About the Work
The Problem of China is a comprehensive analytical study of China’s political, social, and cultural condition in the early twentieth century, written by the British philosopher Bertrand Russell. The book emerged from Russell’s direct engagement with China, where he traveled to teach and observe the country firsthand. The work is structured as a formal treatise, organized into fifteen chapters that move from historical background through contemporary political analysis to forward-looking prescriptions for China’s future.
The book combines several genres: it is part history, part political analysis, part cultural criticism, and part policy recommendation. Russell examines China’s ancient civilization, its interactions with Western powers, the rise of Japan as an imperialist force, and the internal struggles of the Chinese Republic following the 1911 revolution. He writes from the perspective of a Western intellectual sympathetic to Chinese civilization while critical of both Chinese weaknesses and Western depredations.
The text is notable for its comparative approach, frequently drawing parallels between Chinese and European history, institutions, and cultural values. Russell writes in his characteristic clear, direct prose, mixing statistical data with anecdotal observations and philosophical reflection. The book reflects its author’s engagement with contemporary events, including the Washington Conference of 1921-22, the ongoing civil conflicts in China, and Japan’s expanding imperial ambitions.
Context
The book was written during a period of profound transformation in East Asia. China had overthrown its imperial system in 1911, establishing a republic that was struggling to consolidate authority amid warlord factionalism. The Great War had recently concluded, reshaping global power dynamics and exposing the weaknesses of European civilization. Japan had emerged from the war strengthened, having seized German concessions in China and presented the Twenty-One Demands that threatened Chinese sovereignty.
Russell’s analysis is informed by his personal visit to China, where he taught at Peking Government University and observed Chinese society, education, and politics directly. His position as a prominent Western intellectual gave him access to Chinese leaders, educators, and students, while his philosophical training shaped his approach to understanding Chinese civilization.
The international context is crucial to understanding the book’s arguments. The Washington Conference of 1921-22 was attempting to restructure Pacific relations, with the Four-Power and Nine-Power treaties addressing naval armaments and the Open Door policy in China. The Russian Revolution had created a new ideological force in Asia, while the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was being allowed to lapse under American pressure. Russell writes with awareness of these developments, analyzing their implications for China’s future.
The book also reflects Russell’s broader political evolution. His disillusionment with the Great War and his growing sympathy for socialist analysis are evident throughout. He writes as a critic of capitalism and imperialism, though not as a Bolshevik sympathizer, maintaining a distinctive position that combines respect for Chinese civilization with progressive Western values.
Structure of the Book
The book is organized into fifteen chapters that proceed from historical foundations through contemporary analysis to future prescriptions. The opening chapter establishes the questions Russell seeks to address, framing China’s situation as a problem requiring both understanding and solution.
The second and third chapters provide historical background, examining China’s civilization before the nineteenth century and its subsequent encounters with Western powers. These chapters cover the Mongol conquests, the development of Chinese institutions, the Confucian ethical system, and the series of wars and treaties through which Western nations and Japan encroached upon Chinese sovereignty.
The fourth chapter examines modern China, analyzing the 1911 revolution, the failure of republican government under Yuan Shih-k’ai, and the subsequent rule of military governors or Tuchuns. This chapter also addresses China’s economic conditions, including agriculture, famine, and the beginnings of industrialism.
Chapters five through eight shift focus to Japan, examining its history before the Meiji Restoration, its modernization, and its relations with China before and during the Great War. These chapters analyze Japan’s unique political structure, its imperial ideology, and its aggressive expansionism culminating in the Twenty-One Demands.
The ninth chapter examines the Washington Conference and its implications for China, while the tenth chapter analyzes the present forces and tendencies in China, including the interests of America, Japan, Russia, and China itself. The remaining chapters address broader cultural questions: Chinese and Western civilization, the Chinese character, higher education in China, industrialism, and finally the outlook for China’s future.
The book thus moves from past to present to future, combining historical analysis with contemporary observation and policy prescription. Each chapter builds on the previous ones, creating a cumulative argument about China’s situation and prospects.
Detailed Section-by-Section Summary
The Mongol Conquests and the Ming Dynasty
Jenghis Khan, a foreign conqueror who died in 1227, swept out of Mongolia to subjugate China, India, Persia, and Russia. His campaigns were marked by staggering atrocities, such as the slaughter of 700,000 at Merv and the systematic decapitation of all inhabitants at Nishapur, their heads piled into separate pyramids for men, women, and children. Similar horrors were visited upon Moscow, Kieff, Hungary, and Poland. Despite this, both St. Louis and the Pope sought his alliance, and Russell wryly notes that Jenghis’s methods were more merciful than those employed since the Armistice.
His grandson, Kublai Khan, who died in 1294, became the first Mongol Emperor of China, ousting the Sung dynasty. He moved his capital to Peking, where he built walls and an observatory, two of whose astronomical instruments remained until the Germans removed them to Potsdam after the Boxer suppression, though Russell understood they were later restored. Kublai’s two armadas sent to conquer Japan were both defeated by storms and Japanese valour, a fate reminiscent of Philip II’s against England. After Kublai, his successors adopted Chinese ways, and the dynasty ended in 1370, giving way to the Ming, who ruled until the Manchu conquest of 1644. The Manchus, in turn, were absorbed by Chinese civilization, contributing only the pigtail before being overthrown in 1911.
Russell argues that the Chinese Empire’s persistence was not due to military skill. While the Huns were defeated, the Tartars and Manchus conquered but were absorbed. Rome fell to successive waves of barbarians, but China was saved by the geographical barriers of the Gobi Desert and Tibetan uplands. This immunity ended when white men arrived by sea.
The Problem of Population
Russell turns to the unreliable statistics of Chinese population. An eighth-century census recorded over 50 million, sinking to 17 million a decade later, though these counted houses, not individuals. He distrusts the figures of Putnam Weale, which show a rise from 55 million in 1651 to 413 million in 1842, falling to 261 million after the Taiping rebellion. The China Year Book for 1919 cites a 1910 census of 329,542,000, exclusive of Tibet. After reviewing various estimates from 1381 to 1885, Russell concludes the population is between 300 and 400 million, likely below 350 million, and that authors who give precise statistics are to be distrusted.
Three Distinctive Features of Chinese Civilization
Russell identifies three features that distinguish Chinese civilization: the use of ideograms instead of an alphabet, the substitution of the Confucian ethic for religion among the educated, and a government by literati chosen through examination. The family system, he notes, is not distinctively Chinese.
On ideograms, he acknowledges their inconveniences: the vast number of signs, the lack of alphabetical order, the difficulty of dictionaries and catalogues, the impossibility of linotype, and the inability to write foreign words phonetically. He supports the reformers’ movement for a phonetic script. However, the advantages are profound: the written word represents an idea, not a sound, making it readable across dialects and by the Japanese, and the classics remain readable. Writing began as pictures everywhere, but China preserved ideograms because its spoken language is monosyllabic, uninflected, and full of homonyms. He cites Mr. Chi Li, who argued that alphabetical civilizations lack solidity, while the Chinese language, being “solid, square, and beautiful,” has protected its civilization for forty centuries. Russell admits the importance of this is great.
Confucius and the Confucian Ethic
Confucius, a historical figure born in 551 B.C., inculcated a strict ethics with little religious dogma. He was a practical statesman, like Lycurgus and Solon, concerned with a peaceful community and deeply conservative. He accepted the existing religion, an unemphatic monotheism with spirits of the dead. His definition of wisdom was “To cultivate earnestly our duty towards our neighbour, and to reverence spiritual beings while maintaining always a due reserve.” Filial piety included obedience to the Emperor, except when he was wicked, and resistance was justified if he governed badly, a doctrine unlike that of Japan. Russell quotes Giles on a ruler who impoverishes his people and deprives spirits of sacrifices, who may be expelled, an example from 558 B.C.
