George Santayana’s Dominations and Powers: Reflections on Liberty, Society, and Government stands as his major work of political philosophy, published in 1951 when the philosopher was eighty-seven years old. Written during and immediately after World War II from his residence at the Convent of the Blue Nuns in Rome, this substantial treatise represents Santayana’s mature reflections on political life, power, freedom, and the nature of human society. The work synthesizes his lifetime of philosophical thought—his naturalism, his materialism, his understanding of human nature—and applies it to questions of political organization, authority, and the perennial tension between individual liberty and social order.
The Framework: Generative and Militant Order
At the heart of Dominations and Powers lies Santayana’s fundamental distinction between what he calls the “generative order” and the “militant order” of society. This conceptual framework structures the entire work and provides the lens through which Santayana examines all political phenomena.
The generative order refers to the spontaneous, organic patterns of human association that arise naturally from human needs, desires, and biological imperatives. This includes the family, local communities, economic cooperation, cultural traditions, religious practices, and all the forms of life that emerge from what Santayana sees as the natural psyche of human beings. The generative order is rooted in what he calls “primary society”—the immediate, face-to-face relationships and institutions that directly serve human flourishing and the reproduction of life. It is generative because it generates and regenerates human life itself, both biologically and culturally. This order is characterized by diversity, spontaneity, and organic development; it is not imposed from above but grows from below, from the actual conditions and needs of human existence.
The militant order, by contrast, refers to the organized, coercive structures of power that arise to defend, regulate, or transform society. This includes governments, states, armies, laws, and all forms of political authority that claim the right to command and enforce obedience. The militant order is necessary, in Santayana’s view, because human societies face external threats and internal conflicts that require organized force to resolve. But the militant order is always secondary and instrumental—it exists to protect and serve the generative order, not to replace or dominate it. When the militant order forgets its subordinate role and begins to see itself as primary, when political power seeks to remake human nature or impose utopian visions on society, it becomes tyrannical and destructive.
This distinction allows Santayana to critique both anarchism and totalitarianism. Against anarchists, he argues that some form of militant order—some government and coercive authority—is necessary given the realities of human nature and the existence of conflict. Against totalitarians and utopian revolutionaries, he argues that the militant order must remain limited and instrumental, respecting the autonomy and diversity of the generative order. The health of a society depends on maintaining the proper relationship between these two orders, with the militant order serving rather than suppressing the generative.
Human Nature and the Psyche
Santayana’s political philosophy rests on his understanding of human nature, which he develops at length in the book. As a philosophical naturalist and materialist, Santayana sees human beings as natural organisms with biological needs, instincts, and limitations. The human psyche, in his view, is not a blank slate to be written upon by society or education, but has its own inherent structure and tendencies rooted in our animal nature.
He identifies what he calls the “primary passions” or fundamental drives that animate human life: the desire for self-preservation, the sexual instinct and family affection, the need for companionship and social recognition, the impulse to dominate or submit, curiosity and the desire to understand, and the aesthetic and religious impulses that seek meaning and beauty. These passions are not chosen but given; they are part of the natural endowment of the human animal. Political philosophy must begin by recognizing these realities rather than imagining that human nature can be fundamentally transformed.
This naturalistic view leads Santayana to be skeptical of rationalist political theories that assume human beings are primarily rational calculators of self-interest, or that they can be perfected through the right institutions. He sees human beings as fundamentally irrational in their motivations, driven by passions and impulses that reason can at best moderate and direct. The psyche has its own logic, its own needs and satisfactions, which political arrangements must respect if they are to be stable and humane.
At the same time, Santayana recognizes that human beings are capable of what he calls “rational life”—the life of the mind, of contemplation, of art and philosophy. But this rational life is itself a natural flowering of the psyche under favorable conditions; it is not opposed to nature but is one of nature’s highest achievements. The role of good government is to create conditions under which this rational life can flourish for those capable of it, while also providing for the basic needs and satisfactions of the many who will never be philosophers.
Liberty and Its Limits
One of the central themes of Dominations and Powers is the nature of liberty and its proper place in political life. Santayana offers a nuanced and somewhat conservative account of freedom that distinguishes him from both classical liberals and modern progressives.
