About the Work
This book provides a comprehensive historical analysis of the Granger movement, a significant agrarian reform movement that emerged in the United States during the late nineteenth century. The work examines the economic, political, and social conditions that gave rise to the movement, traces its organizational development, and evaluates its impact on railway legislation, business cooperation, and the broader landscape of American agriculture and politics.
The book is structured as a scholarly historical study, organized into nine chapters that progress from the fundamental conditions that precipitated the movement, through its organizational phase, its political activities, its legislative achievements in railway regulation, its experiments in business cooperation, and its social and educational features, before concluding with an assessment of the movement’s overall significance. The author, writing in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, draws upon extensive documentary evidence including legislative records, organizational proceedings, contemporary newspaper accounts, and statistical data to construct a detailed narrative of the movement’s rise, peak, and decline.
The work is notable for its systematic approach to its subject, combining quantitative analysis of agricultural production and prices with qualitative examination of political platforms, legislative debates, and organizational records. The author’s treatment is generally sympathetic to the farmers’ grievances while maintaining a critical perspective on the movement’s methods and achievements. The book represents an important contribution to the historiography of American agrarian protest, offering both a detailed account of the Granger movement specifically and broader insights into the challenges facing American agriculture during a period of rapid economic transformation.
Context
The Granger movement emerged during a period of profound economic and social change in the United States, particularly in the decades immediately following the Civil War. The book situates the movement within the context of the rapid westward expansion of agriculture, the dramatic growth of railroad networks, and the financial and monetary upheavals that characterized the post-war period.
The economic context was shaped by several interrelated factors. The Civil War had brought about significant currency inflation, and the subsequent period witnessed painful adjustments as the nation moved toward resumption of specie payments. Farmers who had contracted debts in depreciated currency found themselves obligated to repay those debts with money that had appreciated substantially in value, creating a serious financial burden. The panic of 1873 exacerbated these difficulties, bringing about stagnant business conditions, scarce money, and depressed prices for agricultural products.
The expansion of agricultural production during this period was remarkable. The homestead law of 1862, the timber-culture act of 1873, and extensive land grants to railroads and states made land readily accessible to settlers. Disbanded soldiers and immigrants swelled the agricultural population, while technological advances in agricultural machinery enabled cultivation on an unprecedented scale, including the emergence of large “bonanza farms.” The book provides statistical tables showing dramatic increases in acreage and production of corn, wheat, and cotton from 1866 to 1880, accompanied by declining prices that left farmers with little or no increase in revenue despite their greater output.
The political context was equally significant. The book notes that farmers lost political power after the Civil War, with only seven percent of the Forty-third Congress being farmers while forty-seven percent of the working population was engaged in farming. The period was marked by corruption, including the Credit Mobilier scandal and corrupt reconstruction governments. Farmers felt that the transportation problem, patent rights, currency, banking, and tariff policies were all manipulated against their interests by political parties that ignored them.
Socially and intellectually, farmers found themselves at a disadvantage relative to urban dwellers. They lacked technical education, as agricultural colleges were still in their infancy and the agricultural press was weak. Farmers were described as ignorant of business usages and economic principles, and their social position had lowered relative to that of city residents. The book emphasizes that farmers lacked the organization that other classes possessed, and it was this absence of collective action that the Granger movement sought to address.
Structure of the Book
The book is organized into nine chapters that trace the Granger movement from its origins through its various manifestations and ultimate decline. The structure follows a logical progression from background conditions through organizational development, political activity, legislative achievements, business experiments, and social features, concluding with an assessment of the movement’s significance.
Chapter I, “Fundamental Conditions,” establishes the economic, political, and social context that gave rise to the Granger movement. This chapter examines the financial and currency problems facing farmers, the burdens of tariff and taxation policies, the expansion of agricultural production and its effect on prices, the farmers’ loss of political power, and their social and intellectual disadvantages. It also introduces the origin of the Patrons of Husbandry, the formal name of the Grange, describing its founding in 1867 by Oliver Hudson Kelley and his associates.
Chapter II, “Organization,” traces the early development of the Grange from its initial struggles to establish permanent local chapters through its rapid growth and subsequent decline. The chapter details Kelley’s early organizing efforts, the establishment of the first permanent granges in various states, the development of organizing methods, and the statistical growth of the order. It also examines the causes of the Grange’s decline after its peak in the mid-1870s, including excessive growth, lax organization, political involvement, and failed business ventures. The chapter concludes with a discussion of other agricultural organizations that existed alongside the Grange, including farmers’ clubs and the Illinois State Farmers’ Association.
Chapters III through VI are devoted to the Granger movement as a political force and its railway legislation. Chapter III examines the state Anti-Monopoly and Reform parties that emerged in 1873 in Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, their platforms, election results, and the legislative outcomes that followed. Chapters IV, V, and VI provide detailed examinations of railway legislation in various states, beginning with Illinois and proceeding through Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin, Kansas, Nebraska, the Pacific Coast states, and eastern states. These chapters analyze the specific provisions of railway laws, the legal challenges they faced, the campaigns for their repeal, and their ultimate effects.
Chapter VII, “Business Cooperation,” examines the Grange’s experiments in cooperative buying and selling, including local agencies, county and district agencies, state agencies, cooperative stores, and manufacturing ventures. The chapter provides detailed accounts of the cooperative programs in various states, their successes and failures, and the factors that contributed to their outcomes.
Chapter VIII, “Social and Educational Features,” covers the non-economic aspects of the Grange, including its social functions and educational activities. Chapter IX, “Conclusion,” provides the author’s overall assessment of the Granger movement’s significance and legacy.
Detailed Section-by-Section Summary
The Economic and Social Conditions Preceding the Granger Movement
The years following the Civil War brought a cascade of economic hardships that weighed heavily on American farmers. The wartime inflation of the currency created a period of financial instability, marked by high interest rates and a damaging “leakage” of wealth. Farmers sold their surplus crops abroad in exchange for gold, but were forced to purchase their supplies with depreciated paper currency. This disparity was a constant source of loss. The most serious injury, however, came from the gradual rise in the currency’s value between 1865 and the resumption of specie payments in 1879. Debts that had been contracted in cheap, depreciated dollars now had to be repaid with money that was worth fifteen to twenty percent more, effectively increasing the burden of every mortgage and loan. The panic of 1873 compounded these troubles, bringing stagnant business, scarce money, and ruinously low prices to the agricultural sector.