Russell identifies filial piety as the weakest point in Confucian ethics, as it militates against public spirit. He recounts the story of a feudal prince boasting of his upright men, where a son testified against his father who stole a sheep; Confucius said the father and son should shield each other, a stark contrast with the elder Brutus and his sons. Chao Ki held that refusing a lucrative post to relieve aged parents is contrary to filial piety, and the worst failure is remaining without children, as ancestors suffer without descendants’ cult. Yet Russell argues that filial piety is less harmful than patriotism, which leads to militarism and imperialism, whereas family feeling leads to corruption and intrigue.
Confucianism was a code of civilized behaviour—self-restraint, moderation, and courtesy—that survived wars and revolutions. Its calm made wars less terrible. Russell illustrates this with Wu-Pei-Fu, who attacked in wet weather, won, but returned to his original position and fought again on a fine day because the beaten general complained of a breach of etiquette. Battles in China, he notes, are seldom bloody.
Confucianism assumed its present form in the twelfth century A.D. when Chu Fu Tze thrust aside the personal God, and his interpretation became orthodox. Since 1370, the Government favoured Confucianism, though before that it struggled with Buddhism and Taoism, whose magic led emperors to die drinking Taoist elixirs. The Mongol Emperors were Buddhists of the Lama religion, while the Manchu Emperors were ultra-orthodox Confucians. The literati were pure Confucians, sceptical in religion but not in morals, while the rest practised all three religions. The Chinese, Russell notes, lack the Jewish belief that there is only one true religion.
The Western Powers
Russell opens this section with a quoted letter from the Emperor Chien Lung to King George III, rejecting British trade and diplomatic overtures. The Emperor praises the King’s humility but declares an ambassador useless, as Chinese civilization cannot be transplanted. The Celestial Empire possesses all things and needs no foreign manufactures, though limited trade at Canton would continue for tea, silk, and porcelain. He concludes with an injunction to “Tremblingly obey and show no negligence.”
Russell argues that no one understands China until this document ceases to seem absurd. He compares Chien Lung’s worldview favourably to Alexander the Great’s, noting that China’s empire had risen with Rome and never fallen. He concedes that China’s culture lacked science, and that Britain’s superiority lies in Newton and Robert Boyle, giving greater proficiency in killing.
He then recounts the Western wars against China: the first in 1840 over opium, ending with Hong-Kong’s cession and five ports opened; the 1856-60 joint English-French war, which destroyed the Summer Palace; the 1870 war after a British diplomat’s murder, which led to more ports and an opium tariff; France taking Annam and Britain taking Burma; and the 1894-5 war with Japan, leading to Japan’s conquest of Korea. He describes the 1897 murder of two German missionaries in Shantung, leading to Germany seizing Kiaochow Bay, and the Boxer rising, after which the Legation Quarter became a fortified city.
Russell details China’s loss of fiscal independence: the 1842 treaty fixing 5% duties, the 1858 schedule of conventional prices, and the most-favoured-nation clause requiring thirteen Powers’ unanimous consent for tariff changes. He discusses the Customs administration, with a British Inspector-General, first Sir Robert Hart, and the salt tax similarly secured for foreign loans. He quotes three 1922 Times telegrams illustrating artificial bankruptcy.
He attributes Chinese official corruption to an ethics that stresses family duty over public duty, arguing that the decay of the family system is vital for progress. He concludes that the best Great Power is America, the worst Japan, and that Socialism in Europe and America offers the only ultimate solution to Chinese economic domination.
Modern China
Turning to modern China, Russell describes the 1911 revolution, Sun Yat Sen’s election as provisional President, and Yuan Shih-k’ai’s scheme to become first President. Yuan quarrelled with Parliament, concluded an unconstitutional foreign loan, suppressed a Southern revolt, and became an absolute ruler before dying in 1916 after a failed attempt to become Emperor. Since then, Tuchuns, or military governors, have governed despotically, with Chang-tso-lin, Viceroy of Manchuria, receiving the largest share of a nine-million-dollar payment to leave Peking. In the South, Canton established a progressive Government under Sun Yat Sen, opposed by Britain partly due to the Cassel agreement, while Americans befriended it.
Russell argues that China’s political troubles are not due to mere anarchy, as Europe has more governments, fiercer enmities, more troops, and more fighting since the Armistice. Chinese battles are seldom bloody, fought by mercenary soldiers indifferent to the cause, and Russell believes the Chinese are on average happier than Europeans.
Political reform in China, when possible, must take a federal constitution with large provincial autonomy, as provincial feeling is strong and ancient. A non-federal constitution requires a homogeneous population, as seen in Ireland. Most progressive Chinese favour federalism, leaving the Central Government only armaments, foreign affairs, and customs. The difficulty is disbanding troops without money to pay them, and borrowing abroad risks sacrificing Chinese independence.
One Tuchun may become supreme and make friends with constitutionalists. Two important Tuchuns are Chang-tso-lin, supreme in Manchuria, Japanese-supported, and reactionary, and Wu-Pei-Fu, a liberal and able general who established authority on the Yangtze and Hunan, dealing a blow to Canton’s hopes. Wu-Pei-Fu might come to terms with Canton, especially since it allied with Chang-tso-lin, but could establish authority elsewhere by being constitutional.
China’s economic life is pre-industrial except in Treaty Ports and mining regions. Peking has nearly a million inhabitants, no trams or buses, and only two or three factory chimneys; people live by handicrafts with long hours and infinitesimal pay. Seventy to eighty percent are in agriculture: rice and tea in the south, wheat and grain in the north. In autumn 1920, a terrible famine afflicted the north due to drought, nearly as bad as Russia’s 1921 famine; foreigners brought relief, while the Chinese regarded it passively as fate.
Most land is held by peasant proprietors who divide holdings among sons, making each share barely sufficient. When rainfall is less, immense numbers starve. Scientific agriculture, afforestation, railways, and roads could help temporarily, but if the birth-rate is as great as supposed, no permanent cure is possible while families remain large—Malthus’s theory finds full scope. Only education and a higher standard of life can remove the fundamental cause, but popular education requires better government and revenue, and there are insufficient competent Chinese teachers.
The impact of European civilization takes two forms: commercial and intellectual, both depending on the prestige of armaments. The Chinese have a strong instinct for trade and intellectual curiosity; only a bare minimum of common decency is required to secure their friendship. In Treaty Ports, Europeans live in their own quarters; Russell describes the contrast between European cleanliness and Chinese romance, overcrowding, and disease. He thinks Chinese life brings more happiness to Chinese men than English life to Englishmen, but not for women.
Shanghai and Tientsin are white men’s cities. Hankow, a Treaty Port almost exactly in China’s centre, is where North and South, divided by the Yangtze, and East and West, divided by the Peking-Canton route, meet. A railway runs from Peking to Hankow, formerly Franco-Belgian, now Chinese Government; from Wuchang a railway to Canton runs only half-way to Changsha. Its completion will increase Canton’s importance and diminish Hong-Kong’s.
In the lower Yangtze and mining districts there are beginnings of industrialism. China produces raw cotton, mostly manipulated by primitive methods, with some modern cotton-mills. Low wages do not mean cheap labour for employers; China will not become a formidable competitor until methods and education improve. The beginnings of industry are sordid and cruel; intellectuals seek a less horrible method, but none is in sight.
The intelligentsia has a peculiar position: hereditary aristocracy has been extinct for about 2,000 years, and the country has been governed by successful candidates in competitive examinations, giving the educated prestige. The Tuchuns, many of whom, including Chang-tso-lin, began as brigands, are mostly too stupid to share this attitude, making their regime weak. Young China—educated abroad or in modern colleges—has far greater influence than elsewhere; this is the most hopeful feature. In another ten years they will probably be strong enough to regenerate China, if the Powers allow.
