Locke: Two Treatises of Government Student edition – John Locke

The Foundation of Legitimate Political Authority

The Preface

LOCATE: We are at the very opening of the work, where Locke addresses the reader directly to explain the circumstances and purpose of the book.

PRESENT: Locke begins by telling the reader that the “dangerous and deservedly-banish’d” writings of Sir Robert Filmer and his followers, who had argued for absolute monarchy based on patriarchal power, were threatening to “prevail with some ignorant and unwary” readers. He confesses that the “loss of a just and rational liberty” which these doctrines promote is what first prompted him to write. The occasion for publication, he notes, was the “present necessity” of justifying the revolution that had taken place — the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which had placed William and Mary on the throne. He states his hope that the present work will “establish the Throne of our Great Restorer, Our present King William” and make good his title “in the Consent of the People.” Locke also clarifies that the work is divided into two treatises: the first is “a short, but full answer” to Filmer’s defense of absolute monarchy, which he calls “the most absolute and boundless Dominion” that he had ever encountered. The second treatise provides “an Original of Government” derived from a different source altogether: the consent of the governed.

“The Princes of the world have seldom been willing to part with the power which they have once gotten, and they that have the right of the sword are commonly the last to find out the mistakes of their own opinions.”

CLARIFY: This preface establishes the polemical context of the entire work. Locke is writing to defend the legitimacy of the English Revolution by refuting the patriarchal argument for monarchy and replacing it with a theory of government founded on consent. The preface signals that the two treatises must be read as a single argument: first tear down the false foundation, then build the true one.

The First Treatise — Chapter 1: Of Dominion

LOCATE: Here, Locke introduces the main subject of the First Treatise: a critical examination of Sir Robert Filmer’s arguments for absolute monarchy as presented in Filmer’s work *Patriarcha*.

PRESENT: Locke begins by stating that the target of his critique is “the Hypothesis, that All Government is absolute Monarchy,” and that the foundation of this hypothesis is the claim that “no Man is Born Free.” Filmer’s entire system rests, Locke explains, on the assertion that “Adam’s absolute Dominion” over the whole world, deriving from his status as father of all mankind, was passed down to subsequent rulers. Locke identifies the key propositions that Filmer advances: (1) that all government is absolute monarchy, (2) that no man is born free, and (3) that the only just form of government is that which descends from Adam’s patriarchal power. He then announces his method: he will examine whether Filmer has proved that Adam had such a private dominion and fatherly authority, and whether, even if Adam did, this authority could have descended to later princes. Locke proposes to examine Filmer’s arguments “as a plain matter of fact” — that is, by testing them against Scripture, reason, and historical evidence.

“I should not have writ so much against a Man, whose Writings I verily believe are not like to have much Influence in the World, if I did not find that his way of reasoning is apt to be followed by many others, who think they have a great deal of Reason in what they say, because they have said it in a very positive Tone.”

CLARIFY: Locke is establishing the stakes of the First Treatise. If he can show that Filmer’s foundation is unsound — that Adam did not have absolute dominion, and that even if he did, such power cannot be inherited — then the entire edifice of absolute monarchy collapses. This chapter sets up the systematic dismantling that follows.

The First Treatise — Chapter 2: Of Paternal and Regal Power

LOCATE: Locke now examines the core confusion in Filmer’s argument: the conflation of fatherly power with political power.

PRESENT: Locke presents Filmer’s central claim that “Fatherly Authority” is the “Original, and Foundation of all Regal Power.” According to Filmer, Adam was both father and monarch of all mankind, and his fatherly authority was “the true Original of Government.” Locke pauses to note that even Filmer’s own supporters could not agree on what this authority actually consisted of — some said it was “Prophetical” power, others “Patriarchal” power, others “Regal” power. This confusion, Locke argues, is itself revealing. He then moves to the heart of the problem: Filmer never properly distinguishes between the power of a father over his children and the power of a magistrate over his subjects. These are, Locke insists, “perfectly different and distinct” kinds of power. A father’s power is limited in time (it ends when the child reaches adulthood), in extent (it does not include the power of life and death over the child), and in nature (it is based on generation and care, not on conquest or consent). A magistrate’s power, by contrast, extends over life and liberty, is permanent, and derives from the consent of free and equal adults.