For Santayana, liberty is not an absolute good or a natural right, but a condition that may or may not serve human flourishing depending on circumstances. He distinguishes between several kinds of liberty. There is what he calls “natural liberty”—the freedom of the organism to follow its own impulses and satisfy its needs. This is the liberty of the animal, and in human beings it must be constrained by society if civilization is to exist. Unlimited natural liberty leads to chaos and the war of all against all.
Then there is what he calls “civil liberty”—the freedom that exists within a framework of law and social order. This is the liberty that matters for political philosophy: the freedom to pursue one’s own good within the constraints necessary for social peace and cooperation. Civil liberty is always limited and conditional; it exists only where there is effective government to maintain order and protect rights. The question is not whether liberty should be limited, but how it should be limited and for what purposes.
Santayana is critical of what he sees as the modern fetishization of liberty as an end in itself. He argues that liberty is valuable only insofar as it enables human beings to live well, to satisfy their natural needs, and to pursue rational goods. A society that maximizes formal liberty but leaves people isolated, anxious, and unable to achieve their natural ends is not truly free in any meaningful sense. Conversely, a society that constrains liberty in certain ways but provides security, community, and the conditions for human flourishing may offer a deeper and more satisfying freedom.
This leads him to be skeptical of both laissez-faire capitalism and revolutionary socialism. Capitalism, in his view, often creates a kind of formal liberty that masks real powerlessness and insecurity for the many. Socialism promises liberation but tends toward tyranny when it tries to reorganize society according to abstract principles rather than respecting the organic patterns of the generative order. What Santayana seems to favor is a kind of traditional, organic society with strong local communities, stable hierarchies, and limited government—though he is too much of a skeptic to offer any detailed blueprint.
Government and Authority
Santayana’s treatment of government and political authority is marked by a kind of resigned realism. He sees government as necessary but inherently problematic—a necessary evil that must be accepted and managed rather than celebrated or perfected.
Government arises, in his account, from the need to resolve conflicts and coordinate action in the face of common threats. In the state of nature, or in the absence of effective authority, human societies would be torn apart by internal strife and vulnerable to external enemies. Some form of coercive power is therefore necessary to maintain peace and provide for common defense. But this power is always dangerous, always prone to abuse, always tempted to expand beyond its proper limits.
The legitimacy of government, for Santayana, does not rest on consent or social contract or divine right, but on effectiveness and service to the generative order. A government is legitimate to the extent that it actually provides security, maintains order, and allows the natural life of society to flourish. When government fails in these tasks, or when it becomes predatory and destructive, it loses its justification. But this does not mean that people have a right to revolution—Santayana is too aware of the costs of disorder to endorse easy rebellion. Rather, it means that government is always provisional and instrumental, to be judged by its fruits rather than its claims.
He is particularly critical of what he calls “militant democracy”—the tendency of modern democratic states to become aggressive, expansionist, and totalitarian in their claims on citizens. Democracy, in his view, is not inherently superior to other forms of government; it is simply one possible arrangement that may work well in some circumstances and poorly in others. The danger of democracy is that it can unleash mass passions and create a tyranny of the majority that is more oppressive than traditional monarchies or aristocracies. Democratic governments, claiming to represent the will of the people, often feel entitled to intrude into every aspect of life in ways that more modest forms of authority would not.
War, Empire, and International Relations
Writing during and after World War II, Santayana devotes considerable attention to questions of war, empire, and relations between states. His treatment of these topics reflects both his naturalistic realism and his deep pessimism about human nature and political possibilities.
War, in Santayana’s view, is a permanent feature of human existence, rooted in the competitive nature of life itself. As long as there are separate political communities with different interests and limited resources, there will be conflicts that cannot be resolved peacefully. The dream of perpetual peace through international organization or the spread of democracy is, he suggests, a dangerous illusion. It is dangerous because it leads states to pursue utopian goals that justify unlimited violence, and because it prevents realistic accommodation to the actual conditions of international life.
He is critical of both pacifism and crusading militarism. Pacifism, he argues, is noble but unrealistic; it fails to recognize that some goods can only be defended by force, and that a society unwilling to fight will eventually be conquered or destroyed. But crusading militarism—the attempt to impose one’s own values or system on the world—is equally dangerous. It transforms limited conflicts over concrete interests into unlimited wars of ideology that can only end in total victory or total defeat.
Santayana’s treatment of empire is complex and somewhat sympathetic, which has made this aspect of his thought controversial. He sees empire as a natural and often beneficial form of political organization, arising when a strong power extends its authority over weaker peoples. Empire can provide peace, order, and the conditions for cultural flourishing across diverse populations. The Roman Empire, in particular, serves as a model of successful imperial governance that allowed local communities to maintain their own customs and traditions while benefiting from imperial peace and protection.