Russell distinguishes two generations of Young China: older men, aged 30 to 50, who fought their way out of Confucian prejudices, resembling the rationalists of Darwin’s and Mill’s generation; and younger men who found modern schools waiting. The older men are somewhat weary; the younger have more energy and self-confidence. Young men under thirty have assimilated Western ideas without great struggle, learning from Chinese teachers. Even the youngest still have reactionary families but resist family claims better. In these young men Russell sees the hope of China.
A traditional Chinese belief dies hard: that correct ethical sentiments are more important than detailed scientific knowledge, derived from Confucian tradition. The West has swung to the opposite extreme, thinking technical efficiency is everything. Russell illustrates this with Forsythe Sherfesee, Forestry Adviser, who gave an address in January 1919 proving that waste lands are suitable for forestry, timber importation is unnecessary, and floods would be prevented by re-afforestation. Yet even reforming Chinese find it difficult to interest themselves in afforestation because it is not easy for ethical enthusiasm. Chinese students learn political theory as taught in Western universities and despise humble questions like the utility of trees; our theories of politics are only true in the West, but our theories of forestry are equally true everywhere.
Science makes the difference between Western and Chinese intellectual outlook. The Chinese look to white nations, especially America, for moral maxims to replace Confucius. What we have to teach is not morals but science and technical skill. The real problem is to acquire Western knowledge without acquiring Western militarism.
Japan Before the Restoration
Russell continues his discussion of Japan’s political structure. The Shogun was as much a figurehead as the Mikado; real power was wielded by Regents in the Shogun’s name. This lasted until lyeyasu, a supreme military commander of the Minamoto family, assumed the Shogunate himself. His descendants held the office until the Restoration. The Restoration did not end the practice of a real Government behind the nominal one: the Prime Minister and Cabinet are presented as the Government, but the real Government is the Genro, or Elder Statesmen.
The Japanese transformation of Buddhism resembles what Teutonic nations made of Christianity. Both religions originally aimed at holiness through renunciation, ignored politics and wealth, and were religions of peace teaching non-resistance. Both underwent transformations to suit warlike barbarians. In Japan, sects arose differing from Mahayana orthodoxy; Buddhism became national and militaristic, with abbots as feudal chieftains commanding monk-armies. Sieges of monasteries were constant in Japanese history.
After about 100 years of Western contact, Japan closed to foreigners except restricted Dutch commerce. The Portuguese arrived around 1643 and were expelled in 1639. The first Portuguese brought Christianity and fire-arms; the Japanese tolerated the former for the latter. The Daimyo were engaged in constant wars; the island of Kyushu was especially independent. The Portuguese traded from Macao, bringing merchandise, matchlocks, and Jesuits. Some Daimyo allowed themselves to be baptized to obtain trade and guns. The Portuguese were genuinely more anxious for converts than trade. From 1592, Spaniards from Manila competed with Portuguese from Macao, and Dominican and Franciscan missionaries competed with Jesuits. They quarrelled furiously. When shown maps of the King of Spain’s dominions, the Japanese became alarmed for their independence.
In 1596, the Spanish ship San Felipe, en route from Manila to Acapulco, was becalmed off Japan. A local Daimyo had it run aground and claimed the cargo, valued at 600,000 crowns. Hideyoshi, acquiring supreme power, had the Spanish pilot interviewed by Masuda. The pilot produced a map showing Philip II’s dominions and said their Kings first send religionists to induce people to embrace their religion, then troops combine with the new Christians to accomplish conquest. As Spain and Portugal were both subject to Philip II, the Portuguese suffered from suspicion. The Dutch, at war with Spain, traded with Japan and spoke against the Jesuits and Papists. Will Adams, an Elizabethan sea captain, was wrecked in Japan and gave an account of the Armada. The Japanese had mastered fire-arms and thought they had nothing more to learn from Christian nations.
A succession of three great men—Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and lyeyasu—unified Japan, destroying the quasi-independence of feudal nobles, establishing internal peace until the Restoration, nearly two and a half centuries. The Jesuits and Friars had made about 300,000 converts, mostly in Kyushu, the last region subdued by Hideyoshi. They tended to disloyalty due to Christianity and geography. The revolt against the Shogun began there in 1867; Satsuma, the chief clan of Kyushu, has had great power since the Restoration, except during its rebellion of 1877. lyeyasu decided to persecute Christians vigorously, if possible without losing foreign trade. His successors were more anti-Christian. After an abortive revolt in 1637, Christianity was stamped out and foreign trade prohibited: “So long as the sun warms the earth, let no Christian be so bold as to come to Japan… they shall pay for it with their heads.” The persecution was due solely to political motives, not religious intolerance. The Japanese feared Christians might side with the King of Spain. Economic exploitation did not yet exist apart from political domination. The Japanese overrated Spain’s power; Japanese armies were larger than European armies, they had fire-arms and great strategic knowledge. Kyoto had about a million inhabitants. Japan’s population exceeded any European State. It would have been easy to conquer Manila, as Hideyoshi thought of doing. The Japanese sent pretended converts to Europe, who became priests, had audience of the Pope, and mastered European Imperialism’s meditated villainies. These spies increased the Government’s fears. Japan decided to have no further intercourse with white men; Russell cannot feel convinced this policy was unwise.
For over two hundred years, until Commodore Perry’s squadron came from the United States in 1853, Japan enjoyed complete peace and almost complete stagnation—the only period of either in Japanese history. It then became necessary to learn fresh lessons in fire-arms from Western nations. When learnt, perhaps another period of isolation will follow.
Modern Japan
The modern Japanese nation is unique in history, combining supposedly incompatible elements, realizing an original plan. The Japan that exists is almost exactly what the leaders of the Restoration in 1867 intended. America has risen and Russia has fallen, China has become a Republic, the Great War shattered Europe, but Japan’s statesmen have followed the road traced at the beginning of the Meiji era. One purpose has animated leaders: the strengthening and extension of the Empire. A new kind of policy combines the sources of strength in modern America with Rome at the Punic Wars, uniting pre-war Germany’s material organization with the Hebrews’ outlook in the Book of Joshua.
The transformation since 1867 is amazing, but more amazing is that such change in knowledge brought so little change in religion and ethics. Science supposedly tends to rationalism, yet scientific knowledge in Japan has synchronized with intensification of Mikado-worship and nationalism.
The Sacred and Inviolate Emperor
The constitutional framework of Imperial Japan rested on the absolute sanctity of the Emperor. Article 3 of the Constitution declared him “sacred and inviolate,” a status elaborated by Marquis Ito’s commentary, which described the Throne as heaven-descended and divine, established at the very separation of heaven and earth. The Emperor was pre-eminent above all subjects, to be reverenced, and while he might pay respect to law, the law could not hold him accountable, nor could he be made a topic of derogatory discussion. He wielded legislative, executive, and judiciary power, could convoke and dissolve the Diet, and issue ordinances in its stead. He commanded the armed forces, declared war, made peace, and concluded treaties. Ministerial responsibility, per Article 55, flowed solely to the Emperor, who alone appointed and dismissed Ministers. The Diet was denied the power to hold them accountable, though it could question them publicly. There was no joint responsibility among Ministers; each was personally appointed, and Ito rejected the corporate Cabinet system, fearing party combination would overrule the Sovereign’s supreme power.
The Diet, the War, and the Industrial Dilemma
Despite its small powers, the Diet caused considerable annoyance between 1890 and 1894. Until that year, Marquis Ito controlled policy, opposing militarism, while the older Meiji statesmen focused on education and social organization to preserve independence without imperialist expansion. When the Diet proved difficult, they imitated Bismarck’s tactic of military glory, and in 1894 Japan warred against China, securing Diet support. Ito was responsible for the war’s outbreak, though he later opposed predatory war and was ultimately murdered in Korea. Since 1894, Japan pursued consistent imperialism, and the Diet became as unimportant as it had been under the Tudors. An unsuccessful war would destroy national unity, as Japan would not be firm in defeat like Germany. Industrialism was explosive: Japan needed industry for its growing population, which required control of Chinese raw materials, which in turn required a strong navy. In Osaka’s cotton industry, girls under fourteen worked eleven hours daily for a pittance. Labour organization and Socialism were persecuted but would inevitably spread, and class conflict between proletarians and employers was likely within twenty to thirty years, potentially synchronizing with agrarian discontent.