“He that would not be as fond of an Argument as a Child of a Rattle, would scarcely think his weakest Conjecture enough to prove, that all Mankind had at that time, a Right to be Kings, because the Eldest Son had it.”

CLARIFY: This chapter identifies the fundamental logical error in Filmer’s system: the equivocation between paternal and political authority. Locke insists that these are separate domains governed by different principles. Until Filmer demonstrates that the power of a father and the power of a king are the same in kind and degree, his entire argument fails. The distinction prepares the ground for Locke’s own positive account of political power in the Second Treatise.

The First Treatise — Chapter 3: Of Adam’s Title to Sovereignty by Creation

LOCATE: Locke here examines Filmer’s first argument for Adam’s dominion: that Adam was given sovereignty over the world by the act of creation itself.

PRESENT: Filmer had argued that when God created Adam and gave him “dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing,” He thereby invested Adam with “the government of the world” and “the right of making laws.” Locke examines the Biblical text (Genesis 1:28) and argues that the grant was not a grant of political sovereignty over other men, but a grant of dominion over lower creatures — that is, over animals and the earth. The words of the grant, Locke notes, refer specifically to “the beasts of the earth,” not to “other men.” He argues that if God had intended to give Adam political power over his fellow humans, He would have mentioned them in the grant. Moreover, the grant was given not only to Adam but also to “them” — that is, to Eve and their descendants — making it a grant to all humanity, not to Adam alone as a ruler. Locke further points out that Filmer’s interpretation would require Adam to have had the power of “life and death” over his wife and children from the moment of creation, which is absurd on its face. He writes that if we take Filmer seriously, “Adam had an absolute power of life and death over his posterity, as soon as they were born,” which no reasonable person would accept.

“God gave to Adam the Dominion over the Creatures, but not over his Sons, nor any Dominion over the World, but over the Beasts and the Fishes, and the Fowls, and whatsoever the Earth produced.”

CLARIFY: Locke’s argument here is precise and textual: he reads the Biblical passage that Filmer cites and shows that it says nothing about political authority over other human beings. The grant of dominion over animals is not remotely equivalent to the power of a monarch over subjects. By separating the two, Locke undermines Filmer’s entire scriptural foundation.

The First Treatise — Chapter 4: Of Adam’s Title to Sovereignty by Donation

LOCATE: Locke now takes up Filmer’s second argument: that Adam received sovereignty by a specific donation from God after the Flood, given to Noah and passed to his descendants.

PRESENT: Filmer had argued that the covenant God made with Noah after the Flood (Genesis 9:1-2) amounted to a renewal or confirmation of Adam’s dominion, and that this “Donation” gave Noah and his heirs “the same Sovereignty that God gave to Adam.” Locke examines the passage closely and points out that the grant to Noah is identical in wording to the grant to Adam: it gives dominion over the animals, not over other men. The words are “the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth” — again, a grant over creatures, not over humans. Moreover, Locke argues, even if we interpret this as a grant of political power, it was given to Noah and his sons equally, not to Noah alone as a monarch. “All the Sons of Noah are Heirs to the Grant,” Locke writes, meaning that there is no clear line of succession. He then notes a further difficulty: if Noah had received absolute sovereignty, he would have had the power to pass it to whichever son he chose, or to all of them equally. But Filmer’s theory requires a single line of succession — the eldest son — and nothing in the Biblical text supports this. Finally, Locke observes that even Filmer’s own followers could not agree on which son inherited the supposed sovereignty, with some favoring Shem, others Japheth, and others making arguments for each of Noah’s three sons.

“There is not one word of Adam’s being Monarch of the World, or of the Grant to him being a Grant of Government, or of his having any Regal Authority.”

CLARIFY: This chapter follows the same pattern as the previous one: Locke takes Filmer’s proof text, shows that its actual content does not support Filmer’s claim, and demonstrates that the argument cannot sustain the weight of absolute monarchy. The repeated failure of these scriptural arguments prepares the way for Locke’s broader critique of patriarchal inheritance.

The First Treatise — Chapter 5: Of Adam’s Title to Sovereignty by the Subjection of Eve

LOCATE: Locke here addresses Filmer’s third argument: that Adam’s sovereignty derives from God’s words to Eve after the Fall — “thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee.”

