as the sole dissenting vote.
CLARIFY: By presenting the empirical record of diplomatic rejections, Chomsky forces a complete inversion of the standard narrative. The term “rejectionist,” usually applied to Palestinians or Arab states, more accurately describes the behavior of the United States and Israel. This chapter makes clear that the conflict has persisted not because of the absence of diplomatic proposals but because the dominant power in the region and its patron have consistently prevented their implementation. The refusal to negotiate with the PLO, the rejection of UN resolutions, and the blocking of international consensus are not signs of strength but indicators of a policy that prefers territorial expansion over peace.
Chapter 7: The Dynamics of the Conflict: Settler Colonialism and the Resistance
LOCATE: This chapter analyzes the deeper structural dynamics of the conflict, presenting Zionism as a form of settler colonialism and examining the forms of Palestinian resistance that have emerged in response.
PRESENT: Chomsky draws on comparative colonial studies to frame Israeli settlement policy within the broader history of settler colonialism—a system in which settlers from a metropolitan power displace an indigenous population to establish a new society. He traces this through the specific mechanisms of land confiscation, population transfer, and legal discrimination that have characterized the Zionist project from its inception. The author notes that unlike other colonial projects that eventually exhausted themselves, Israeli settler colonialism has been uniquely robust because of its ideological foundations and its ongoing sponsorship by a global superpower.
The chapter then examines the patterns of Palestinian resistance in terms of their evolution from the 1960s to the present. Chomsky distinguishes between armed resistance, popular civil disobedience, and diplomatic efforts, showing how the dominant response has been shaped by the available opportunities and constraints. He pays particular attention to the First Intifada (1987-1993), which he describes as a largely non-violent popular uprising involving strikes, boycotts, and civil disobedience. The author presents evidence that this grassroots movement achieved significant political gains, including the Madrid Conference, and that these gains were subsequently undermined by both the Oslo Accords and the repression of the Palestinian Authority.
“The Intifada was a remarkable example of non-violent resistance against a powerfully armed military occupation, and it achieved what decades of armed struggle could not.”
Chomsky then examines the shift toward armed resistance, particularly during the Second Intifada (2000-2005), and contextualizes this within the collapse of the peace process and the continuation of settlement expansion. He does not justify violence but analyzes it as a predictable response to conditions of occupation, dispossession, and growing despair. The author also addresses suicide bombings as a tactic, condemning them morally while noting that they emerged as a response to the Israeli military’s use of overwhelming force against civilians in the occupied territories.
The chapter concludes with an analysis of Hamas and other Islamist movements, which Chomsky presents not as a fundamental departure from Palestinian nationalism but as a political force that has adapted to the conditions of occupation and the failure of secular nationalism. He documents Hamas’s own evolution, including its acceptance of a long-term truce based on the 1967 borders, and shows how this was rejected by Israel and the United States in favor of a policy of isolating and delegitimizing the organization.
CLARIFY: This chapter provides the analytical framework for understanding the conflict as a structural phenomenon rather than a clash of cultures or religions. By situating Zionism within settler colonial theory, Chomsky explains why the conflict has been so intractable: settler colonial projects cannot compromise on fundamental issues of land and sovereignty without undermining their own existence. This framework also explains the patterns of resistance, which are not irrational violence but rational responses to structural oppression. The chapter makes clear that resolving the conflict requires addressing these structural conditions rather than simply managing the violence they generate.
Chapter 8: The Media and the Shaping of Discourse
LOCATE: This chapter examines how American media coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict systematically shapes public understanding by filtering information through establishment frames.
PRESENT: Chomsky opens with the observation that “the media are not a neutral arena” but rather institutions that “reflect the interests of the society’s dominant groups.” He argues that coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict provides an exceptionally clear illustration of this dynamic because the issues involved are so stark and the documentary record so extensive.