Japan’s Dilemma and the Illusion of the “Yellow Races”
Japan’s fundamental dilemma was that population growth required industry, industry required Chinese raw materials, which opposed American and European interests, requiring large military forces, which created wage-earner poverty, which bred Socialism and dissolved Mikado-worship. External threats included war with America or a Chinese revival; the internal threat was proletarian revolution. The only escape was birth-rate reduction, but this opposed Japanese religion and morality based on patriotism and filial piety. More intense Westernization—free thought, scepticism, reduced herd-instinct—was needed. The concept of the “Yellow Races” was misleading; ethnic affinities mattered little, cultural similarity more. Japanese culture derived from China—script, Buddhism, Confucian loyalty—but developed differently. China was a unified bureaucratic land empire, while Japan was an island kingdom divided into warring clans, developing feudal chivalry. Confucius’s doctrines suited feudal Japan, and Japanese loyalty to clan chieftains became patriotism, while Chinese security bred courtesy and compromise. Western influence accentuated these differences: the Chinese liked Western thought but disliked mechanism; the Japanese liked mechanism but disliked thought. Asia, including Russia, might be a unity, but Japan was excluded. Russia, China, and India had vast peasant plains, easily swayed by military empires, while Japan, like Great Britain, depended on commerce. Japan lacked a Liberal mentality, pursuing Asiatic conquest instead, bringing conflicts with China and Russia.
Japanese Ambitions and the Wars with China and Russia
Japan held incompatible ambitions: championing Asia against white oppression while seeking white equality and joining in exploiting inefficient nations. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance inspired Korean annexation and virtual annexation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Count Okuma claimed three hundred million Indians looked to Japan for rescue, and Dr. Ichimura listed white men’s sins—considering only whites human, selfishness, racial pride, extremism, money-worship—which Russell found “wholly just,” but the Japanese drew the moral to imitate whites, not be unlike them. Japan wanted to be above whites, not equal. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 concerned Korea, with both sides claiming infringement of agreements; it was rival imperialisms, and China was decisively defeated. Russia, Germany, and France intervened, England holding aloof, making the Russo-Japanese war inevitable. Russia acquired Port Arthur, Dalny, and railway rights in Manchuria. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 was the corner-stone of Japanese foreign policy, providing mutual assistance if either Power was attacked by two Powers, preventing Russia from calling on France. Without it, Japan could not have fought Russia and France alone. The war’s results saw Russia renounce Korean interference, surrender Port Arthur and Dalny, and the railway to Changchun.
The Twenty-One Demands and the Great War
In 1914, China could have been induced to join the Allies against Germany at Kiao-Chow, but Japan undertook the work, insisting China remain neutral until 1917. After capturing Tsing-tau, Japan presented the Twenty-One Demands in January 1915, which gave the Chinese Question its modern form. The demands had five groups: the first dealt with Shantung, demanding China agree in advance to any terms Japan made with Germany; the second concerned South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, demanding a protectorate; the third gave Japan a monopoly of mines and iron/steel works in a Yangtze region; the fourth demanded China not cede any harbor or island to any Power except Japan; the fifth demanded Japanese political, financial, and military advisers, joint police administration, purchase of munitions from Japan, railway rights, industrial priority in Fukien, and missionary propaganda rights. These demands involved a complete loss of Chinese independence and attacked the British position in the Yangtze. Mr. Lloyd George never heard of them until explained by the Chinese Delegation at Versailles, yet concluded a secret agreement with Japan in February 1917 supporting Japan’s claims in Shantung. Japan broke the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by communicating only the first four groups. China secured modifications but yielded to an ultimatum, accepting on May 9, 1915. The United States immediately notified Japan it could not recognize the agreement, and in November 1917, the Ishii-Lansing Agreement recognized Japan’s special interests in China.
China’s Entry into the War and Its Aftermath
America led in severing diplomatic relations with Germany. Dr. Paul S. Reinsch induced China to send a Note of expostulation on February 9, 1917, and to break off relations on March 14th, though the declaration of war was not until August 14th. Japan opposed China’s participation. In November 1915, Viscount Ishii stated Japan must keep a firm hand. In July 1916, Russia and Japan concluded a secret treaty, subsequently published by the Bolsheviks, binding each to assist the other and safeguarding China from political domination by a third Power, violating Article 3 of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. On February 16, 1917, Britain concluded an agreement supporting Japan’s claims in Shantung and islands north of the equator; France gave similar assurances. Japan then saw no objection to China’s participation, using the war issue to increase internal strife in China. President Li Yuan Hung opposed severing relations; Prime Minister Tuan Chih-jui favored war. The militarists attempted to coerce Parliament and brought military force to bear on the President to dissolve Parliament unconstitutionally. Members of Parliament retired to the South. In July, a militarist effected a five days’ restoration of the Manchu Emperor. The President resigned. China entered the war for democracy and against militarism, while the Allies’ objects were to confiscate German property and expel Germans. Japan gained from the Chinese declaration of war: the Northern military faction was dependent on Japan, and in March 1918, military and naval agreements enabled Japan to send troops into Chinese territory and acquire control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. During 1918, Japan placed loans in China to the extent of Yen 246,000,000. By Article 156 of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany renounced her rights in Shantung in favor of Japan, and the Chinese delegates refused to sign the Treaty. Young China moved public opinion on the anti-Japanese cry, and the pro-Japanese An Fu party was ejected from the Peking Government in the summer of 1920.
Russia and the Siberian Question
The Washington Conference determined not to concern itself with Russia, whose Bolsheviks’ existence embarrassed America. Japan’s conduct towards Russia had been bad. At the time of the Czecho-Slovak revolt, the Allies occupied Vladivostok, but all withdrew except the Japanese. Siberia east of Lake Baikal formed the Far Eastern Republic, with its capital at Chita. The Japanese launched miniature Kolchaks—Semenov, Horvath, Ungern—all defeated, but Japan remained in military occupation of Vladivostok. The Russians lost Northern Manchuria, now controlled by Japan, and a board of Chinese and reactionary Russians formed the directorate of the Chinese Eastern Railway. There was no through communication by rail between Peking and Europe. Outer Mongolia was conquered by Bolshevik armies, who had the enthusiastic sympathy of younger Chinese students. Russia might become strong enough to secure some real freedom for China.
The Shantung Treaty and the Washington Conference
At the Washington Conference, the Japanese initially sought direct negotiation with China rather than Conference discussion, aiming to establish an informal Japanese Protectorate over China. The Conference agreed to direct negotiations, but Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour were to mediate in case of deadlock. A deadlock occurred; Britain no longer backed Japan whole-heartedly, and American opinion forced the Administration to urge Japan to yield, lest the Senate refuse ratification of the Conference treaties. This produced the Shantung Treaty, by which China recovered everything in Shantung except Japanese private property and railway restrictions. China offered to buy back the railway, having raised half the money through a patriotic merchant movement, but Japan refused, compelling China to borrow from the Japanese Government, repayable in fifteen years. Until repayment, Japan retained control: a Japanese traffic manager and two accountants under a Chinese President. On paper, China gains everything in five years, but only if a Power forces Japan to keep its word; Hughes and Balfour urged this compromise, so America and Britain bear responsibility. Manchuria and Inner Mongolia were not raised at Washington, and Japan’s position there remains secure until China or Russia challenges it. The Siberian question was also unsettled, with a chronic semi-war between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic. A conference at Dairen between Japan and the Chita Government broke up on April 16th, 1922. Russell believed the Russian account of the breakdown, noting even the Japanese communique showed unwillingness to evacuate Vladivostok, comparing their vague promise to Mr. Gladstone’s promise to evacuate Egypt. The Conference went well for Chita until the Senate ratified the Washington treaties; afterward Japan sought compensation at the Far Eastern Republic’s expense. Japanese policy involved hostility to Russia, explaining friendship between Japan and France: both championed nationalistic capitalism against international capitalism, relying on armaments for income while England and America relied on commerce. An uninvited Far Eastern Republic delegation at Washington produced documents suggesting France and Japan were secret allies; authenticity was denied but widely believed. Washington and Genoa have sown seeds of future wars.