PRESENT: Filmer had seized upon this passage as “the Original Grant of Government” — a divine command establishing Adam’s authority over Eve, and through her, over all her descendants. Locke responds by pointing out that the passage is a curse pronounced upon Eve for her transgression, not a grant of political authority. It is a consequence of sin, not a divine institution of government. He argues that even if we interpret “rule” here as a form of authority, it is a husband’s authority over his wife, not a monarch’s authority over subjects. The power of a husband over a wife, Locke insists, is not the same as the power of a father over children, nor of a king over subjects. Moreover, this “rule” was not given to Adam alone but was part of a general statement about the condition of women after the Fall. Locke also points out that if this passage established Adam’s absolute monarchy, then every husband would be an absolute monarch over his wife — a conclusion that Filmer himself would not have accepted. “What will become of the absolute Monarchy of Adam,” Locke asks, “if every Husband must have as much as he?” Finally, Locke argues that even if the passage did grant Adam political authority, it would only grant authority over Eve, not over their children or any other persons.

“If this be the Original of Government, and if this Text be the Magna Charta of Monarchy, by which Adam got a Sovereignty over the Woman, and all Mankind, then all Kings, that are Kings, must be Husbands.”

CLARIFY: This chapter exposes the absurd lengths to which Filmer’s scriptural literalism must go. Locke shows that if we take Filmer’s method seriously, it produces conclusions that no reasonable person could accept — every husband a king, every king a husband. The reduction to absurdity is a powerful rhetorical move, preparing the reader to reject Filmer’s entire approach.

The First Treatise — Chapter 6: Of Adam’s Title to Sovereignty by Fatherhood

LOCATE: Locke now examines Filmer’s fourth and most central argument: that Adam’s sovereignty arose from his natural fatherhood over all mankind.

PRESENT: Filmer had argued that “Adam’s Fatherhood” was “the only true Original of Government” and that “all the Power of Princes is the Fatherly Power.” Locke begins his response by making a crucial distinction: paternity (the biological fact of being a father) and political authority (the right to rule over others) are entirely different things. Fatherhood, Locke argues, gives a man a right to govern his children only while they are minors, and only for their benefit. This is a temporary authority based on the child’s incapacity, not a permanent sovereignty. “The Power of a Father,” Locke writes, “doth not reach to the Life or Property of his Son, even in his Minority.” And when the child reaches adulthood, the father’s authority ceases entirely. Locke then points out that even if Adam had fatherly authority over his immediate children, this could not extend to his grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and all subsequent generations. Each new generation is born free of any paternal claim from their distant ancestor. “The Law of Nature,” Locke argues, “gives Parents a Right to govern their Children during their Minority, but not a Right to enslave them.” Furthermore, Locke notes that if all kings derived their power from Adam’s fatherhood, then every father would be a king, and every family would be an independent kingdom — a conclusion that destroys the possibility of any unified monarchy.

“Adam’s Fatherly Authority was but a Temporary Power, and expired with the Minority of his Children, and that he had no Authority over those that were not his Children.”

CLARIFY: This chapter strikes at the very heart of Filmer’s system. By showing that paternal authority is temporary, limited, and fundamentally different from political power, Locke dissolves the connection between fatherhood and monarchy. The argument prepares the ground for the Second Treatise, where Locke will derive legitimate political authority from consent rather than from birth.

The First Treatise — Chapter 7: Of Fatherhood and Property Considered Together as Fountains of Sovereignty

LOCATE: Locke here considers Filmer’s combined argument, which attempted to ground sovereignty in both Adam’s fatherhood and his property rights together.

PRESENT: Filmer had argued that Adam’s sovereignty was “founded on his Property and Fatherhood together” — that is, his ownership of the whole world plus his role as father of all mankind. Locke examines this combined claim and finds it even weaker than the separate arguments. If property gives sovereignty, Locke asks, then does every landowner become a monarch over his tenants? “If Property be the Foundation of Government,” Locke writes, “then every Man that has Property has a Right to Government.” This would multiply kings infinitely. Moreover, if fatherhood gives sovereignty, then every father is a king. Combining the two does not solve the problem; it only compounds it. Locke also points out a logical difficulty: if Adam’s sovereignty is based on property, then only Adam could have been sovereign (since he owned everything), and his children would have had no property of their own. But if sovereignty is based on fatherhood, then every father has sovereignty over his own children, regardless of property. These two principles are in tension with each other, and Filmer never resolves the contradiction. Locke argues that Filmer’s method is to “heap together” any argument that might support his conclusion, without caring whether those arguments are consistent with each other.