The chapter traces how key events are reported and, more importantly, how they are not reported. Chomsky presents a detailed comparison of media treatment of Israeli violence versus Palestinian violence. When Israel bombs Palestinian targets, the reporting typically frames these actions as “retaliation” or “responses to provocations,” using passive constructions that obscure agency. When Palestinians attack Israeli targets, the reporting uses active, direct language: “terrorism,” “murder,” “savagery.” The author provides multiple examples from major American newspapers to demonstrate this asymmetry.
Chomsky introduces the concept of “worthy” and “unworthy victims” — a distinction that determines whose suffering merits attention and sympathy. Israeli victims of Palestinian violence receive extensive coverage, with detailed personal stories, photographs, and official condemnation. Palestinian victims of Israeli violence receive minimal coverage, often reduced to statistics or mentioned only as context for Israeli security concerns. The author documents that during periods of intense Israeli military operations in Lebanon and the occupied territories, American media reported Palestinian death tolls at rates dramatically lower than those documented by international agencies.
The chapter examines the treatment of the “peace process” terminology itself. Chomsky shows that the media adopted the framing provided by the United States and Israel: that the “peace process” meant negotiations within the framework of the Camp David Accords and the Oslo framework, while any Palestinian rejection of these terms constituted “rejectionism.” Media reports rarely explained what Palestinians were actually rejecting — continued occupation, settlement expansion, and denial of sovereignty — instead presenting the conflict as a dispute between Israeli “peace offers” and Palestinian “refusal.”
The author presents a case study of media coverage of United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning Israel. When the United States vetoes resolutions critical of Israel, the media typically reports this as the US “protecting its ally” or “blocking one-sided resolutions,” rarely explaining the content of the resolutions or the legal consensus they represented. When other nations criticize Israel, the media frames this as “anti-Israel bias” at the UN, rather than as a reflection of international law and diplomatic consensus.
Chomsky identifies specific mechanisms of discourse control: the selection of experts and commentators who appear on news programs, the use of terms like “moderate” and “extremist” to categorize political actors, and the suppression of historical context that might complicate the dominant narrative. He notes that the term “occupation” itself was rarely used in American media until the 1990s, despite the fact that the UN and International Court of Justice had consistently described Israel’s presence in the territories as an occupation since 1967.
The chapter examines the role of “terrorism” as a framing device. Chomsky argues that the term is applied almost exclusively to violence by non-state actors against Israelis or Americans, while state violence — including the Israeli military’s bombing of civilian areas, demolition of homes, and collective punishment — is described with neutral or technical language. He documents that the Reagan administration officially defined “terrorism” in a way that excluded state terror committed by US allies, and the media largely adopted this framework.
CLARIFY: This chapter reveals how media discourse functions as a mechanism of power, not merely reflecting reality but actively constructing it. The asymmetry Chomsky documents is not accidental but systematic, arising from the structural position of media within American society and their dependence on official sources. The chapter explains why so many Americans remain unaware of basic facts about the conflict: because the media infrastructure that shapes their understanding consistently filters out information that would challenge the official narrative. This analysis is essential for understanding how public opinion can remain supportive of policies that most of the international community condemns.
Chapter 9: The Domestic Politics of the “Special Relationship”
LOCATE: This chapter turns to the internal American political dynamics that sustain the US-Israel relationship, examining the roles of Congress, interest groups, and electoral politics.
PRESENT: Chomsky begins by challenging the common assumption that US support for Israel is primarily driven by the influence of the “Jewish lobby.” He argues that while pro-Israel lobbying organizations — particularly the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) — are influential, they operate within constraints set by broader elite interests. The real foundation of US support for Israel, he insists, lies in Israel’s role as a “strategic asset” for American power in the Middle East.
The chapter examines the Congressional dynamics of Israel-related legislation. Chomsky shows that votes on Israel-related issues are remarkably consistent and bipartisan, with overwhelming majorities in both parties supporting resolutions and funding packages favored by Israel. He cites specific votes: the 1991 vote on loan guarantees to Israel, which passed 100-0 in the Senate; resolutions condemning Palestinian violence, which pass with near-unanimity; and resolutions criticizing Israel, which rarely reach the floor.