At the same time, he recognizes that empires are inherently unstable and tend to overreach. The temptation of imperial power is to try to homogenize and control what should be left to local autonomy, to impose the culture and values of the center on the periphery. When empires do this, they destroy the very diversity and organic life that made them valuable, and they sow the seeds of their own collapse.
Ideology and Political Religion
One of the most prescient aspects of Dominations and Powers is Santayana’s analysis of ideology and what he calls “political religion”—the tendency of modern political movements to take on the character of religious crusades, complete with sacred texts, infallible leaders, and demands for total commitment.
Santayana sees this tendency as particularly dangerous because it represents the militant order claiming the authority and passion that properly belongs to the generative order. Traditional religion, in his view, arose from the deepest needs and intuitions of the human psyche; it expressed in symbolic form the ultimate concerns and values of a community. Political ideologies like nationalism, communism, and fascism try to harness this religious energy for political purposes, creating secular religions that demand absolute loyalty and justify unlimited violence.
The problem with political religion is that it cannot deliver what it promises. Religion properly understood points beyond the political realm to transcendent goods and ultimate meanings that politics cannot provide. When politics tries to become religion, when it promises salvation through the state or the revolution or the nation, it inevitably disappoints and often turns tyrannical. The state cannot save souls or create heaven on earth; it can at best maintain order and provide for basic needs. When it claims more than this, it becomes monstrous.
Santayana is particularly critical of what he sees as the religious character of modern democracy and nationalism. Democracy, he argues, has become a kind of political religion in the modern world, with its own dogmas (equality, popular sovereignty, progress) and its own rituals (elections, constitutions, declarations of rights). This democratic faith leads nations to pursue crusades to spread democracy, to refuse realistic compromises with non-democratic powers, and to demand ever-greater conformity and participation from citizens.
Similarly, nationalism transforms the natural love of one’s own people and place into an absolute loyalty that overrides all other commitments. The nation becomes a kind of god demanding sacrifice, and those who question its claims are treated as heretics. This nationalist religion, Santayana suggests, was one of the primary causes of the catastrophic wars of the twentieth century.
Culture, Tradition, and Modernity
Throughout Dominations and Powers, Santayana expresses a deep appreciation for traditional cultures and a corresponding skepticism about modern progressive movements. This aspect of his thought reflects his broader philosophical commitment to naturalism and his suspicion of rationalist schemes to remake society.
Traditional cultures, in Santayana’s view, represent the accumulated wisdom of generations adapting to their circumstances. They embody in their customs, institutions, and beliefs solutions to perennial human problems—solutions that have been tested by time and found workable. These traditions are not arbitrary or irrational; they are rational in a deeper sense than abstract theory, because they are adapted to the actual conditions of human life and the actual structure of the human psyche.
Modernity, by contrast, tends to reject tradition in favor of rational reconstruction according to abstract principles. Modern reformers and revolutionaries believe they can design better institutions and create better human beings through education and social engineering. Santayana sees this as a dangerous hubris that ignores the limits of human reason and the complexity of social life. Most attempts at radical reform, he suggests, end up destroying valuable traditions without creating anything better to replace them.
This does not mean Santayana is simply a reactionary who opposes all change. He recognizes that traditions must adapt to changing circumstances, and that some traditions are oppressive or dysfunctional. But he insists that change should be gradual, organic, and respectful of what has worked in the past. Revolutionary change that tries to start from scratch, that rejects all inherited wisdom, is almost certain to fail and likely to cause immense suffering in the process.
He is particularly critical of what he sees as the shallow optimism of modern progressive thought—the belief that history is moving inevitably toward greater freedom, equality, and rationality. This progressive faith, he argues, is itself a kind of superstition, a secular version of Christian eschatology that has no basis in reality. History shows no such inevitable progress; it shows instead cycles of rise and fall, periods of civilization followed by barbarism, achievements followed by losses. The task of political wisdom is not to accelerate progress toward utopia but to preserve what is good and valuable against the forces of decay and destruction.
The Rational Life and the Life of Reason
Despite his political conservatism and his skepticism about progress, Santayana is not a pessimist about human possibilities. He believes that human life can achieve genuine excellence and that some individuals can attain what he calls the “rational life” or the “life of reason”—a life devoted to understanding, contemplation, and the appreciation of beauty and truth.