The nation’s fiscal policies seemed designed to benefit everyone but the farmer. The high protective tariff, originally adopted during the war for revenue, was maintained for the benefit of manufacturers. This system bore down on farmers with particular severity, as they were forced to sell their unprotected surplus crops in a competitive world market while buying their goods at prices artificially enhanced by the tariff. Taxation, too, was a source of bitter complaint. National taxation was indirect, derived from articles of common consumption like sugar, molasses, and woolen goods, which placed a disproportionate burden on people of small means. At the state and local level, farmers felt they were being singled out. Their real property was assessed at full value, while urban personal property and the property of corporations often escaped taxation entirely. They also protested the assessment of uncultivated land and growing crops, which they saw as an unfair penalty on their productivity.
The primary cause of unremunerative agriculture, however, was the great extension of agricultural operations after the war, which had all the features of a speculative boom. Railroads expanded rapidly across the West, and population followed in their wake. The homestead law of 1862, the timber-culture act of 1873, and generous land grants to states and railroads made land accessible to a flood of settlers. This surplus industrial population came from the disbanded armies and a steady stream of immigration. Technical advances in agricultural machinery enabled large-scale cultivation, including the rise of “bonanza farms,” which injured small farmers who could not compete with their economies of scale. Statistics for corn, wheat, and cotton from 1866 to 1880 told a stark story: while acreage and production increased dramatically, prices declined just as steeply, leaving farmers with little or no more revenue for their vastly increased labor.
The farmer’s political power had also eroded. In the Forty-third Congress, only seven percent of members were farmers, even though forty-seven percent of the working population was engaged in farming. Farmers felt their interests were ignored by the political parties, which they saw as manipulating the transportation problem, patent rights, currency, banking, and the tariff against them. This was a period of notorious corruption, marked by the Credit Mobilier scandal and corrupt reconstruction governments, which further alienated farmers from the political process. Their social position had also lowered relative to city dwellers. They lacked technical education, as agricultural colleges were in their infancy and the agricultural press was weak. Ignorant of business usages and economic principles, farmers were at a distinct disadvantage in the marketplace. The text concludes that farmers lacked the organization that other classes possessed. The idea of association appealed to them not only for social intercourse and knowledge, but also for political power and as a counter-organization against the merchants and manufacturers who seemed to control their economic destiny.
The Origin of the Patrons of Husbandry
It was out of this ferment of discontent that the Patrons of Husbandry, or Grange, was organized in 1867. Its conception came from Oliver Hudson Kelley, a government clerk. After a trip through the South, he concluded that a national secret order of farmers was needed to address their common grievances. He discussed the idea with his niece, Miss Carrie Hall, who suggested admitting women to the order. Kelley, along with W. M. Ireland, planned a ritual, and later enlisted William Saunders to help. On December 4, 1867, seven “founders” met and constituted themselves the National Grange. The order was structured with seven degrees: four for subordinate granges (Laborer, Cultivator, Harvester, and Husbandman for men; Maid, Shepherdess, Gleaner, and Matron for women), one for state granges (Pomona), and two for the National Grange (Flora).
Kelley’s Early Organizing Efforts
Kelley’s initial efforts to spread the order were met with difficulty. During a trip to Minnesota, he sold four dispensations for subordinate granges at fifteen dollars each, but only one became permanent. With A. S. Moss of Fredonia, New York, he established the first regular, active, permanent grange. Dispensations for Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and Columbus, Ohio, were paid for but produced nothing, and a Chicago grange gathered by H. D. Emery, editor of the Prairie Farmer, failed to develop. Kelley, often financially embarrassed, had to borrow money to reach his home at Itasca, Minnesota. The author notes that Kelley erred in working in large cities rather than among farmers; success came only after he returned to his Minnesota farm. Meanwhile, the Washington “National Grange” members lost interest, leaving Kelley to his own devices except for requests for money to pay printing bills. He maintained the illusion of a national organization by circulating founders’ photographs and grandiloquent circulars.
First Permanent Granges and State Organizations
The first permanent granges began to take root in 1868. Correspondence with A. Failor of Newton, Iowa, produced that state’s first grange, and Kelley publicized the order through agricultural papers like the Prairie Farmer, the Farmers’ Union, and the Rural World. In August 1868, Colonel D. A. Robertson of St. Paul was enlisted, and with his help, North Star Grange, the first permanent Minnesota grange, was organized on September 2. Revised circulars emphasized protection against corporations, crop and market statistics, produce depots, and concerted purchasing. By February 23, 1869, representatives organized the Minnesota State Grange, which within two months appointed a state purchasing agent for cooperative supplies—the order’s first such step. By the end of 1869, Minnesota had thirty-seven active granges.
Kelley left Minnesota in March 1869, visiting Fredonia and then Washington, where the National Grange held its “first annual session” with six members present. Returning to Minnesota, he traveled to northern Iowa in late October, organizing the second Iowa grange at Pottsville and then Waukon Grange, which was said to have held more meetings than any other grange. Dudley W. Adams, later a prominent figure in the order, became Waukon’s secretary. A trip through Illinois and Indiana in late 1869 and early 1870 established granges at Nunda and Henry, Illinois, and at Honey Creek, Terre Haute, and Indianapolis, Indiana. On his way to Washington, he organized Ohio’s first grange at East Cleveland on March 2, 1870.
Organizing Methods and Growth in 1870
The organizing plan was systematic: establish subordinate granges, form temporary state granges, whose masters appointed deputies. Charters required at least nine men and four women, and membership was limited to thirty, ten being women. Initiation fees were three dollars for men and fifty cents for women, with fifteen dollars going to the National Grange. In Illinois, a Producers’ Convention at Bloomington arose from railroad antagonism. Kelley and W. W. Corbett tried to capture it for the Patrons, but only one new Illinois grange resulted in 1870. In April, Kelley corresponded with Norman J. Coleman about Missouri, and in August he spent two weeks in St. Louis, organizing two granges and a temporary state grange. By October 1870, Kelley moved his headquarters to Washington, sending circulars claiming the order worked in fifteen states, though it was actually active in nine by January 1, 1871. The statistics for 1870 showed Minnesota gaining nineteen granges, Iowa nine, and smaller gains elsewhere, with Tennessee and California organized by letter.
The Grange’s Peak and Decline
By January 1, 1875, the West was crowded with granges. Indiana, Iowa, and Missouri each reached two thousand subordinate organizations. Kansas and Nebraska had higher ratios per agricultural population, with Kansas having one grange for every eighty-four agricultural persons, implying at least three-fourths of eligible persons were members. This situation was not permanent. Decline came through consolidation, disbanding, and charter revocation for delinquency. During 1874-75, the order’s size gave it prestige, and the National Grange treasury was full. Officers’ salaries ranged from $1,000 to $2,500 per year, and the surplus, about $50,000 on January 1, 1874, doubled by early 1875. This accumulation caused distrust among members who feared misappropriation and resented paying dues to an exclusive body. Agitation arose for reduced dues and democratic reformation. At the Charleston session in February 1875, the National Grange voted a loan of over $50,000 to state granges, but it was soon evident the loans would never be repaid, so they were changed into donations. This policy was disastrous, leading state granges into business schemes that caused financial loss and discredit while leaving the National Grange financially embarrassed.