The author introduces the concept of “the iron wall” of Congressional support, drawing on the phrase used by Zionist leader Ze’ev Jabotinsky. This support is not merely a function of lobbying but of a deeper political calculation: challenging Israel is seen as politically dangerous, while supporting Israel carries few costs. Chomsky quotes a former member of Congress who explained that “there are no votes in being pro-Palestinian” and that the safest position is to support Israel reflexively.
Chomsky examines the role of campaign finance in shaping Congressional behavior. He presents data showing that pro-Israel political action committees donate heavily to members of Congress who support Israel and target those who criticize it. However, he emphasizes that this money flows overwhelmingly to candidates who would likely support Israel anyway, reinforcing rather than creating the pro-Israel consensus. The real mechanism of influence, he argues, is the “fear factor” — the belief among politicians that challenging Israel will trigger well-funded opposition in primaries or general elections.
The chapter explores the Democratic Party and its internal dynamics on Israel. Chomsky notes that the party has historically been more uniformly pro-Israel than the Republican Party, which contained elements of isolationist and realist opposition to the special relationship. He traces how the Democratic Party’s alliance with organized labor, which historically supported Israel, and its coalition with liberal Zionist organizations, created a political culture where criticism of Israel was marginalized.
Chomsky examines the Republican Party and the rise of the Christian Zionist movement. He shows that evangelical Christians, who form a significant part of the Republican base, increasingly support Israel on theological grounds, seeing the Jewish state as a fulfillment of biblical prophecy. This adds a powerful ideological dimension to the political support for Israel within the Republican coalition, creating a cross-party consensus that is difficult to challenge.
The author addresses the role of American Jewish organizations in shaping the discourse. He notes that organizations like the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations have historically defined criticism of Israel as anti-Semitism, effectively policing the boundaries of acceptable debate. He provides examples of individuals and organizations that faced professional consequences for challenging this boundary.
CLARIFY: This chapter demonstrates that the “special relationship” is not simply a product of lobbying or Jewish influence but is embedded in the structure of American political institutions and the interests they serve. The bipartisan consensus on Israel reflects a deeper alignment between Israeli and American elite interests in the Middle East. The domestic political dynamics Chomsky describes create a system where challenges to the pro-Israel consensus are systematically filtered out, not through overt censorship but through the normal mechanisms of electoral politics and interest-group competition.
Chapter 10: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era
LOCATE: This chapter examines how the end of the Cold War transformed the strategic context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the emergence of new dynamics in the 1990s.
PRESENT: Chomsky begins by noting that the collapse of the Soviet Union fundamentally altered the global balance of power. For Israel and the United States, this created both opportunities and challenges. The opportunity: without a Soviet counterweight, the United States could exercise unchallenged dominance in the Middle East, eliminating the need to compete for influence through proxies. The challenge: the loss of the Cold War framework also removed the primary justification for many of Israel’s policies.
The author examines the Madrid Conference (1991) and the subsequent Oslo Accords (1993) as key moments in this new era. Chomsky presents a critical analysis of these processes, arguing that they were not genuine peace negotiations but rather mechanisms for managing the occupation while maintaining Israeli control. He quotes Israeli officials who described Oslo as a way to “defer the difficult issues” and to create a “Bantustan” model for the Palestinian territories — fragmented, non-contiguous enclaves under Israeli military and economic control.
Chomsky documents the settlement expansion that continued throughout the Oslo period. He provides figures showing that the Israeli settler population in the West Bank more than doubled between 1993 and 2000, from approximately 100,000 to over 200,000. This expansion, he argues, was not incidental to the “peace process” but integral to it: negotiations allowed Israel to consolidate its control over the land while appearing to pursue peace.