America’s Role and the Failure of Idealism
Russell then considered America, the Conference’s leading spirit. American public opinion favored peace but believed America wise and virtuous, believing in commerce, Protestant morality, athletics, hygiene, and hypocrisy—the ingredients of Anglo-Saxon Kultur. Every American Russell met in the Far East was a missionary for American Kultur. He distinguished conscious hypocrisy (Japanese diplomats) from unconscious Anglo-Saxon hypocrisy, citing Labouchere on Gladstone: he thought the Lord had put the card up his sleeve. Gladstonian England was a moral force; America is now, but a similar decline is inevitable. Idealism is incompatible with tolerance; art cannot exist amid bustling philanthropy. America has been China’s best friend, Japan its worst enemy. Russell was glad Britain befriended America, abandoning the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but not in hostility to Japan. American policy on China and naval armaments, while good for the world, is in line with American interests: with a navy equal to Britain’s, America controls the seas; limiting armaments decreases cost. American ambitions in China are economic, requiring the Open Door; spheres of influence suit a rich country less. America’s liberal policy is no reason to expect liberalism against self-interest. Evidence: Panama tolls—a Bill passed by two-thirds of the House of Representatives discriminating against British shipping, despite treaty obligations, showing Bethmann-Hollweg’s view of treaties. Also Russian trade: American hostility to Bolsheviks remained implacable; Gompers thunders against “shaking hands with murder.”
The Consortium and the Threat of Financial Control
Russell quoted The Freeman (November 23, 1921): On November 1st, the Chinese Government failed to meet a $5,500,000 obligation to a Chicago banking-house; the State Department had facilitated the loan, then cabled Peking with intimations of serious effects. American consortium bankers offered to advance money covering the default and other arrears, with State Department support—”heroes and villains of the piece,” preparing an American financial protectorate. The Peking Government decided not to accept consortium loans; the article concludes the plan would make consortium bankers virtual owners of China, with American bankers best positioned. At the Conference’s start, an attempt was made by consortium banks, with British connivance, to establish international control. Russell quoted the Japan Weekly Chronicle (November 17, 1921): Mr. Wellington Koo told the Philadelphia Public Ledger: “We suspect the motives… China will bitterly oppose any Conference plan to offer China international aid… International control will not do. China must be given time and opportunity to find herself.” Russell called these wise words.
The Prospect of War and the Fate of Japan
The Japanese Government viewed war with America as unavoidable, believing American economic imperialism would not tolerate a rival in the Pacific. The Japanese would face a choice between starvation and the battlefield, with Bushido leading them to choose battle. Admiral Sato, called the Japanese Bernhardi, claimed Americans lack Bushido and will be defeated due to their “money-grubbing souls.” Russell called this “romantic nonsense,” stating Bushido is useless in modern war and Americans are equally courageous. A war would end in Japan’s defeat. Russell drew a parallel to England and Germany before 1914: Germans sought a colonial empire, as do the Japanese; the British considered such methods wicked, as do the Americans; German industrial competition roused hostility, as does Japan’s; Germans felt encircled, as do the Japanese, isolated at Washington. Germany challenged the world and fell; Japan may do likewise, though Japan aims only at hegemony in Eastern Asia, not the world. The conflict is superficially economic but cloaks deeper passions. Japan believes in the divine right of kings; America in the divine right of commerce. Americans believe their religion and culture superior, which Russell called a delusion. The Japanese long to preserve their culture, and Russell sympathized. Color prejudice is more intense among Americans; the Japanese are determined to prove the yellow man equal to the white, where justice is on Japan’s side. Thus, on deeper issues, Russell’s feelings go with Japan. However, Japan puts itself in the wrong through impatience and contempt. They should have claimed for China the consideration they extorted for themselves. The Chinese are prone to gratitude and would have helped Japan loyally, but the Japanese despise the Chinese more than Europeans do. This behavior caused well-deserved hatred in China and made the best Americans hostile. If Japan changes its Chinese policy and adopts a more democratic constitution, it could win affection; otherwise, it will fall as Germany fell. A war between America and Japan would destroy Japanese civilization, subjugate China to Western culture, and launch America on worldwide militaristic imperialism. To avoid it, Japan must become more liberal, which requires discrediting the present regime by failure. Russell suggested Japan should be forced by joint Anglo-American diplomatic pressure to disgorge Shantung and all of Manchuria except Port Arthur. The Alliance with Japan since the Russo-Japanese war has encouraged Japan’s mistakes; ending it is necessary for reform.
Russia’s Potential and the Inapplicability of Bolshevism
Turning to Russia, Russell dismissed the view of Russia as decrepit. Despite starvation and industrial standstill, Russia can steal a march in Persia, Afghanistan, and Outer Mongolia, and organize Bolshevik propaganda across Asia. In China proper, Bolshevism affects only younger students, appealing as a method of developing industry without private capitalism. But Bolshevism is inapplicable to China because: it requires a strong centralized state, while China is weak and tending toward federalism; it requires much government control, while China has developed personal liberty; and it dislikes private trading, which is China’s breath of life. However, Bolshevism as a political force is not the same as a creed; its Asiatic expansion is a continuation of traditional Russian policy, carried on by more energetic and intelligent men than the Tsar’s officials, who believe they are liberating mankind. Russia may regain Manchuria and influence over Peking if Japan is at war with America or Britain. Russians have an instinct for colonization and have trekked eastward for centuries. Russell would not regret Russian hegemony in Asia: Russia would not tyrannize as much as the English, Americans, or Japanese; Russians are sufficiently Asiatic to relate to Asiatics; an Asiatic block would be strong for defense and weak for attack, making for peace.
China’s Ideal Interest and the Failure of the Washington Conference
China’s ideal interest would be to recover Manchuria and Shantung and be left alone. The anarchy in China might take time to subside, but a system suited to China would emerge. Artificial ending of anarchy by outside interference means a system convenient for foreign trade, not for the Chinese. England, France, America, and Russia passed through anarchy and civil war essential to their development. Western political ideas have swept away the old imperial system but not replaced it stably. Foreigners should be patient; the Chinese understand their own country. The Washington Conference decisions will not permanently benefit China. In Manchuria the status quo is maintained; in Shantung the Japanese made concessions. The Four Powers—America, Great Britain, France, and Japan—agreed to exploit China in combination. A consortium for loans will have the power of the purse and become the real government. Americans, with spare capital, will control it, turning Chinese into “muscular Christians” and enriching financiers, who will establish colleges, hospitals, and Y.M.C.A.s and buy artistic treasures. Chinese intellect will be in the pay of Trust magnates. Russell stated it is impossible to make peace and freedom out of capitalism. The fourfold agreement safeguards peace but puts freedom further off. It is like competing firms joining a combine. The Open Door principle merely ensures American domination. Americans would wish for a stable government, increased purchasing power, and no territorial aggression, but not for Chinese owning railways or mines. They will keep dossiers on students, hound out Socialists, and insist on hypocrisy, as with Gorky. They will destroy beauty and substitute tidiness, preventing China from contributing a new civilization. The ideal of capitalism would destroy competition among capitalists via Trusts but keep competition among workers alive. Trade Unionism has diminished competition within countries but intensified conflict between races, especially white and yellow. Under capitalism, cheap Asiatic labor harms white labor; under Socialism, immigration of productive workers would be a gain. Capitalism creates artificial conflicts of interest. The question of Asiatic immigration can only be solved by Socialism, which harmonizes private interests with national and world interests.