From January to October 1875, the total number of granges fell from 21,697 to 19,007, with every North Central state except Michigan declining. The decline continued through 1876, and by 1880, annual dues to the National Grange had fallen from almost $43,000 to just over $6,000, representing perhaps 150,000 members—the lowest point. The decline was partly a reaction from excessive growth in 1873-74. Many had joined with no permanent interest, hoping for political and financial regeneration. Lax organizers admitted non-agricultural persons whose interests opposed those of farmers, and disgruntled politicians sought entrance for personal advancement.
The Illinois Railway Legislation of 1871
The Illinois legislature’s “Act to Prevent Unjust Discrimination and Extortions,” passed in 1871, was a landmark of Granger-era lawmaking. Its passage was overwhelming, with votes of 39 to 2 in one house and 132 to 9 in the other, and it received immediate gubernatorial approval. Despite its title, the act’s first section was remarkably broad, making any discrimination illegal and applying the strict pro rata principle that charges should be based entirely on distance. The text explicitly prohibited charging “the same nor any larger or greater amount” for a shorter distance than for a greater distance on the same road. This provision was even broader than the later interstate commerce act of 1887’s “long and short haul clause,” which only prohibited higher charges for shorter hauls when the shorter distance was included within the longer and in the same direction. A further section prohibited increasing rates because of decreases required under the first section, fixing the rates of 1870 as maximums. The author criticizes this approach as forcing all rates to the lowest competitive levels of 1870, ignoring the fact that much railroad expense is fixed and that conditions vary on different parts of roads.
Warehouse Regulation and the New Commission
The same legislative session produced significant warehouse and grain legislation. The warehouse act, approved April 25, 1871, set maximum storage charges at two cents per bushel for the first thirty days and one-half cent per bushel for each succeeding fifteen days. Warehousemen were required to publish their rates annually in January, with no increases permitted during the year and no discrimination allowed between customers. Another act forbade discrimination between shippers and warehouses in grain handling.
The most important act of the twenty-seventh general assembly, however, was the creation of a Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners. This bill passed the Senate 33-0 and the House 103-9. The governor was to appoint three commissioners, none of whom could be connected with railroads. Section 6 required annual reports with forty-one enumerated particulars, including capital stock, earnings, expenses, rates, and arrangements with other companies. Enforcement provisions, however, were generally inadequate. The discrimination act provided for penalties up to one thousand dollars and franchise forfeiture for willful violation. The passenger fare act allowed five hundred dollar penalties but required five judgments before quo warranto proceedings could begin. The warehouse act had no definite enforcement procedure at all.
Initial Implementation and Legal Challenges
Governor Palmer appointed Gustav Koerner, Richard P. Morgan, Jr., and David S. Hammond on July 3, 1871. The Prairie Farmer objected to Hammond as “a political bummer.” Four principal railroads responded jointly, denying the law’s validity but offering reasonable information. By October, all but three of twenty-one roads reported, mostly with validity disclaimers. The board classified roads by gross earnings, but leading roads did not observe the fare law. The board condemned commutation tickets as unjust to ordinary travelers.
Legal challenges soon followed. S. H. Moore of Kankakee sued the Illinois Central for overcharge; Judge Wood ruled for the defendant on contract grounds, but the supreme court affirmed on different grounds—the overcharge occurred before classification. The Chicago and Alton case involved charging more for lumber to Lexington (110 miles) than to Bloomington (126 miles, through Lexington). Judge Tipton ruled for the people in November 1872, but Chief-Justice Lawrence reversed, declaring the law violated the state constitution by prohibiting all discrimination rather than unjust discrimination only.
The Railroad Law of 1873
The State Farmers’ Association convention at Bloomington in January 1873 demanded enforcement of the 1871 law, “legal fare” protection, and a farmer on the commission. The new law made unreasonable charges “extortion” and defined discrimination in detail, with discrimination as prima facie evidence only. Fines ranged from one thousand to twenty-five thousand dollars. The commission was directed to prepare schedules of maximum rates as prima facie evidence of reasonableness.
The Repeal Campaign and Legislative Battles
The railroad forces’ primary strategy was to make the legislation unpopular by portraying it as contrary to the state’s best interest. A considerable part of the state’s press and influential eastern newspapers aided this effort. They asserted that interference would prevent further railroad construction and deter eastern and foreign capitalists from investing. A decline in railroad line extension at this time, though attributable to many causes, made this argument seem plausible. Many were induced to oppose regulation due to the continued desire for more railroads.
The first shot in the repeal campaign was fired on the day the law became law, May 2, 1873, when four Senate members presented a formal written protest, declaring the measure unconstitutional and claiming it would paralyze the state’s commercial and industrial interests. The second shot came when the law went into effect, as railroads, apparently by preconcerted agreement, raised competitive rates to the level of non-competitive rates, asserting this was the law’s working. This illustrated the favorite method of attack: appearing to obey the law while making it as obnoxious as possible. Railroad officials constantly blamed the law for every inconvenience.
Farmers’ organizations did not cease their efforts. In September 1873, the railroad commission held a joint meeting with the executive committee of the State Farmers’ Association. In October 1873, a “Northwestern Farmers’ Convention” in Chicago appointed a committee which reported the law’s effects were not as anticipated due to railroad non-observance. Later that year, the state grange and State Farmers’ Association adopted resolutions demanding enforcement and opposing repeal. Political parties, mindful of farmers’ votes, continued inserting planks favoring strict regulation.
The bitterest fight occurred in the adjourned session beginning January 1874. The legislature was deluged with petitions for repeal, including two from local farmers’ clubs. A significant memorial signed by 103 Chicago mercantile firms declared the legislature did not understand the law’s effect on commerce. They admitted prior discrimination and extortion but claimed they could usually get redress. Now, they asserted, the law had injured their business, increased shipment costs to the interior without lessening costs to tide-water, impaired the state’s credit, and made borrowing for competing roads almost impossible. They requested repeal or amendment.
Violent attacks were made on the commission, with an attempt to abolish it on grounds of retrenchment, which failed 40 to 91 in the House. An attempt to strike out section 3, defining discrimination, was defeated 25 to 101. The House adopted a resolution to prepare a bill against the Pullman Palace Car Company, but nothing further was done. The only railroad legislation enacted was a minor technical amendment.