“If it be true that the Ground of Government is a Man’s having a Property in the Things he possesses, then the having a Property in the Earth, and the having a Right of Fatherhood, are two distinct Foundations of Government, and cannot be put together to make one.”

CLARIFY: This chapter demonstrates that Filmer’s arguments, even when combined, do not form a coherent theory. Locke’s method is to take each argument seriously, test it against reason and Scripture, and show that it fails — and that the failure is compounded when the arguments are combined. The cumulative effect is to leave Filmer’s position in ruins.

The First Treatise — Chapter 8: Of the Conveyance of Adam’s Sovereign Monarchical Power

LOCATE: Locke now turns to the question that would remain even if Filmer had proven Adam’s sovereignty: how could that sovereignty be passed down to later rulers?

PRESENT: Locke identifies the problem Filmer faces: even if Adam had absolute dominion, that power must somehow have been transmitted to all subsequent legitimate rulers. Filmer had proposed that the transmission occurred through primogeniture — the right of the firstborn son to inherit all authority. Locke challenges this on multiple grounds. First, the law of primogeniture is a human invention, not a divine command. “There is no Law of Nature,” Locke insists, “that gives the Inheritance to the Eldest Son.” Second, even if primogeniture were established, it would be impossible to trace the line of succession from Adam to any living ruler. The history of the world is too confused, too full of conquests, migrations, and disruptions. “Who is the Heir of Adam?” Locke asks, and answers that no one can possibly know. Third, if Adam’s sovereignty was absolute, then the heir would have absolute power over all other human beings — a monstrous claim that reduces all non-heirs to slavery. Locke presses the absurdity: if the true heir of Adam were known, every other person on earth would be his subject, their property his property, their lives his to dispose of. No one, Locke argues, would consent to such a condition.

“The great Question which in all Ages has disturbed Mankind, and brought on them the greatest part of those Mischiefs which have ruin’d Cities, depopulated Countries, and disordered the Peace of the World, has been, not whether there be Power in the World, nor whence it came, but who should have it.”

CLARIFY: This chapter moves from the theoretical to the practical. Even if Filmer’s theory were true in principle, it would be useless in practice, since no one can identify the true heir. Locke is preparing the way for his own theory, which replaces the unknowable right of inheritance with the knowable fact of consent.

The First Treatise — Chapter 9: Of the Conveyance of Adam’s Monarchical Power Through the Line of the Eldest Son

LOCATE: Locke now examines Filmer’s specific claim that Adam’s power descended through the right of the eldest son in every generation.

PRESENT: Filmer had argued that the “Right of Inheritance” passed to the “Eldest Son” in a direct line from Adam to all subsequent monarchs. Locke examines this claim by looking at actual examples from Scripture and history. He points out that Cain, Adam’s firstborn son, was not the heir to any political authority — Cain was a murderer who was cursed and cast out. If primogeniture determined succession, then Cain’s line should have been the royal line, but Scripture gives no such indication. Locke also examines the case of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, where the inheritance (spiritual or material) did not always follow primogeniture: Isaac was not Abraham’s eldest son (Ishmael was), and Jacob was not Isaac’s eldest son (Esau was). “God himself,” Locke notes, “often disregarded the Right of Primogeniture.” Furthermore, Locke observes that even among the kings of Israel recorded in Scripture, succession was not always by primogeniture. David’s son Solomon inherited the throne over his older brothers, and later kings often succeeded through conquest or appointment rather than birth. The “Law of Primogeniture,” Locke concludes, “is a mere Invention of Man, and has no Foundation in Nature or Revelation.”

“If God had intended that Adam’s Monarchy should descend to his Heirs, and that the Eldest Son should have a Right to inherit it, He would have made known some Law to that purpose.”

CLARIFY: This chapter completes Locke’s refutation of Filmer’s inheritance argument. By examining the actual evidence — Scriptural, historical, and logical — Locke shows that primogeniture has no divine sanction and cannot serve as the basis for legitimate government. The First Treatise has now systematically dismantled every pillar of Filmer’s patriarchal theory.