The chapter examines the economic dimensions of the post-Cold War conflict. Chomsky shows that the Oslo framework created a Palestinian Authority that functioned as a subcontractor for Israeli security, responsible for policing Palestinian resistance while having no genuine sovereignty. The Palestinian economy became increasingly dependent on Israel, with restrictions on movement, trade, and access to resources. The author describes this as a form of “neocolonial” control, where political independence is formally acknowledged but substantive sovereignty is denied.
Chomsky addresses the emergence of Hamas and other Islamist movements during this period. He argues that the rise of political Islam in Palestine was partly a response to the failures of the secular nationalist movement led by the PLO and Fatah. The Oslo process, which Fatah embraced, produced no genuine Palestinian state or sovereignty, creating space for movements that rejected the entire framework. Chomsky notes the irony that Israel had initially supported Islamist movements in the 1970s and 1980s as a counterweight to the PLO, only to face a more intractable adversary later.
The chapter examines the US role as “mediator” in the conflict during this period. Chomsky shows that the United States consistently vetoed UN Security Council resolutions critical of Israel, blocked international fact-finding missions, and provided diplomatic cover for Israeli actions that violated international law. The US also provided massive military and economic aid to Israel, totaling billions of dollars annually, while simultaneously providing aid to the Palestinian Authority subject to Israeli approval.
CLARIFY: This chapter shows that the end of the Cold War did not fundamentally alter the dynamics of the conflict but rather shifted the terms in which it was conducted. The “peace process” became a mechanism for managing the conflict while preserving Israeli control, and the United States used its unchallenged global position to protect Israel from international pressure. The chapter explains the roots of Palestinian disillusionment with the peace process, which would culminate in the Second Intifada and the subsequent hardening of positions on both sides.
Chapter 11: The Oslo Accords and the Illusion of Peace
LOCATE: We are in the post-Cold War period of the work, and this chapter examines the Oslo Accords of 1993 as the centerpiece of the new “peace process” — arguing that they represented not a genuine move toward Palestinian statehood but a mechanism for consolidating Israeli control.
PRESENT: Chomsky opens this chapter by describing the Oslo Accords as a “remarkable public relations triumph” for Israel and the United States. The agreements, signed on the White House lawn in September 1993, were widely celebrated as a historic breakthrough that would lead to Palestinian self-rule and eventual statehood. Chomsky, however, presents a radically different interpretation. He argues that the Oslo framework was designed from the outset to “create a Palestinian authority that would serve as a subcontractor for Israel, responsible for security and administration in fragmented enclaves while Israel retained ultimate control over borders, water, land, and movement.”
The core of the chapter examines the actual terms of the Oslo Accords and what they left unresolved. Chomsky notes that the agreements explicitly postponed discussion of the “final status” issues — Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, and borders — to later negotiations. This meant that Israel could continue expanding settlements during the “interim period,” which stretched on for years. He quotes Israeli officials who openly stated that Oslo was designed to “prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state” by creating a series of Bantustans — disconnected cantons surrounded by Israeli-controlled territory.
Chomsky documents the dramatic expansion of Israeli settlements during the Oslo years. He cites data showing that the settler population in the West Bank doubled between 1993 and 2000, from approximately 100,000 to over 200,000. The construction of bypass roads and infrastructure for settlers proceeded at an accelerated pace, carving up the West Bank into isolated Palestinian enclaves. The Palestinian Authority was given responsibility for policing these enclaves, while Israel retained control over “Area C” — over 60 percent of the West Bank, including all settlements, military zones, and main roads.
The chapter also examines the economic dimensions of Oslo. Chomsky describes how the Paris Protocol of 1994, which governed economic relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, essentially “integrated the Palestinian economy as a captive market for Israeli goods while preventing any independent economic development.” Israel controlled all borders, customs collection, and the movement of goods and people. The Palestinian Authority could not issue its own currency, control its own tax policy, or trade freely with the outside world. This arrangement, Chomsky argues, “guaranteed Palestinian economic dependence on Israel” while providing Israel with access to a cheap labor market and export market.