During the 1875 session, the commission was attacked for instituting suits using names of persons who had not requested action. The commission admitted this but declared that requiring aggrieved parties to initiate suits would nullify the law, as fear of corporate power would deter those dependent on railway transportation. In this and the next three general assemblies (1877, 1879, 1881), numerous bills were introduced but none enacted. It was becoming evident that Illinois was determined to maintain the policy of regulation by a commission with power to establish maximum rate schedules.
Summary of the Farmers’ Role in Illinois
The demand for legislation appeared before farmers’ organization got under way, resulting in the inefficient law of 1869. Farmers then took hold: their influence secured constitutional provisions in 1870, the Legislative Farmers’ Club helped secure the 1871 legislation establishing the railroad commission, and after the supreme court invalidated an essential part, the thoroughly organized farmers played the principal role. Their influence was exerted through the Springfield convention of April 1873, followed by the 1873 law. Farmers’ organizations stood behind the commission’s enforcement efforts, preventing repeal before the law could be tested. The phrase “Granger legislation” is rightly applied to Illinois’s railway laws.
Minnesota’s Early Regulation
Minnesota was the only other state enacting a stringent law as early as 1871. Railroad construction began in 1862, with nearly two thousand miles operating by 1872. The 1858 constitution forbade special acts for companies and declared common carriers must carry productions on equal and reasonable terms. An 1858 incorporation act limited charges to three cents per mile for passengers and five cents per ton mile for freight, but the demand for railroads led to its supersession by a law requiring only reasonable charges.
Toward the close of the sixties, complaints of extortionate and discriminating rates arose; a dispute over railroad bonds helped arouse antagonism, and the Patrons of Husbandry turned attention to transportation. A transportation convention at Owatonna in November 1870 demanded legislation. The legislature of 1871 enacted two laws: one establishing a fixed schedule of maximum rates (passenger maximum five cents per mile), the other providing for a railroad commissioner.
The Minnesota railroad companies denied the laws’ validity. A suit by the attorney-general against the Winona and St. Peter Company, along with a private suit, was decided for the railroad in circuit court but reversed by the state supreme court in May 1873, which upheld the state’s right to regulate tolls. One case, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court as Winona and St. Peter Railroad Company v. Blake, was decided in October 1876, upholding the law’s validity. Before this decision, however, the legislature had superseded that law. During the three years the 1871 law was a dead letter, antagonism grew. The victory of the Independent party in the 1873 election placed the Granger element in control.
Iowa: Repeal of the 1874 Law
After the 1874 Iowa law, railroad interests sought its repeal. They argued it harmed shippers and the public. The state’s right to regulate rates was thought to extend only to the in-state portion of interstate shipments, but this proved ineffective in practice. Railroads nominally charged legal rates in Iowa but raised through rates to Chicago, especially on agricultural products, blaming the law. Competing railroads also ended rivalries, raising rates at previously competitive points to the legal maximum, citing the law’s goal of rate equalization. This built sentiment for repeal.
The Patrons of Husbandry, though declining, supported Governor Carpenter’s enforcement efforts. Political parties still demanded state control, but the Anti-Monopoly platform of June 1874 hinted at dissatisfaction.
The National Cheap Transportation Association and the Windom Committee
In May 1873, the National Cheap Transportation Association was organized in New York City, drawing delegates from the Mississippi Valley states and most eastern states. Its declared mission was to secure from Congress and state legislatures legislation that would control and limit the rates of existing transportation lines within constitutional limits. The association also advocated for increased transportation means and the formation of subsidiary state, county, and local associations. Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts, the leading spirit of the movement, became its president and issued a call in November 1873 for a Washington meeting the following January.
Other conventions that year reflected a growing national concern. In September, a New York Cheap Transportation Association formed, reportedly attended by Senator Windom and members of his Senate committee on transportation routes. In May, a convention called by Governor Smith of Georgia met in Atlanta, favoring more roads and canals over regulation. Later that month, the National Agricultural Congress met in Indianapolis, recommending that railway corporations be subjected to regulation by both General and State Governments to prevent extortionate charges and unjust discrimination. In late October, a Northwestern Farmers’ Convention in Chicago, with two hundred delegates mainly from Illinois, declared its first object to be “Cheap Transportation,” embracing water transportation, regulation by legislation of existing railways, and governmental railways. This convention requested a federal maximum freight and passenger law, protested further subsidies to private corporations, and appointed a committee to meet with Senator Windom’s committee.
The Windom committee began sessions in New York in September, traveling to various eastern and Mississippi Valley locations and Washington, taking testimony from railroad officials, merchants, manufacturers, state railroad commissioners, and farmers’ representatives. At St. Louis in October, delegates from the Northwestern Farmers’ Convention appeared, advocating for congressional maximum freight and passenger tariff laws with a three cents per mile passenger limit, no subsidies, and no class legislation. When questioned on constitutionality, one delegate declared that western people believed all power rested with the people, and if courts declared such laws unconstitutional, they should “wipe the Supreme Court out and get one that would decide it.” The committee’s report, presented to the Senate on April 24, 1874, concluded that the problem of cheap transportation was to be solved through competition, recommending government-owned waterways and freight railroads. It also recommended restrictive measures including complete publicity of rates, prevention of consolidation of parallel lines, prohibition of discrimination against lake or river ports, and establishment of a bureau of commerce.
Congressional Inaction and the Shift to Anti-Discrimination
The McCrary bill, reported by Mr. McCrary of Iowa, proposed prohibiting extortion and unfair discrimination by interstate railroads and establishing a nine-member commission to make maximum rate schedules. The House adopted a resolution declaring Congress possessed constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce, and the bill passed the House on March 26, 1874, by a vote of 121 to 115. The Senate, however, referred it to the Windom committee, which reported it back with amendments late in the session, and no action was taken.
Mr. Reagan of Texas later introduced a bill in the Forty-fifth Congress providing that railroads could not discriminate between interstate commerce persons, charge higher rates for short than longer hauls on the same line, or charge higher interstate rates than intrastate rates, and requiring publicly posted rate schedules. A substitute measure, adding a section prohibiting pooling and excluding intrastate commerce, passed the House by a vote of 130 to 104, but the Senate committee on commerce allowed it to sleep. A comparison of the McCrary and Reagan bills indicates a significant change in emphasis: the early focus was on “cheap transportation” for through traffic, but by the Reagan bill, the emphasis had shifted to eliminating unjust discriminations between persons and places, resulting from great reductions in through freights and increased discriminations from competition.