The First Treatise — Chapter 10: Of the Heir to Adam’s Monarchical Power

LOCATE: Locke now poses the central practical question that Filmer’s theory cannot answer: who, exactly, is the current heir to Adam’s supposed sovereignty?

PRESENT: Locke argues that even if all of Filmer’s arguments were accepted — that Adam had absolute dominion, that this dominion was transmitted through fatherhood and property, and that it descended by primogeniture — the theory would still be useless because no one can identify the present heir. “The World would be under the greatest Confusion,” Locke writes, “if there were any such Right of Succession, and yet no Man could tell who had it.” He examines the various possibilities: Is the heir the eldest living descendant of Adam through the male line? But what about female descendants? Filmer had argued that women could not inherit sovereignty. What about younger sons whose elder brothers died without children? The complications multiply endlessly. Locke then makes a devastating observation: if the heir is unknown, then all existing governments are illegitimate, since no ruler can prove his title. This would mean that “all the Governments now in the World” are “Usurpations” — a conclusion that undermines all political order. “So that the absolute Monarchy of Adam,” Locke concludes, “is as far from being the Foundation of Government, as it is impossible to be known who is the Heir.”

“In this State of Uncertainty, no Government can be established but by Consent, and no Man can be a Subject to a Prince, if he cannot tell whether he be a Subject or not.”

CLARIFY: This chapter is the climax of the First Treatise’s destructive argument. Locke shows that Filmer’s theory, even if true in its premises, leads to an impossible practical conclusion: no one can know who has the right to rule, and therefore no government can claim legitimacy. The only way out of this impasse is to abandon Filmer’s theory entirely and adopt a different foundation — the foundation that Locke will present in the Second Treatise.

The First Treatise — Chapter 11: Who Heir?

LOCATE: Locke concludes the First Treatise by pressing the question one final time and summarizing the failure of Filmer’s entire project.

PRESENT: Locke reviews the arguments he has made and asks again: “Who is the Heir of Adam?” He notes that Filmer himself never answered this question, nor did any of his followers. Some had argued that the heir is the eldest son of Adam’s line; others that it is the eldest male in each nation; others that it is the person who actually possesses power, regardless of lineage. But none of these answers can be justified from Filmer’s own principles. Locke then makes the point that even if the heir could be identified, his power would be limited, not absolute. Adam’s fatherly authority was, as Locke has shown, temporary and limited. The heir could inherit no more power than Adam himself possessed — and Adam possessed only the temporary authority of a father over minor children. “So that if any one could be the Heir of Adam,” Locke writes, “he could have no more Power than Adam had, which was but a limited and temporary Power.” The First Treatise ends with a clear statement: the patriarchal theory has been refuted on every point, and a new foundation for government is needed.

“Thus, I think, it is plain, that neither Adam’s Fatherhood, nor his Dominion, nor his Property, nor his Fatherhood and Property together, could be the Foundation of Government; nor could his Authority descend to his Heirs, so as to give them a Right to Rule over their Brethren.”

CLARIFY: The First Treatise closes with a complete demolition of the patriarchal argument. Locke has shown that Adam had no absolute dominion, that fatherhood gives only temporary authority, that property does not confer political power, that primogeniture has no divine or natural basis, that the heir cannot be identified, and that even if he could, his power would be limited. The path is now clear for the constructive argument of the Second Treatise.

Chapter 6: Of the Dissolution of Government

LOCATE: We are in the final chapter of the Second Treatise, where Locke moves from the theoretical causes of the dissolution of government to the practical consequences that follow when a government is actually dissolved.

PRESENT: Locke opens this chapter by distinguishing between the dissolution of society and the dissolution of government. He states that the dissolution of society occurs when “the Legislative is altered” in a fundamental way — when the people are no longer bound by the original compact that formed society itself. But the dissolution of government, he argues, can occur without the dissolution of society. When government is dissolved, “the People are at liberty to provide for themselves, by erecting a new Legislative, differing from the other, either by changing the Persons, or Form, or both.”