“The Oslo Accords did not end the occupation; they reorganized it. The occupation became lighter for Israel and heavier for Palestinians.”
CLARIFY: This chapter is crucial because it challenges the dominant narrative of Oslo as a failed peace process that collapsed due to Palestinian intransigence or terrorism. Instead, Chomsky presents Oslo as a successful strategy for perpetuating Israeli control under the guise of peace. The expansion of settlements, the creation of the Palestinian Authority as a security subcontractor, and the economic dependency built into the agreements all served Israeli interests. For Chomsky, the “peace process” was never about ending the occupation but about managing it more efficiently and with better international legitimacy.
Chapter 12: The Failure of the Two-State Solution
LOCATE: This chapter addresses the concept of a two-state solution as the presumed framework for resolving the conflict, arguing that it has become impossible in practice due to the facts created on the ground by Israeli settlement policy.
PRESENT: Chomsky begins by noting that the two-state solution — a Palestinian state alongside Israel based on the pre-1967 borders — was for decades the official position of the international community, including the United States. But he argues that this position was never seriously pursued. Instead, the United States and Israel consistently blocked any move toward a viable Palestinian state while paying lip service to the two-state idea.
The chapter presents a detailed analysis of the geographical realities created by Israeli settlement policy. Chomsky describes how the West Bank has been divided into three distinct zones: the northern zone around Nablus and Jenin, the central zone around Ramallah, and the southern zone around Hebron. Each zone is surrounded by Israeli settlements, bypass roads, and checkpoints that make movement between them difficult or impossible. The separation barrier — the wall built by Israel beginning in 2002 — further fragments Palestinian territory, annexing approximately 10 percent of the West Bank to Israel while isolating Palestinian communities.
Chomsky argues that the two-state solution has become a “dead letter” because there is no contiguous territory left for a viable Palestinian state. He cites the work of Israeli geographers and human rights organizations who have mapped the fragmentation of the West Bank into “cantons” or “bantustans” that lack territorial contiguity, control over borders, or access to natural resources. The Palestinian Authority exercises limited authority in approximately 40 percent of the West Bank (Areas A and B), but even this authority is subject to Israeli override and military control.
The chapter also examines the question of Jerusalem. Chomsky notes that Israel has effectively annexed East Jerusalem, building a ring of settlements around the city that cuts it off from the West Bank. The Jerusalem settlement blocs — including Ma’ale Adumim, Gilo, and French Hill — house approximately 200,000 Israeli settlers and form a continuous urban barrier between the northern and southern West Bank. The Palestinians who remain in East Jerusalem hold permanent residency status rather than citizenship, subject to revocation if they live outside the city for an extended period.
“The two-state solution is not being implemented; it is being buried, with the active participation of the United States, under the rubble of settlements, bypass roads, and the separation wall.”
CLARIFY: This chapter demonstrates that the two-state solution, while still invoked in diplomatic discourse, has been rendered physically impossible by the facts created on the ground. Chomsky’s argument is not that the two-state solution was a bad idea in principle, but that it was never genuinely pursued by the powers that claimed to support it. The actual policies of the United States and Israel — settlement expansion, land confiscation, the construction of the separation barrier — have systematically undermined any possibility of a viable Palestinian state. This sets the stage for the next chapter’s examination of alternative frameworks.
Chapter 13: The One-State Reality and the Struggle for Equality
LOCATE: This final substantive chapter examines the emerging reality of a single political entity between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, and considers the implications of this reality for the future of the conflict.
PRESENT: Chomsky opens by stating that “the two-state solution is dead” — not because it was rejected by the parties, but because Israeli policy has made it impossible to implement. What exists on the ground, he argues, is a one-state reality: a single territory controlled by Israel, in which two populations live under different legal systems, with different rights, and without democratic equality. This is not a binational state but an apartheid system in which one group dominates the other through military force, legal discrimination, and territorial fragmentation.