The National Grange in November 1880 amended a resolution favoring the Reagan bill, then adopted a substitute making no mention of it. Later, another resolution accepted the Reagan bill “as a beginning of railroad legislation” and urged Subordinate Granges and farmers to petition representatives to support it. After 1880, agricultural influence in railroad regulation agitation declined as the Patrons of Husbandry gave way to organizations interested in financial questions, and manufacturing and commercial classes grew more interested. In 1885, the Senate established a select committee with Senator Cullom as chairman; the Cullom committee’s 1886 report, together with the Wabash decision denying states authority over interstate traffic, led to the interstate commerce act of 1887. Grange enthusiasts’ claims of credit cannot be substantiated, as merchants and manufacturers were equally insistent on regulation, though the Patrons of Husbandry deserve credit for inaugurating the first important movement for federal railway regulation.
Local and State Cooperative Agencies
After a local grange formed, cooperative buying and selling was almost the first step. Early efforts involved arrangements with local dealers for special rates in return for members’ cash trade, a plan that rarely lasted and gave way to local agencies. Agents either forwarded cash orders to manufacturers, jobbers, or state agencies and distributed shipments, or the agency received capital from the grange or a stock company of members, approaching a cooperative store. Granges often formed county councils or Pomona granges to establish county or district agencies, which first induced manufacturers and wholesalers to make special terms with more success than local agencies due to larger trade. The object was securing lower prices by bulking orders, dealing directly with manufacturers and jobbers, and eliminating middlemen profits by shipping produce directly to large markets. The aggregate business through local agencies was enormous in 1873–1875, forcing local dealers to lower prices and benefiting non-members too.
Grangers sought state-wide cooperation, and by December 1874, twenty-six state granges had adopted agency systems. In Minnesota, sentiment favored a state agent at the first state grange in 1869, but Kelley and other founders feared prematurity, and the subject was laid on the table at the National Grange’s first annual session. Master Smith of Minnesota then appointed C. A. Prescott of St. Paul as state business agent, who issued weekly bulletins and circulars to implement manufacturers. In February 1873 a committee was appointed, and in December 1873 J. H. Denman was elected state purchasing agent with a salary not exceeding $1,600 from commissions. The Minnesota agency never did business on as large a scale as others, partly due to few granges, but Patrons claimed large savings.
Iowa achieved the first marked success. A state business agency was established at Des Moines in 1872 with J. D. Whitman as agent, and a Chicago firm received produce shipments. Whitman built a large business in implements and supplies, negotiated special rates communicated by confidential circulars, and worked without capital at first, then used state grange funds to make large outright purchases. By December 1872, reports claimed one-third of grain elevators and warehouses were Grange-owned or controlled, five million bushels of grain plus cattle and hogs shipped direct to Chicago with ten-to-forty percent savings, and $365,000 saved on implements. A reaper retailing at $240 sold to granges at $140. In 1873 the executive committee reported five million dollars business, saving fifteen percent on family supplies and twenty percent on implements. In 1874 the state grange began manufacturing farm machinery, which was “the beginning of the end.” In 1875 the implement works failed, bankrupting the grange, and an attempt to raise $25,000 by selling $10 shares failed.
Cooperation in Illinois and Price-Control Attempts
In Illinois, cooperation began with the first active granges in Lee and Whiteside counties before the state grange in 1872. Open farmers’ clubs existed alongside the Grange, and county or district farmers’ associations of both clubs and granges managed business. The Central Farmers’ Association of Centralia, formed in January 1873, had difficulty getting terms from implement manufacturers and faced local merchant opposition, but by November 1873 it sold about $100,000 of implements, saving farmers within fifteen miles $25,000. The Illinois State Farmers’ Association attempted a state agency, which was a failure. The state grange’s first agent merely negotiated terms and issued circulars. During 1874–75 the agent and executive committee disagreed, and local agents took advantage of temporary concessions elsewhere. At the fourth annual meeting in December 1875, the state agency was conceded a failure, and local agencies except stock companies were unsatisfactory. The National Grange donation was turned over to the executive committee for business purposes, authorizing a new salaried, bonded agency in Chicago, which was tried during 1876 with considerable success and continued on a small scale into the eighties. Chicago commercial firms also filled orders for clubs and granges at wholesale prices, notably Z. N. Hall and Montgomery Ward and Company. A contract with commission firm Reynolds, Corbett, and Thomas made it official Grange agent, but when it failed late in 1874 without loss to shippers, its members said Grange support did not warrant further experiments.
Farmers talked of rings and monopolies fixing prices, and agitators advised forming organizations to control farm product prices. The Northwestern Farmers’ Convention in Chicago in October 1873 recommended withholding hog products until prices reached five dollars per hundred pounds, but the result does not appear, presumably a failure, as many farmers could not withhold hogs and organization was too incomplete. Later county and subordinate granges in Illinois and other western states tried “holding their hogs,” and in January 1878 the state grange recommended withholding hogs for thirty days unless specific prices were offered. There was no evidence of success.
Cooperative Stores and Manufacturing Ventures
Many Patrons’ cooperative stores were established in the Middle West during 1874–75, but they often lacked the Rochdale system’s essential feature of dividing profits proportionally to purchases. Most were short-lived, though some reorganized on the Rochdale plan, and a few well-managed ones survived selling at cost. In Ohio, a Grange store existed in practically every county at one time, but none lasted more than a few years. Near the decade’s close, a “Cincinnati Grange Supply House” was established under state grange auspices, organized on the Rochdale plan, intended to serve Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, and West Virginia, but by then enthusiasm had waned.
The Bibliography: Newspapers and Periodicals
The book’s concluding bibliography begins by cataloging the state-level Grange newspapers that served as crucial organs for the movement. Among these are the Vermont Record and Farmer (Brattleboro, weekly, 1862-80), the Southern Planter and Farmer (Richmond, monthly, 1841-date), which ran a dedicated Grange department, and the short-lived Virginia Granger (Portsmouth, 1879-80) and Virginia Patron (Richmond, 1875-78). The Wisconsin papers receive particularly detailed treatment, reflecting their central role in the movement’s political battles. The Adams County Press (Friendship, 1861-date) was edited by the master of the state grange and served as the official organ in 1871-72. The Bulletin of the Executive Committee of the State Grange of Wisconsin (Madison, Oshkosh, Neenah, 1875-85), first edited by J. H. Osborn—who was both master of the state grange and chairman of the railroad commission—later fell to the state grange secretary, became semi-monthly in 1880, and was absorbed by the Western Farmer of Madison in 1885. The Oshkosh Times was noted as “practically an organ of the Grange for several years.” The bibliography carefully distinguishes between two separate Western Farmer publications in Madison (1868-75, which merged into the Western Rural of Chicago, and 1882-91, which absorbed the Grange Bulletin). Other Wisconsin papers include the Western Journal of Agriculture (Milwaukee, semi-monthly, 1873-74), started by Dr. O. W. Wright, a leader of the Peoples’ Reform party; the Wisconsin Post (Shawano, 1872-74), a German-language paper supporting the same party; and the Wisconsin Statesman (Madison, 1875-76), successor to the Wisconsin Granger, which was Democratic in national politics and whose editor candidly admitted in December 1873 that he lacked sufficient patronage but would continue publishing “for his own amusement.”