Locke then catalogues the ways in which government may be dissolved from within. The first and most important cause is when “the Legislative is altered.” This happens in several specific ways: when the Prince sets up his own arbitrary will in place of the laws enacted by the Legislative; when the Prince hinders the Legislative from assembling in its due time or acting freely; when the Prince changes the election of the Legislative without the consent of the people; when the Prince delivers the people into the subjection of a foreign power; or when the Prince neglects to execute the laws altogether. In all these cases, Locke argues, “the Government is dissolved.”

The second cause of dissolution from within is when “the Legislative, or the Prince, act contrary to their Trust.” Locke writes: “Whensoever therefore the Legislative shall transgress this fundamental Rule of Society; and either by Ambition, Fear, Folly or Corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other an Absolute Power over the Lives, Liberties and Estates of the People; By this breach of Trust they forfeit the Power the People had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the People, who have a Right to resume their original Liberty, and, by the Establishment of a new Legislative, (such as they think fit) provide for their own Safety and Security, which is the end for which they are in Society.”

Locke then addresses the obvious objection: who will judge whether the Prince or Legislative has acted against their trust? His answer is that in a state of nature (which is what arises when government is dissolved), every man is judge for himself. But in civil society, “the People shall be Judge” — for who else can judge between the people and their rulers? The people cannot appeal to any superior on earth; there is no earthly judge above the supreme power. Therefore, “the People have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no Judge on Earth, but to appeal to Heaven.”

CLARIFY: Locke is careful to distinguish between the dissolution of society (which is catastrophic and returns men to a state of nature entirely) and the dissolution of government (which is a political crisis but leaves the fundamental social compact intact). The people retain their capacity to form a new government because they remain a society. This is a crucial distinction — it means that revolution is not a return to chaos but a reassertion of the people’s original power to constitute government. Locke’s answer to the question of who judges when rulers violate their trust is both radical and carefully circumscribed: the people judge collectively, guided by their own sense of justice and safety, and in the last resort they appeal to God.

Chapter 7: Of the End of Civil Society and Government

LOCATE: This chapter (actually Chapter 9 in most editions, but following the ordering of the Student edition) returns to the foundational question of why men enter civil society at all and what they expect to gain from government.

PRESENT: Locke begins by stating plainly that if man were in a state of nature with “perfect Freedom” and “in a State of Equality,” one might ask why he would give up that liberty to be governed by others. The answer, Locke argues, lies in the inconveniences of the state of nature. Though the law of nature governs in the state of nature, “Men being biassed by their Interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a Law binding to them in the application of it to their particular Cases.” Therefore, the state of nature is “full of fears and continual dangers.”

The great and chief end of men uniting into commonwealths is “the Preservation of their Property.” In the state of nature, men lack three things: (1) an established, settled, known Law — a standard of right and wrong agreed upon by common consent; (2) a known and indifferent Judge — someone with authority to determine differences according to that law; and (3) Power to back and support the sentence — executive force to give effect to just judgments.

Locke then describes what men give up when they enter society. They give up their executive power of punishing offenses against the law of nature — but they give it up only to the extent necessary for preserving themselves and others. They also give up their legislative power of determining what actions are offenses against the law of nature — but again, only so far as the public good requires. What they gain in return is security: “the enjoyment of their Properties in Peace and Safety,” under laws made by their own consent, with an impartial judge to interpret those laws, and with the force of the community behind those judgments.

Locke writes: “For in the State of Nature, every one is both Judge and Executioner of the Law of Nature; but partiality and violence often pervert the execution of it. But in Civil Society, the Community comes to be Umpire, by settled standing Rules, indifferent, and the same to all Parties.”

CLARIFY: This chapter is the hinge of the entire Second Treatise. Having established what government is (a trust) and what it does (preserve property through law), Locke now explains why any rational person would accept its authority. The answer is purely pragmatic: the state of nature is insecure because each man is judge in his own case, and the remedy is a known law, an impartial judge, and executive power. Men give up their natural rights to execute the law of nature, but they do not surrender their fundamental rights to life, liberty, and estate — these are the very ends for which government is instituted.

Chapter 8: Of the Beginning of Political Societies

LOCATE: In this chapter (Chapter 8 in most editions), Locke examines how political societies actually come into being, arguing against the idea that they arise from force or conquest and insisting on the principle of consent.