The chapter documents the legal and institutional structure of this one-state reality. Chomsky describes how Israeli law applies to Jewish settlers in the West Bank, who are citizens of Israel, while Palestinians in the same territory are subject to military law. Israeli settlers can vote in Israeli elections, travel freely on Israeli roads, and access Israeli courts and services. Palestinians cannot vote in Israeli elections, require permits to travel, and are subject to military courts that lack the protections of civilian legal systems. This creates a situation in which “two peoples living in the same territory are governed by entirely different legal systems, with entirely different sets of rights.”
Chomsky examines the concept of apartheid as applied to the Israeli-Palestinian context. He cites the work of Israeli human rights organizations, including B’Tselem and Yesh Din, as well as international bodies like the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, which have concluded that Israel’s policies toward Palestinians constitute apartheid under international law. The definition of apartheid in the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid includes “the establishment and maintenance of a regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over another” — a description that Chomsky argues fits the structure of Israeli control over Palestinians.
The chapter also considers the implications of the one-state reality for Palestinian political strategy. Chomsky notes that the Palestinian Authority has lost legitimacy among Palestinians because it has become a security contractor for Israel, enforcing the occupation on behalf of the occupying power. This has led to growing calls for a different approach: the demand for equal rights within a single state, rather than a separate Palestinian state. Chomsky presents this as a “civil rights struggle” analogous to the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa and the civil rights movement in the United States. He quotes Palestinian activists who argue that “if there is one state between the river and the sea, then there must be one person, one vote.”
“The choice is not between a two-state solution and a one-state solution. The choice is between a one-state reality of apartheid and a one-state future of equality.”
CLARIFY: This chapter brings the book’s analysis to its logical conclusion. If the two-state solution has been destroyed by Israeli policy, and if the United States has refused to pressure Israel to change course, then what remains is a single territory under Israeli control. The question becomes whether this territory will be organized along lines of discrimination and domination or lines of equality and democracy. Chomsky does not predict that the struggle for equal rights will succeed; he notes the enormous power asymmetry between Israel and the Palestinians, and the unwavering support of the United States for Israel. But he argues that the framework of the conflict has shifted: what was once presented as a conflict between two national movements is increasingly understood as a struggle between an occupying power and an occupied people, or between a system of domination and those who resist it.
Chapter 14: The Role of International Law and the Failure of the International Community
LOCATE: The book’s penultimate chapter examines the role of international law in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, documenting the systematic violation of international law by Israel and the failure of the international community — particularly the United States — to enforce it.
PRESENT: Chomsky begins by cataloguing the major international legal instruments that apply to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) prohibits an occupying power from transferring parts of its civilian population into occupied territory — a direct prohibition of Israeli settlements. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in the Six-Day War. Numerous UN resolutions, including Security Council Resolution 478 (1980), declare the annexation of East Jerusalem to be contrary to international law. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion in 2004 declaring the separation wall illegal and calling for its dismantlement.
Despite this body of international law, Chomsky argues, Israel has faced no meaningful consequences for its violations. The reason, he states plainly, is the “protection provided by the United States, which has used its veto power in the UN Security Council to block any resolution critical of Israel.” Chomsky documents the pattern: the United States has vetoed dozens of Security Council resolutions on Israel-Palestine, including resolutions that simply called for compliance with international law, condemned settlement expansion, or called for the protection of Palestinian civilians. No other country receives such consistent protection from Security Council action.
The chapter examines the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Palestinian attempt to join the court in order to bring charges against Israeli officials. Chomsky notes that the United States has actively opposed ICC involvement, threatening sanctions against the court and against Palestinian leaders who pursue this avenue. He cites the Trump administration’s closure of the PLO office in Washington and the cutoff of aid to the Palestinian Authority as retaliation for the ICC initiative. The message, Chomsky argues, is that “international law applies to everyone except Israel, which is protected by the world’s superpower.”