General and Miscellaneous Material
The general section of the bibliography surveys broad works on the movement. Elisha B. Andrews’s history characterizes the Granger movement in a chapter on “Agrarian and Labor Movements in the Seventies,” connecting it with Kearneyite agitation in California. Appleton’s Annual Cyclopedia contains documentary articles on “Patrons of Husbandry,” “Illinois,” and “Iowa” in its 1873 volume. L. H. Bailey’s Cyclopedia includes chapters on “Business Organization in Agriculture,” “Social and Service Association,” and “Education by Means of Agriculture.” Edward W. Bemis examines why farming failed to increase in profit relative to city occupations. Albert S. Bolles’s account is dismissed as inaccurate, while James Bryce treats Granger railroad legislation “briefly but fairly.” D. C. Cloud’s Monopolies and the People is dedicated to the Patrons of Husbandry. Various works analyze agricultural discontent, including those by John R. Dodge, C. F. Emerick (who approves tax reform and thrift as remedies), and a pseudonymous “New Englander” who attributes farmers’ evils to the tariff and over-production. William A. Peffer, a Populist leader, proposes free silver as a remedy. John M. Stahl argues that radical movements originated among city workingmen rather than farmers, over-emphasizing the Knights of Labor’s role in Populist origins.
Local Histories and Organization Histories
State-specific works cover Illinois (including Granger railway legislation), Wisconsin (including the Potter Law), Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas (where the Grange reportedly influenced the 1876 constitutional convention toward economy measures), and California (including the 1878 constitutional convention). Works on the Grange itself include accounts by O. H. Kelley (a founder), John Trimble, Mortimer Whitehead, and Colonel Hiram Hawkins. Several exposés purport to reveal the order’s secret rituals. Darrow’s work claims the order achieved “everything from the interstate commerce act to the Sherman anti-trust law.”
Railroad Studies
The railroad studies section is extensive. Charles Francis Adams Jr.’s “The Granger Movement” (1875) treated it as past, admitting adequate causes existed in railway abuses. Grosvenor called Granger legislation “communistic” and blamed it for the panic of 1873. Hadley accepted railroad claims about the legislation’s disastrous effects, as did Hendrick, who preferred the Massachusetts-type supervisory commission. John L. Ringwalt’s Development of Transportation Systems in the United States (Philadelphia, 1888) treats Granger legislation at some length and brings out abuses in railway construction and management, but views the laws as attempts “to compel railways to render services for inadequate compensation.” J. B. Sanborn’s Congressional Grants of Land in Aid of Railways (Madison, 1899) is called the standard work on the subject. Edwin R. A. Seligman’s “Railway Tariffs and the Interstate Commerce Law” discusses the Granger movement as one origin of the commission system of government control, though his conclusions that “the Granger movement was economically as unwise as it was politically important and successful” and that “the compulsory commissions were an avowed failure” are stronger statements than the facts warrant. The Senate Committee on Commerce’s Rates of Freight on Railroads (Washington, 1873) is listed, as is Charles Seymour’s “A Western View of Interstate Transportation” (1872), which maintained rates were too high and favored canal construction. Harrison S. Smalley’s “Railway Rate Control in its Legal Aspects” (1905) discusses the Granger cases at some length. E. Stanwood’s “Farmers and Railroads” (1873) is a general consideration of railway abuses. Albert B. Stickney’s The Railway Problem (St. Paul, 1891), written by the president of the Chicago and Great Western Railway Company, is described as a tremendous indictment of railway management that sustains many charges of the farmers as well as the justice of Granger legislation; his State Control of Trade and Commerce (1897) discusses the Granger cases as establishing the right of the state to control public employment. J. Q. Thompson’s The Farmers’ Fight against the Railroads (Indianapolis, 1874) is a short pamphlet. Steven F. Van Oss’s American Railroads as Investments (New York, 1893) summarizes railway abuses and Granger legislation fairly despite some inaccuracies. David A. Wells’s “How will the United States Supreme Court Decide the Granger Railroad Cases?” (1874), relying on the Dartmouth decision and the fourteenth amendment, expected the decision to be adverse to the laws. Francis Wharton’s “Retrospective Legislation and Grangerism” (1876) concludes the Granger laws were invalid.
The Windom Committee and Local Railway Studies
The Report of the Select Committee on Transportation Routes to the Seaboard (Washington, 1874, 2 vols.) is listed, with its second volume of “Testimony” containing statements of W. C. Flagg, President of the Illinois State Farmers’ Association, and Samuel P. Tufts, both representing the Northwestern Farmers’ Convention which met at Chicago, October 22-23, 1873; the entire proceedings of this convention are incorporated. Yesterday and Today; a History of the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company (Chicago, 1905) contains extracts from annual reports relative to Granger legislation. Local studies include J. H. Gordon’s Illinois Railway Legislation and Commission Control since 1870 (Urbana, 1904), called valuable but not exhaustive, and Fred E. Newton’s Railway Legislation in Illinois from 1828 to 1870 (University of Illinois thesis, 1901). Edward F. Adams’s “The Wisconsin Method of Railway Reform” and “The Granger Morality” (1874) defend the Wisconsin “Reformers” whom the Nation had charged with dishonesty, giving an account of how the Potter law was passed. Senator Matthew H. Carpenter’s Speech on the Power of the Legislature to Govern Corporations (1874) early affirmed the right of a state to regulate railroads. John W. Gary’s Brief in the Case of the State of Wisconsin vs. Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railway Company ([1874]) is listed, with Gary as counsel for the railroad company. Frank A. Flower’s Life of Matthew Hale Carpenter (Madison, 1883) brings out Carpenter’s connection with railroad legislation and litigation in Wisconsin. A pseudonymous “Granger” replies to F. R. Leland’s letter on “Second Stage of Wisconsin Railroad Legislation” in the Nation (April 8, 1875), denying the order of Patrons of Husbandry was responsible for the legislation. James H. Howe’s Statement in behalf of the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Company relative to Assembly Bill no. 260 (Chicago, 1870) is an argument against a bill pending in the Wisconsin legislature. John W. Hoyt’s “Second Stage of Wisconsin Railroad Legislation” (1875), written by a member of the railroad commission of Wisconsin, is a reply to charges made by F. R. Leland of Lacrosse. The bibliography concludes with the Memorial of the Chicago and Northwestern and the Chicago [railway companies], a document that, like so many of the sources listed, captures the enduring legal and political contest between the railroads and the agrarian reformers who sought to bring them under public control.