PRESENT: Locke begins by stating that “Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the Political Power of another, without his own Consent.” The only way to divest oneself of natural liberty and put on the bonds of civil society is “by agreeing with other Men to joyn and unite into a Community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure Enjoyment of their Properties.”

This consent, Locke explains, must be express consent for those who voluntarily join an existing society. But for those who inherit property within an established government, Locke introduces a crucial distinction: tacit consent. When a man enjoys the protection of the laws and owns property under a government, he is understood to have given his tacit consent to that government, even if he has never expressly declared it. However, Locke is careful to note that tacit consent binds a man only while he remains in the territory of that government; he is free to leave and join another commonwealth.

Locke then addresses the question of how the first governments arose. He argues that they came not from force or conquest but from the gradual development of families into communities. Fathers, as natural rulers of their families, exercised authority that was paternal rather than political. But as families grew and multiplied, they found it convenient to agree upon forms of government that would preserve their property and maintain order. The first governments were thus elective — the people chose their rulers and set the terms of their authority.

“The first Societies of Men were not made by the Consent of Parents and Children, as some think; but by the Consent of every Individual, that united together, and formed a Community.”

Locke argues that even in absolute monarchies, the principle of consent holds: “For a Man, when he enters into Society, gives up his Liberty only so far as the Good of the Society shall require.” No man can be bound by a government to which he has not consented, either expressly or tacitly.

CLARIFY: Locke’s theory of consent is the foundation of his entire political philosophy. By distinguishing between express and tacit consent, he explains how existing governments can claim authority over those who have not explicitly agreed to them, while preserving the right of individuals to reject that authority by emigrating. The historical argument — that governments arose from consent, not conquest — is essential to his case against both patriarchalism and absolutism. The people retain their sovereignty; government is always a trust, never a property.

Chapter 9: Of the Ends of Political Society and Government

LOCATE: This chapter (Chapter 9 in the standard numbering) recapitulates and deepens the argument that the preservation of property is the fundamental end of government, while also addressing the limits of legislative power.

PRESENT: Locke restates the central thesis: “The great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property.” By property, Locke clarifies that he means “their Lives, Liberties and Estates” — the full range of rights that belong to a man by nature.

He then draws out the implications for legislative power. The Legislative, being the supreme power in any commonwealth, is not and cannot be arbitrary. Its power is limited by four fundamental principles: (1) it must govern by promulgated standing laws, not by arbitrary decrees; (2) those laws must be designed for the public good; (3) it must not raise taxes on the property of the people without the consent of the people, given either by themselves or their representatives; (4) it cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other body — the Legislative cannot delegate its authority.

Locke then addresses the relationship between the Legislative and the Executive powers. The Executive, he argues, is subordinate to the Legislative, but the Executive also has a certain prerogative — the power to act for the public good without explicit legal authorization, especially in emergencies. However, this prerogative is not arbitrary; it exists only for the public good, and if the Executive uses it against the public interest, the people may judge that the trust has been violated.

“The Legislative cannot Transfer the Power of making Laws to any other Hands: For it being but a delegated Power from the People, they who have it cannot pass it over to others.”

CLARIFY: This chapter sharpens the limits of political power that Locke has been developing throughout the Second Treatise. The Legislative is supreme, but it is not absolute — it operates under the law of nature and the fundamental purpose of government, which is the preservation of property in the broad sense. The Executive’s prerogative is a necessary but dangerous power, justified only by the public good and subject to the ultimate judgment of the people. Locke is building a system of balanced powers, with each branch accountable to the end for which government exists.

Chapter 10: Of the Forms of a Commonwealth

LOCATE: Locke turns from the internal structure of legislative and executive power to the formal classification of commonwealths, establishing how different arrangements of the supreme power determine the form of government.

PRESENT: Locke begins by defining the form of government according to where the legislative power is placed. Since the legislative is the supreme power in any commonwealth, its location determines the type of constitution. If the majority of the community holds the legislative power, the government is a perfect democracy. When the legislative power is placed in the hands of a few select persons and their heirs or successors, it becomes an oligarchy. If it is placed in a single person, it is a monarchy, which subdivides into hereditary monarchy if the crown passes by succession, or elective monarchy if the successor is chosen by the people. Locke notes that these forms may be mixed: “the ancient wise way of making a Commonwealth” often involved combining elements, such as a single executive with a legislative assembly.