The Promise of Chinese Science
Russell argues that the stagnation of traditional Chinese civilization stems not from racial decadence but from a lack of new intellectual material. Western knowledge, he believes, provides the necessary stimulus, and Chinese students are both able and eager to receive it. He contends that Chinese civilization, while deficient in science, never contained anything inherently hostile to it, unlike the Church in Europe. With a stable government and adequate funding, he predicts China could produce remarkable scientific work within thirty years, possibly outstripping the West, with an enthusiasm reminiscent of fifteenth-century Italy.
The Contrast of Western and Chinese Aims
Unlike the Japanese, the Chinese seek from the West things of ethical, social, or intellectual value, not wealth or military strength. The Great War made many Chinese doubt the moral superiority of Western civilization, and some younger ones hoped Bolshevism would offer a solution, though that hope was suffering disappointment. Russell observes that the Japanese adopted Western faults while keeping their own, but the Chinese may keep their merits and adopt Western virtues. The West’s distinctive merit is the scientific method, while China’s is a just conception of the ends of life. He contrasts Lao-Tze’s description of Tao—”production without possession, action without self-assertion, development without domination”—with the Western pursuit of possession and domination, which Nietzsche erected into a philosophy. Though the Chinese are tenacious of money and their politics are corrupt, they show less desire to tyrannize than white races, and this virtue is partly the cause of China’s international weakness.
The Roots of Chinese Pacifism
Chinese pacifism is rooted in a contemplative outlook, as exemplified by Po-Chui’s poem “The Old Man with the Broken Arm,” which makes a hero of a recruit who maimed himself to avoid service. The Chinese lack the Western ideal of progress; they seek knowledge as a gateway to wisdom, while white men go to China to fight, make money, and convert. The Chinese are tolerant and do not seek to convert others to Confucianism. Russell believes the average Chinaman is happier than the average Englishman, though the Chinese go too far in the other direction. He went to teach but learned more than he taught, and he notes that the Chinese have a power of securing the affection of foreigners; almost all Europeans like China. New arrivals notice the evils—beggars, poverty, disease, corruption—but gradually begin to doubt Western maxims. The Chinese retain a capacity for civilized enjoyment, leisure, and laughter, and possess an imperturbable quiet dignity that is not self-assertive. The typical Westerner wishes to cause changes, while the typical Chinaman wishes to enjoy; Western “progress” is really a love of power.
Defects and Virtues of the Chinese Character
Russell acknowledges three defects in the Chinese character: avarice, cowardice, and callousness. Callousness is shown in indifference to famine; cowardice is rational in mercenary battles, but they endure torture passively. Avarice is the gravest, as Chinese politicians resist Japanese bribes poorly. However, they are capable of wild excitement, as in the Boxer rising. Chinese avarice is widespread, with tuchuns (military governors) using power to amass fortunes and escape to Japan. Yet the corruption of Chinese politics does less harm than the efficient governments of the West. Individual liberty survives in China, and men think for themselves. “Saving face” carries out respect for personal dignity, and Chinese politeness interferes with efficiency and sincerity. They love compromise, as shown by their treatment of the Manchu Emperor, who was left with his title and palace. Public opinion caused the An Fu party’s downfall in summer 1920, and hatred of Japan is the strongest political passion. The teachers’ strike showed public feeling for education. The Chinese are patient, aware of the foreign menace—Japan in Manchuria and Shantung, England in Hong-Kong. They have been conquered by Tartars and Manchus but absorbed them. Chinese immigrants into Manchuria exceed the Japanese a hundredfold. China is a civilization, not a political entity, and the only one surviving from ancient times. Their art is perishing under industrialism, but the pacific temper may persist unless the West forces militarism upon them. China is misjudged as a museum, but patriotic Chinese promote higher education to acquire Western knowledge without Western follies.
The Old and the New in Education
The old curriculum involves rote learning of classics without explanation in youth, followed by intelligent study later, similar to eighteenth-century classical study in England. Men over thirty typically began in old-fashioned schools, which still form the majority and provide most elementary education. Children memorize classical text portions daily, reciting aloud simultaneously, creating a deafening din. Reading is widespread—even coolies in large towns often read—but writing, being very difficult in Chinese, is rarer; perhaps five percent can both read and write. Normal schools grew from the 1905 edict abolishing the old examination system. Statistics from Mr. Tyau’s China Awakened show schools rising from 42,444 in 1910 to 134,000 in 1919, and students from 1,625,534 to 4,500,000—remarkable progress despite revolution and civil war. Universal elementary education schemes exist but remain unimplemented except on small scales due to disturbance and lack of funds; a stable government would enable them.
The Influence of Missionary and American Education
Missionary education, now almost entirely American, was acquired through the Boxer indemnity. Critics claim Americans demanded vastly more than actual losses, then devoted the surplus to educating Chinese students. This has justified itself politically and commercially, as more posts go to American-influenced men who believe America is China’s one true friend. Tsing-Hua College, about ten miles from Peking, owes its existence entirely to Boxer indemnity money. It resembles a small American university with a Chinese President reproducing the American College President type. Entering its gates reveals virtues usually absent in China: cleanliness, punctuality, exactitude, and efficiency. Students learn English, which is essential since Chinese differs so profoundly from European languages that translation alone cannot convey European ideas. They study mathematics, science, and philosophy, and many go to America for Doctor’s degrees, returning as teachers or civil servants, contributing to efficiency, honesty, and technical intelligence. The Rockefeller Hospital and Peking Union Medical College combine Chinese beauty with European utilitarian requirements, but with Standard Oil’s monopolistic tendency, it refuses use to outsiders. Scientific medicine is immensely important to China, which lacks sanitation and suffers frequent epidemics.
The Peking University Naming Dispute and Returned Students
The Chinese Government established a fully equipped university named Peking University, but Methodist missionaries gave their schools the same name, forcing the existing institution to rename itself “Government University.” Russell compares this to old-fashioned Chinamen in London forcing London University to abandon its name. He does not wish to raise extra-territoriality, though it cannot be abandoned for years despite abuses. Returned students form a definite set with a Peking “Returned Students’ Club.” Europeans speak ill of them without good reason. Those who studied only in Japan are not regarded as equals by those from Europe or America. America stamps students more definitively than other countries; those returning from England are less Anglicized than American-returned students are Americanized. To modern Chinese, skyscrapers and hustle seem romantic, being unlike home. Old European traditions are mushroom growths compared to China’s, where authentic Confucius descendants abound.
The Critique of Americanism
Though American educational work is admirable, foreign direction cannot satisfy China’s needs. Chinese civilization and temperament are in many ways superior to white men’s. Americans never discover this; they remain missionaries—not of Christianity but of Americanism. Americanism means “Clean living, clean thinking, and pep”—substituting tidiness for art, cleanliness for beauty, moralizing for philosophy, prostitutes for concubines, and busyness for leisurely calm. Voltaire’s “aimer et penser” are common in China but incompatible with “pep.” American influence would save lives through hygiene but make them not worth saving.
Chinese-Controlled Modern Education
The best Chinese educationists have established modern schools under Chinese direction, with some European or American teachers but not the Y.M.C.A. spirit. White-controlled education seems designed to produce tools for capitalist penetration. Modern Chinese schools are not nationalist hotbeds but teach free thought, judged by intelligence not utility. Russell’s seminar at Peking Government University surpassed anything for keenness, candour, and fearlessness. The Science Society of Nanking impressed similarly. Young Chinese desire Western knowledge while realizing Western vices—scientific but not mechanical, industrial but not capitalistic. They are all Socialists, as are most of their best teachers. They respect European knowledge but set aside arrogance. These institutions lack adequate libraries, thorough English teaching, and mental discipline.