This rational life is, for Santayana, the highest achievement of which human beings are capable. It represents the flowering of human nature when conditions are favorable—when there is sufficient security, leisure, and cultural development to allow some individuals to transcend immediate practical concerns and devote themselves to intellectual and aesthetic pursuits. The great philosophers, artists, and scientists exemplify this rational life; they show what human beings can become when the generative order is healthy and the militant order is properly limited.
But Santayana is realistic about how rare and fragile this achievement is. Most human beings, most of the time, are absorbed in practical concerns—making a living, raising families, pursuing immediate pleasures and avoiding immediate pains. This is not a failure or a defect; it is simply the normal condition of human life. The rational life is possible only for a few, and only under favorable circumstances. It depends on a stable social order, on material prosperity, on cultural traditions that value learning and contemplation.
The role of politics, then, is not to try to make everyone a philosopher or to create a society of perfect rationality. That is impossible and the attempt leads to tyranny. Rather, the role of politics is to maintain the conditions under which the rational life is possible for those capable of it, while also providing for the natural needs and satisfactions of the many. A good society is one that allows for diversity—that makes room for both the contemplative life and the active life, for both the philosopher and the farmer, for both high culture and popular culture.
This vision is fundamentally aristocratic in spirit, though not necessarily in institutional form. Santayana believes in natural hierarchy—that some individuals are more capable than others of rational life, and that society should recognize and honor this fact. But he does not advocate for rigid class divisions or hereditary privilege. Rather, he suggests that a healthy society will naturally develop informal hierarchies based on actual achievement and capacity, and that these hierarchies should be respected rather than artificially leveled in the name of equality.
Santayana’s Context and the Book’s Significance
Dominations and Powers was written during a period of extraordinary upheaval and violence. Santayana began working on it in the late 1930s as Europe moved toward war, continued through World War II while living in neutral but Fascist Italy, and completed it in the immediate aftermath of the war. The book reflects this context in its preoccupation with totalitarianism, war, and the dangers of political religion.
Yet the book is not primarily a response to current events. Rather, it represents the culmination of Santayana’s lifelong philosophical project. Born in Spain in 1863, educated at Harvard where he later taught philosophy alongside William James and Josiah Royce, Santayana had spent his career developing a comprehensive naturalistic philosophy that encompassed metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. His major earlier works include The Life of Reason, a five-volume study of human culture and achievement, and Realms of Being, his mature metaphysical system.
Dominations and Powers applies this philosophical framework to political questions. It shows how Santayana’s naturalism—his view that human beings are natural organisms subject to natural laws—leads to a particular understanding of politics as rooted in human nature rather than in abstract rights or rational principles. It shows how his materialism—his view that matter is the fundamental reality and that consciousness is a natural product of material processes—shapes his skepticism about idealistic political theories. And it shows how his aesthetic sensibility—his appreciation for beauty, tradition, and the life of contemplation—informs his critique of modern mass society and utilitarian politics.
The book was not widely read or influential when it first appeared. By 1951, Santayana was somewhat out of fashion in academic philosophy, and his conservative political views were uncongenial to the dominant liberal and progressive currents of postwar thought. The book’s length, its discursive style, and its lack of systematic organization also made it difficult for readers expecting a conventional work of political theory.
Yet Dominations and Powers has found a small but devoted readership among those interested in conservative political philosophy, in naturalistic approaches to politics, and in alternatives to both liberal individualism and socialist collectivism. The book’s critique of ideology, its analysis of the tension between organic society and political power, and its skepticism about progress and rationalism have seemed prescient to some readers in light of later developments. Its defense of tradition, hierarchy, and cultural diversity against homogenizing modern forces has influenced some strands of conservative and communitarian thought.
The book also stands as a testament to Santayana’s independence of mind and his willingness to follow his philosophical convictions wherever they led, regardless of contemporary opinion. Writing from his room in Rome as an old man, supported by the charity of nuns, Santayana produced a work that challenges many of the fundamental assumptions of modern political thought—the primacy of individual rights, the value of democracy, the possibility of progress, the desirability of equality. Whether one agrees with his conclusions or not, Dominations and Powers represents a serious and sustained attempt to think about politics from first principles, grounded in a comprehensive philosophical vision of human nature and the human condition.