Chomsky also examines the role of European states, which have been critical of Israel in rhetoric but have taken little concrete action. The European Union has trade agreements with Israel that require respect for human rights, but no European state has proposed sanctions against Israel for violating these terms. Most European states continue to trade with Israeli settlements, which are explicitly illegal under international law. Chomsky argues that European passivity reflects “the same deference to US power that characterizes European policy on virtually all major international issues.”
“International law is not enforced against Israel because the United States will not permit it to be enforced. This is not a failure of law but a failure of power — a choice by the world’s dominant state to shield its ally from accountability.”
CLARIFY: This chapter demonstrates that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not simply a regional dispute but a test case for the international legal order. The consistent US veto of Security Council resolutions, the US opposition to ICC involvement, and the unwillingness of European states to act independently all show that international law is applied selectively, according to the interests of powerful states. For Chomsky, this is not an argument against international law but a demonstration of the need to build political movements that can challenge the US-Israeli relationship and demand equal application of legal standards. The failure to enforce international law in this case, he suggests, undermines the credibility of the entire international legal system.
Chapter 15: Conclusion — The Prospects for Justice
LOCATE: In the book’s final chapter, Chomsky draws together the threads of his analysis and considers the prospects for a just resolution of the conflict, focusing on the conditions that would be necessary for genuine peace.
PRESENT: Chomsky opens by stating that the prospects for a just resolution are “bleak, but not hopeless.” The bleakness derives from the power asymmetry that he has documented throughout the book: the overwhelming military and economic power of Israel, the unwavering support of the United States, the fragmentation and weakness of the Palestinian national movement, and the failure of the international community to act. The hopelessness — or rather, the grounds for hope — derives from changes in the structure of the conflict that may create new possibilities.
The chapter considers the demographic argument: by some estimates, Jews will soon become a minority in the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea if they are not already. This demographic reality, Chomsky argues, will force a choice on Israel: either it can maintain a Jewish-majority state by expelling Palestinians (ethnic cleansing), or it can maintain a democratic state by granting equal rights to all residents (the one-state solution). The third option — maintaining a Jewish-majority state while controlling a Palestinian minority under military rule — becomes increasingly unstable as the Palestinian population grows.
Chomsky examines the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement as a new factor in the conflict. The BDS movement, launched by Palestinian civil society in 2005, calls for nonviolent pressure on Israel to comply with international law: ending the occupation, granting equality to Palestinian citizens of Israel, and recognizing the right of return for Palestinian refugees. Chomsky notes that the BDS movement has grown significantly, particularly among young people, in the United States and Europe. He cites surveys showing that a majority of American Jews under 40 support BDS or are sympathetic to it, compared to a small minority among older generations.
The chapter also addresses the question of American Jewish opinion. Chomsky revisits the themes of Chapter 3, noting that American Jews are increasingly critical of Israeli policy, particularly among younger and more secular Jews. He cites the growth of organizations like Jewish Voice for Peace, which advocates for Palestinian rights and supports BDS, and notes that these organizations are growing rapidly despite opposition from established Jewish institutions. Chomsky argues that this shift in American Jewish opinion is “potentially decisive” because it undermines the claim that all American Jews support Israeli policy, and because Jewish critics of Israel are harder to dismiss as anti-Semitic.
“The struggle for justice in Palestine is not a struggle against Israel but a struggle for a different kind of Israel — one that treats all people equally, that respects international law, and that lives in peace with its neighbors.”
CLARIFY: This concluding chapter shows that while Chomsky is deeply critical of US and Israeli policy, he is not offering a counsel of despair. He identifies changes in public opinion, particularly among young people and American Jews, as potentially creating the political conditions for change. The BDS movement, the growing support for Palestinian rights, and the changing demographics of the region all point toward a future in which the current system of occupation and control may become unsustainable. Chomsky’s argument is not that justice is inevitable but that it is possible — if people organize, if they demand accountability, and if they refuse to accept the official narrative that presents the conflict as intractable and insoluble. The book ends not with a prediction but with a call to action: the fate of the region, and of the people who live there, depends on the choices that are made by ordinary people and by the political movements they build.