The Prospects of Industrialism
Russell cites Mr. Tyau’s statistics: at the end of 1916, factory hands were officially estimated at 560,000 and mine workers at 406,000, with no official returns since, though a million each might be approximate now. Mr. Tyau praises textile factories with wages from 15 to 45 cents a day, which Russell notes are very low. Russell suggests that as industry develops, Socialism and labour unrest will grow, and if Mr. Tyau represents the modern Chinese governing classes, government policy towards Labour will be illiberal, as Tyau’s outlook is that of an American capitalist. Most Young Chinese Russell met were Socialists, and he hopes the traditional Chinese dislike of uncompromising fierceness will make the Government less savage against Labour than America and Japan. There is room for a great textile industry in China, needing only enterprise. Shipbuilding has begun in Shanghai and would develop with a native iron and steel industry. Total exports of native produce in 1919 were just under £200,000,000, with imports slightly larger. Foreign trade is increasing fast, and China’s economic life is little affected by revolutions and civil wars.
Railways, Mines, and Industrial Control
For railways, nationalization is desirable to prevent foreign control. For mines, development by Chinese is urgent; legislation should make sales to foreigners or loans on mine security legally invalid, though extra-territoriality makes this difficult. Nationalizing all mines now would be unwise; instead, encourage Chinese private enterprise, but the Government should retain rights to buy out concerns and work minerals if owners fail. Mines should eventually be nationalized except where diplomatic agreements like at Tayeh stand in the way; Tayeh must be recovered by China. Europeans say Chinese are not good at managing large joint-stock companies, though honest in business; their businesses usually don’t extend beyond a single family and suffer from nepotism. Russell believes modern education is changing this, as many Chinese have trained in America, there are Colleges of Commerce at Woosung, and Young China’s patriotism leads educated men into industrial development. Chinese are more suited to commerce than industry, but contact with the West is introducing new aptitudes. Industrial development should be controlled by Chinese.
The Outlook for China
Russell takes the standpoint of a progressive Chinese. China must be saved by her own efforts. The Great War was unfortunate, as it gave Japan a free hand; the collapse of Tsarist Russia was fortunate, as it ended the secret Russian-Japanese alliance; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was unfortunate; friction between Japan and America was fortunate; the Washington Conference agreement, though momentarily advantageous regarding Shantung, will likely prove unfortunate as it makes America less willing to oppose Japan. All Great Powers have interests incompatible with China’s welfare, so Chinese must seek salvation in their own energy. A certain cultural independence is as important as political independence. A compromise is necessary: unless they adopt some of our vices, we won’t respect them. A patriotic spirit is necessary—not the bigoted anti-foreign spirit of the Boxers, but an enlightened attitude. This has been generated by the “brutal tuition of Japan.” The danger is that patriotism may turn to foreign aggression; China could become the greatest Power after the United States. Patriotism should be only defensive.
The Three Chief Requisites
The three chief requisites are: the establishment of an orderly Government, industrial development under Chinese control, and the spread of education. Good government is the prerequisite of all other reforms. At the time of writing, a battle between Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu is imminent; Chang is considered the most reactionary force, while Wu-Pei-Fu, called “the Liberal leader” by The Times, may prove no more satisfactory. Chinese Constitutionalists are concerting a joint programme involving convoking a Parliament and ceasing military usurpation. They may offer a high constitutional position to a powerful general, as student agitation turned the scales in July 1920 in favour of Wu-Pei-Fu against the An Fu party. Foreign Powers won’t lend except for sacrifices of independence; Russell doesn’t accept American consortium bankers’ statement that a loan wouldn’t involve control. An internal loan appealing to Chinese merchants’ patriotism is the only way out, but rich Chinese won’t lend to the brigands controlling the Government.
A Federal Constitution and the Path Forward
A permanent Constitution will have to be federal, allowing provincial autonomy, reserving few things for the Central Government. A mistake was made in 1912 in not allowing provincial feeling more scope. A strongly disciplined society of progressive people is needed, avoiding corruption, championing national interests. China must recover the Treaty Ports, control of the tariff, and free itself from extra-territoriality, but this can probably be done without offending foreign Powers, as in Japan. Russia has suffered from universal hostility provoked by the Bolsheviks. For industrial development, all railways ought to be in State hands, and successful mines purchased by the State. Contracts with foreigners should leave control to China. State Capitalism (Lenin’s term) is desirable: the State can borrow more easily, employ foreign experts, and ensure vital industries don’t come under foreign control. It can prevent the growth of evils of private capitalism. This requires a change in Chinese morals—public spirit instead of family ethic, honesty in public service, and energy. Young China is capable of this. China should learn to become technical experts and skilled workers, importing skilled workmen from Germany if necessary to train them.
Main Arguments
Russell’s central argument is that China’s problems stem from a combination of internal weaknesses and external pressures, and that any solution must respect Chinese civilization while incorporating Western knowledge. He argues that China’s traditional civilization, while deficient in science, possesses virtues that the West lacks, particularly a just conception of the ends of life.
The book argues that Western powers, especially Japan, have treated China with consistent injustice. Russell documents the series of wars, treaties, and encroachments through which China lost fiscal independence, territorial integrity, and political sovereignty. He argues that the Western claim to moral superiority is hypocritical, and that China’s suffering has been caused primarily by foreign aggression rather than Chinese inadequacy.
Russell argues that China’s political troubles are not due to mere anarchy, noting that Europe has more governments, fiercer enmities, and more fighting since the Armistice. He contends that Chinese battles are seldom bloody and that the Chinese are on average happier than Europeans. The political solution, he argues, must be a federal constitution with large provincial autonomy, as provincial feeling is strong and ancient.
A key argument concerns the relationship between Chinese culture and Western knowledge. Russell contends that the Chinese need to acquire Western science and technical skill without adopting Western vices. He argues that what the West has to teach China is not morals but science, and that the real problem is to acquire Western knowledge without Western follies.
Russell argues that Japan’s imperial policy is ultimately self-defeating. Japan faces a dilemma: population growth requires industry, industry requires Chinese raw materials, this opposes American and European interests, this requires large military forces, this creates wage-earner poverty, and poverty breeds Socialism that dissolves Mikado-worship. The only escape is birth-rate reduction, but this opposes Japanese religion and morality.
The book argues that capitalism is fundamentally incompatible with peace and freedom in Asia. Russell contends that the Washington Conference agreements, while momentarily advantageous regarding Shantung, will likely prove unfortunate because they make America less willing to oppose Japan. He argues that the fourfold agreement among the Powers to exploit China in combination will create an American financial protectorate, with consortium bankers becoming virtual owners of China.
Russell argues that China must be saved by her own efforts. All Great Powers have interests incompatible with China’s welfare, so Chinese must seek salvation in their own energy. The three chief requisites are: establishment of an orderly government, industrial development under Chinese control, and spread of education. Good government is the prerequisite of all other reforms.
Key Concepts
The book develops several distinctive concepts for understanding China and its place in the world. One central concept is the distinction between China as a civilization and China as a political entity. Russell argues that China is the only civilization surviving from ancient times, and that its persistence is due not to military skill but to cultural absorption of conquerors. The Tartars and Manchus conquered China but were themselves absorbed by Chinese civilization.
Another key concept is the role of ideograms in Chinese civilization. Russell analyzes how the Chinese writing system, using characters that represent ideas rather than sounds, has shaped Chinese culture. The ideograms allow communication across dialects and have preserved the classics for millennia, but they also create practical difficulties for modernization, including problems with dictionaries, filing systems, and printing technology.