Main Arguments
The book advances several central arguments about the Granger movement, its causes, its achievements, and its limitations.
The first major argument concerns the fundamental economic conditions that gave rise to the movement. The author argues that the primary cause of unremunerative agriculture was the great extension of agricultural operations after the Civil War, which had the features of a speculative boom. While acreage and production increased dramatically, prices declined correspondingly, leaving farmers with little or no more revenue despite their greater output. This economic squeeze was compounded by financial problems stemming from wartime currency inflation and the subsequent appreciation of currency value, which forced farmers to repay debts contracted in depreciated currency with money worth fifteen to twenty percent more. The high protective tariff, continued after the war for manufacturers’ benefit, bore severely on farmers who sold their surplus crops in unprotected world markets but purchased goods at enhanced prices.
A second argument concerns the farmers’ loss of political power and their consequent inability to address their grievances through normal political channels. The book demonstrates that farmers constituted a much smaller proportion of Congress than of the working population, and that their interests were systematically ignored by the major political parties. This political powerlessness, combined with the period’s corruption and the manipulation of transportation, currency, banking, and tariff policies against farmers’ interests, created the conditions for organized protest.
A third argument relates to the Grange’s organizational development and its achievements. The author argues that the Grange’s rapid growth in the early 1870s was excessive and unsustainable, leading to an unwieldy, undisciplined mass of members with diverse and often conflicting interests. The decline that followed was partly a reaction from this excessive growth, but it was also caused by specific factors: the admission of non-agricultural persons whose interests opposed those of farmers, the involvement of disgruntled politicians seeking personal advancement, political involvement in third-party movements that failed, participation in radical railway legislation that proved controversial, and most significantly, the collapse of cooperative business ventures that left discredit and indebtedness in their wake.
A fourth argument concerns the railway legislation associated with the Granger movement. The author argues that the phrase “Granger legislation” is rightly applied to Illinois’s railway laws, where farmers’ organizations played the principal role in securing legislation. However, the author also demonstrates that the movement for railway regulation was not exclusively agrarian, noting that a separate movement for supervision of railroads was underway in the East, particularly in Massachusetts, and that merchants and manufacturers were equally insistent on regulation. The author concludes that Grange enthusiasts’ claims of credit for the interstate commerce act of 1887 cannot be substantiated, though the Patrons of Husbandry deserve credit for inaugurating the first important movement for federal railway regulation.
A fifth argument concerns the Grange’s business cooperation experiments. The author argues that cooperative business, which was the feature that built membership, contributed most to the order’s collapse. Enterprises went to pieces, leaving discredit and indebtedness. The National Grange’s policy of lending money to state granges for cooperative projects was disastrous, leading state granges into business schemes that caused financial loss and discredit while leaving the National Grange financially embarrassed. However, the author also notes that some cooperative ventures, particularly those organized on the Rochdale plan, achieved notable success, and that the Grange’s cooperative efforts forced local dealers to lower prices, benefiting even non-members.
Key Concepts
The book develops several key concepts that are central to understanding the Granger movement and its significance.
The concept of “leakage” describes the financial losses farmers suffered from the discrepancy between the gold in which their agricultural products were sold abroad and the depreciated paper currency with which they purchased supplies. This concept captures the farmers’ vulnerability to currency fluctuations and speculation, and their sense that they were being systematically exploited by the financial system.
The “pro rata principle” was a key concept in Granger railway legislation, particularly in Illinois. This principle held that railway charges should be based entirely on distance, so that it would be illegal to charge the same or a larger amount for a shorter distance than for a greater distance on the same road. The author notes that this principle was broader than the “long and short haul clause” of the interstate commerce act of 1887, which only prohibited higher charges for shorter hauls when the shorter distance was included within the longer and in the same direction.
The “Declaration of Purposes” is mentioned as the conservative statement of the Grange’s principles, which was often contrasted with the order’s actual involvement in political and legislative activities. The author notes that involvement in radical railway legislation, despite the conservative Declaration of Purposes, caused decline in northwestern states.
The “Rochdale plan” emerges as a key concept in the discussion of cooperative stores. This plan, which involved dividing profits proportionally to purchases, was the essential feature that distinguished successful cooperative ventures from those that failed. The author notes that many Patrons’ cooperative stores lacked this feature and were consequently short-lived, while those that adopted the Rochdale plan, such as the Johnson County Cooperative Association at Olathe, Kansas, and the Texas Cooperative Association, achieved notable success.
The concept of “bonanza farms” describes the large-scale agricultural operations made possible by technological advances in agricultural machinery and the availability of land. The author argues that these operations injured small farmers by increasing production and depressing prices.
The “Granger movement” itself is a key concept, though the author notes that the term was applied broadly to various phenomena. The public classed all subordinate and state granges that participated in Independent, Farmers’, and Anti-Monopoly parties under the “Granger movement,” even when the Grange’s official position was non-partisan. Similarly, the term “Granger legislation” was applied to railway laws in various states, though the author argues this label is only rightly applied to Illinois’s laws where farmers played the principal role.
The distinction between “mandatory” and “supervisory” railway commissions is another key concept. The Illinois commission had mandatory authority to establish maximum rate schedules, while the Massachusetts commission had no mandatory authority but exercised influence through publicity. The author notes that both models served as examples for other states, and that the debate between these approaches continued throughout the period.
Themes
Several recurring themes emerge from the book’s treatment of the Granger movement.
The theme of economic exploitation runs throughout the book. Farmers are portrayed as victims of a system that systematically disadvantaged them: they sold their products in unprotected world markets but bought goods at prices enhanced by protective tariffs; they contracted debts in depreciated currency but had to repay them with appreciated money; they paid taxes on their real property at full value while urban personal property and corporate property escaped taxation; and they paid high railway rates while railroads discriminated between persons and places. The book’s detailed statistical analysis of agricultural production and prices demonstrates that farmers worked harder and produced more, yet received little or no more revenue.
The theme of political powerlessness is closely related. The book shows that farmers, despite constituting nearly half of the working population, had minimal representation in Congress and felt their interests were ignored by political parties. The Granger movement’s political activities, including the formation of Anti-Monopoly and Reform parties, represented an attempt to address this powerlessness. However, the book also shows the limitations of third-party politics, as these parties achieved only partial success and often failed to maintain their momentum.
The theme of organization versus individualism is central to the book’s analysis. The author argues that farmers lacked the organization that other classes had, and that the idea of association appealed to them for social intercourse, knowledge, political power, and counter-organization against merchants and manufacturers. The Grange represented this impulse toward organization, but the book also shows the difficulties of maintaining organization: the Grange’s rapid growth created an unwieldy mass, its cooperative business ventures often failed, and its political involvement proved divisive.