The concept of filial piety is central to Russell’s analysis of Chinese ethics. He argues that filial piety is the weakest point in Confucian ethics because it militates against public spirit. The family system, while providing stability, leads to corruption and intrigue in public life. Russell argues that the decay of the family system is vital for progress.
Russell introduces the concept of the Tuchuns, military governors who have governed China despotically since the death of Yuan Shih-k’ai. He analyzes the characters of the leading Tuchuns, contrasting the reactionary Chang-tso-lin with the liberal Wu-Pei-Fu, while expressing skepticism about whether any military leader can provide genuine constitutional government.
The book develops the concept of Young China, the generation of educated Chinese who have assimilated Western ideas. Russell distinguishes two generations: older men who fought their way out of Confucian prejudices, and younger men who found modern schools waiting. He sees in these young men the hope of China, arguing that in another ten years they will probably be strong enough to regenerate China.
The concept of Americanism is developed as a critique of American cultural influence. Russell defines Americanism as “clean living, clean thinking, and pep,” arguing that it substitutes tidiness for art, cleanliness for beauty, and busyness for leisurely calm. He argues that American influence would save lives through hygiene but make them not worth saving.
The concept of the Genro, or Elder Statesmen, is used to analyze Japanese politics. Russell argues that Japan has a real Government behind the nominal one, with the Prime Minister and Cabinet presented as the Government while the Genro exercise actual power. This pattern, he notes, continued from the Shogunate through the Restoration.
Themes
A recurring theme is the contrast between Chinese and Western civilization. Russell argues that Chinese civilization, though unprogressive, lacks new material rather than racial decadence. The Chinese seek knowledge as a gateway to wisdom, while white men go to China to fight, make money, and convert. The West’s distinctive merit is scientific method; China’s is a just conception of the ends of life. Russell quotes Lao-Tze’s description of Tao as “production without possession, action without self-assertion, development without domination,” contrasting this with the Western pursuit of possession, self-assertion, and domination.
The theme of happiness runs throughout the book. Russell argues that the average Chinaman is happier than the average Englishman, and that Chinese life brings more happiness to Chinese men than English life to Englishmen. The Chinese retain capacity for civilized enjoyment, leisure, and laughter, with imperturbable quiet dignity. The typical Westerner wishes to cause changes; the typical Chinaman wishes to enjoy. Western “progress” is really love of power.
The theme of imperialism and its consequences is central. Russell documents how Western powers and Japan have encroached upon Chinese sovereignty through wars, treaties, and economic exploitation. He argues that the Open Door principle merely ensures American domination, and that the consortium system will make bankers virtual owners of China. The theme of capitalist exploitation is connected to the argument that it is impossible to make peace and freedom out of capitalism.
The theme of education as salvation appears throughout the book. Russell examines traditional Chinese education, missionary and American education, and Chinese-controlled modern education. He argues that the spread of education is one of the three chief requisites for China’s salvation, and that young Chinese desire Western knowledge while realizing Western vices. He describes his seminar at Peking Government University as surpassing anything for keenness, candour, and fearlessness.
The theme of Japanese militarism and its consequences is developed through the analysis of Japanese history and policy. Russell argues that Japan’s transformation since 1867 is amazing, but more amazing is that such change in knowledge brought so little change in religion and ethics. The Japanese adopted Western faults and kept their own, while the Chinese may keep their merits and adopt Western virtues.
The theme of Chinese character is examined in detail. Russell identifies three defects: avarice, cowardice, and callousness. But he also identifies virtues: tolerance, pacifism, and capacity for civilized enjoyment. He argues that Chinese politeness interferes with efficiency and sincerity, but that “saving face” carries out respect for personal dignity. The Chinese love compromise, as shown by their treatment of the Manchu Emperor, left with title and palace.
The Author’s Conclusions
Russell concludes that China’s salvation must come from Chinese efforts, not foreign intervention. He argues that all Great Powers have interests incompatible with China’s welfare, so Chinese must seek salvation in their own energy. The Great War was unfortunate because it gave Japan a free hand; the collapse of Tsarist Russia was fortunate because it ended the secret Russian-Japanese alliance; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was unfortunate; friction between Japan and America was fortunate; the Washington Conference agreement, though momentarily advantageous regarding Shantung, will likely prove unfortunate because it makes America less willing to oppose Japan.
Russell identifies three chief requisites for China: establishment of an orderly government, industrial development under Chinese control, and spread of education. Good government is the prerequisite of all other reforms. He notes that at the time of writing, a battle between Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu is imminent, with Chang considered the most reactionary force while Wu-Pei-Fu may prove no more satisfactory. Chinese Constitutionalists are concerting a joint programme involving convoking a Parliament and ceasing military usurpation.
A certain cultural independence is as important as political independence. Russell argues that a compromise is necessary: unless the Chinese adopt some of our vices, we won’t respect them. A patriotic spirit is necessary, not the bigoted anti-foreign spirit of the Boxers, but an enlightened attitude generated by the “brutal tuition of Japan.” The danger is that patriotism may turn to foreign aggression; China could become the greatest Power after the United States. Patriotism should be only defensive.
Russell concludes that China’s traditional civilization, though deficient in science, never contained anything hostile to it. With stable government and funds, China could produce remarkable scientific work within thirty years, possibly outstripping the West. Unlike the Japanese, the Chinese seek from the West things of ethical, social, or intellectual value, not wealth or military strength. The Japanese adopted our faults and kept their own; the Chinese may keep their merits and adopt ours.
The book ends with qualified hope. Russell sees in Young China the hope of the country, with young men under thirty having assimilated Western ideas without great struggle. He believes that in another ten years they will probably be strong enough to regenerate China, if the Powers allow. The Chinese are patient, aware of foreign menace, but capable of wild excitement. Their art is perishing under industrialism, but the pacific temper may persist unless the West forces militarism upon them.
Significance
The book is significant as one of the most thoughtful Western analyses of China’s situation in the early twentieth century. Russell brings to the subject a combination of philosophical depth, political awareness, and personal observation that distinguishes his work from both apologetic imperialist writing and naive idealization of China. His willingness to criticize Western conduct while acknowledging Chinese weaknesses gives the book a balanced quality rare in the literature of the period.
The book is also significant for its early recognition of Japan’s imperial ambitions and their consequences. Russell’s analysis of Japanese policy, including the Twenty-One Demands and Japan’s conduct during the Great War, anticipated later developments in the Pacific. His argument that Japan’s policy was ultimately self-defeating, leading to a choice between starvation and the battlefield, proved prescient.
Russell’s critique of American cultural and economic imperialism is another significant contribution. His concept of Americanism, with its substitution of tidiness for art and busyness for leisurely calm, remains relevant to discussions of cultural globalization. His argument that American educational work, though admirable, cannot satisfy China’s needs because foreign direction cannot replace Chinese self-determination, speaks to ongoing debates about international development.
The book’s analysis of Chinese civilization and character contributes to Western understanding of China. Russell’s argument that Chinese civilization possesses virtues the West lacks, particularly a just conception of the ends of life, challenged prevailing assumptions of Western superiority. His observation that the Chinese are tolerant and not seeking to convert others to Confucianism contrasts with Western missionary zeal.
The book’s significance also lies in its political analysis of the Washington Conference and its aftermath. Russell’s argument that the Conference agreements would not permanently benefit China, and that the consortium system would create an American financial protectorate, offered a critical perspective on the emerging international order. His conclusion that it is impossible to make peace and freedom out of capitalism anticipated later critiques of international economic arrangements.
Finally, the book is significant as a document of Russell’s intellectual and political development. His engagement with China shaped his thinking about civilization, progress, and the ends of life. His willingness to learn from China, as he states that he went to teach but learned more than he taught, exemplifies the open-mindedness he recommends to both Chinese and Western readers. The book remains a valuable contribution to understanding both China’s historical situation and the challenges of cross-cultural understanding.