The theme of reform and reaction is evident throughout the book. The Granger movement emerged from a period of corruption and economic distress, and it represented an attempt to reform the abuses that farmers perceived in the economic and political system. However, the book also shows how reform efforts could produce unintended consequences: railway legislation sometimes led to rate increases as railroads raised competitive rates to the level of non-competitive rates; cooperative business ventures sometimes led to financial disaster; and political involvement sometimes led to the order’s decline.
The theme of regional variation is also significant. The book demonstrates that the Granger movement was not uniform across the country. It was strongest in the upper Mississippi Valley, particularly in Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, where the combination of railroad expansion, agricultural settlement, and Grange organization created the conditions for political and legislative activity. In other regions, such as Kansas and Nebraska, the desire for more railroad facilities was so overpowering that little attention was paid to regulation. In the East, a separate movement for railway supervision developed, influenced by commercial rather than agricultural interests. In the South, railway enactments were mostly reflections of other states’ legislation.
The theme of decline and legacy concludes the book. The author shows that the Grange declined dramatically after its peak in the mid-1870s, with membership falling from over twenty thousand granges to about four thousand by 1880. The causes of decline were multiple: excessive growth, lax organization, political involvement, radical legislation, and failed business ventures. However, the book also shows that the Grange did not disappear entirely, and that it revived slowly after 1881. More importantly, the Granger movement left a lasting legacy: it inaugurated the first important movement for federal railway regulation, it brought a better understanding of shippers’ rights, and it forced a more conciliatory attitude from railroads. The movement’s cooperative experiments, particularly those organized on the Rochdale plan, provided models that later proved successful.
The Author’s Conclusions
The book concludes with an assessment of the Granger movement’s significance and legacy. The author’s conclusions are measured and nuanced, acknowledging both the movement’s achievements and its limitations.
The author concludes that the Granger movement was a response to genuine grievances. Farmers faced real economic difficulties stemming from currency fluctuations, tariff policies, taxation systems, and railway discrimination. The movement represented a legitimate attempt by farmers to address these grievances through organization, political action, and legislation.
The author also concludes that the Grange’s organizational achievements were significant, despite the order’s decline. The Grange grew rapidly in the early 1870s, reaching a peak of over twenty-one thousand subordinate granges by January 1875. This growth demonstrated the farmers’ desire for organization and their willingness to act collectively. However, the author argues that the growth was excessive and unsustainable, and that the Grange’s decline was partly a reaction from this excessive growth.
Regarding railway legislation, the author concludes that the Granger movement made important contributions to the development of railway regulation. The phrase “Granger legislation” is rightly applied to Illinois’s railway laws, where farmers’ organizations played the principal role in securing legislation. The Illinois legislation, including the act to prevent unjust discrimination and extortions of 1871 and the railroad law of 1873, established important precedents for railway regulation. The author also notes that the Grange deserves credit for inaugurating the first important movement for federal railway regulation, even though the interstate commerce act of 1887 cannot be attributed solely to Grange influence.
The author’s conclusions about the Grange’s business cooperation experiments are more critical. The author argues that cooperative business, which was the feature that built membership, contributed most to the order’s collapse. The National Grange’s policy of lending money to state granges for cooperative projects was disastrous, leading state granges into business schemes that caused financial loss and discredit. However, the author also acknowledges that some cooperative ventures achieved notable success, particularly those organized on the Rochdale plan, and that the Grange’s cooperative efforts had beneficial effects on prices even for non-members.
The author concludes that the Granger movement’s political activities had mixed results. The Anti-Monopoly and Reform parties of 1873 achieved some successes, including reduced Republican majorities and the election of some candidates, but they also contributed to the Grange’s decline by involving the order in partisan politics. The author notes that when political movements failed, the order suffered.
The book’s final assessment is that the Granger movement, despite its decline and limitations, had a lasting impact. It brought a better understanding of shippers’ rights, forced a more conciliatory attitude from railroads, and inaugurated the first important movement for federal railway regulation. The movement also demonstrated the possibilities and limitations of farmers’ organizations, providing lessons that would inform later agrarian movements. The Grange itself survived its decline and revived slowly after 1881, with its membership now differently distributed, with the North Atlantic division holding a larger proportion. The movement’s legacy was thus not simply its specific achievements, but its demonstration that farmers could organize and act collectively to address their grievances.
Significance
The book makes a significant contribution to the historiography of American agrarian protest and the development of railway regulation. Its significance lies in several areas.
First, the book provides a comprehensive and detailed account of the Granger movement that draws upon extensive documentary evidence. The author examines legislative records, organizational proceedings, contemporary newspaper accounts, and statistical data to construct a thorough narrative of the movement’s origins, development, achievements, and decline. This scholarly approach distinguishes the book from more partisan or polemical treatments of the subject.
Second, the book offers a balanced assessment of the Granger movement that acknowledges both its achievements and its limitations. The author does not romanticize the movement or its leaders, but neither does he dismiss the farmers’ grievances or the significance of their protest. This balanced perspective allows readers to understand the movement’s complexity and its place in American history.
Third, the book’s detailed examination of railway legislation provides valuable insights into the development of railway regulation in the United States. The author’s analysis of the Illinois legislation, including the act to prevent unjust discrimination and extortions of 1871 and the railroad law of 1873, and his comparison of the mandatory commission model with the Massachusetts supervisory model, illuminates an important chapter in the history of American economic regulation. The book also traces the movement for federal railway regulation from the Windom committee through the McCrary and Reagan bills to the interstate commerce act of 1887, providing context for understanding this landmark legislation.
Fourth, the book’s examination of the Grange’s business cooperation experiments contributes to the history of cooperative enterprise in the United States. The author’s detailed accounts of cooperative agencies, stores, and manufacturing ventures in various states, and his analysis of the factors that contributed to their success or failure, provide valuable material for understanding the possibilities and limitations of cooperative enterprise.
Fifth, the book’s analysis of the Granger movement’s political activities contributes to the history of third-party politics in the United States. The author’s examination of the Anti-Monopoly and Reform parties of 1873, their platforms, election results, and legislative outcomes, provides insight into the possibilities and limitations of third-party movements in American politics.
Finally, the book’s significance lies in its broader implications for understanding the challenges facing American agriculture during a period of rapid economic transformation. The book’s analysis of the economic conditions that gave rise to the Granger movement, including currency fluctuations, tariff policies, taxation systems, agricultural expansion, and declining prices, speaks to enduring questions about the place of agriculture in the American economy and the relationship between farmers and other economic interests. The Granger movement’s attempt to address these challenges through organization, political action, and legislation, and its partial successes and ultimate limitations, offer lessons that remain relevant to later generations of farmers and reformers.