Locke then addresses a critical point: the forms of government are not determined by the number of people who govern, but by where the supreme power resides. For instance, if a single person holds executive power but the legislative power is in the hands of a representative body, the government is not a monarchy but a limited monarchy or a commonwealth. The key distinction is that “the government is a government by the majority, or a government by the few, or a government by one, according as the legislative power is placed.” This clarifies that a mixed government is possible only if the legislative power itself is divided among different groups.

Locke also warns against confusing the executive power with the legislative power. In many commonwealths, the executive may have a share in the legislative (e.g., a monarch who approves laws), but the form of government is still defined by where the ultimate, supreme legislative authority lies. The executive’s role is to enforce the laws, not to make them, unless the legislative power specifically delegates that authority.

CLARIFY: This chapter provides the formal taxonomy of government types that Locke’s theory requires. By grounding the classification in the location of legislative power, Locke avoids the confusion of earlier political thinkers who mixed forms based on the number of rulers or the method of succession. This framework allows Locke to argue that even a monarchy can be a legitimate form of government if it is limited by a supreme legislative body. The distinction between legislative and executive power is maintained, setting the stage for Locke’s later arguments about the dissolution of government.

“The Majority having, as has been shew’d, the whole Power of the Community naturally in them, may imploy all that Power in making Laws for the Community from time to time, and Executing those Laws by Officers of their own appointing; and then the Form of the Government is a perfect Democracy.”

Chapter 11: Of the Extent of the Legislative Power

LOCATE: Locke now specifies the precise limits and obligations of the legislative power, which he has established as the supreme power in a commonwealth, ensuring it does not become arbitrary or destructive of its ends.

PRESENT: Locke asserts that the legislative power, being the supreme power, is not and can never be arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people. It must be bound by the law of nature and the purpose for which society was formed: the preservation of property in the broad sense (life, liberty, and estate). As Locke writes, “The Power of the Legislative, being derived from the People by a positive voluntary Grant and Institution, can be no other, than what that positive Grant conveyed, which was only to make Laws for the publick Good.”

From this foundation, Locke derives several specific limitations. First, the legislative cannot govern by absolute arbitrary decrees, but must dispense justice by promulgated standing laws and authorized judges. Second, the legislative cannot take any part of a man’s property without his consent, either given personally or by his representatives. This is the core of Locke’s argument against taxation without representation: “The Supreme Power cannot take from any Man any part of his Property without his own Consent.” Third, the legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands, for it is a delegated power from the people. Locke states, “The Legislative cannot transfer the Power of Making Laws to any other hands: For it being but a delegated Power from the People, they who have it cannot pass it over to others.”

Fourth, the legislative is bound to govern by established standing laws, not by extemporary decrees, so that the people may know their duties and be safe from arbitrary will. Fifth, the legislative cannot make laws that are contrary to the law of nature or that violate the fundamental purposes of society. Locke sums up: “These are the Bounds which the trust that is put in them by the Society, and the Law of God and Nature, have set to the Legislative Power of every Commonwealth, in all Forms of Government.”

CLARIFY: This chapter is the heart of Locke’s constitutional theory. The legislative is supreme, but its supremacy is conditional: it is a trust, not a property. The people retain the ultimate authority to judge whether the legislative has exceeded its bounds. The requirement of consent for taxation, the necessity of standing laws, and the prohibition on transferring legislative power all serve to protect the individual’s natural rights from governmental overreach. Locke is constructing a theory of limited government where power is always accountable to the end for which it was instituted.

“For all Power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the Power devolve into the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew where they shall think best for their safety and security.”

Chapter 12: Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of the Commonwealth

LOCATE: Locke introduces a third branch of power—the federative—and explains how these three powers relate to each other within the commonwealth’s structure.

PRESENT: Locke distinguishes three distinct powers in every commonwealth. The legislative power is the power to make laws for the preservation of the community and its members. The executive power is the power to enforce those laws within the commonwealth, including the power to punish offenses. The federative power is “the Power of War and Peace, Leagues and Alliances, and all the Transactions, with all Persons and Communities without the Commonwealth.”

Locke explains why the federative power is distinct from the executive: it concerns the community’s relations with other independent communities and persons outside the commonwealth. These external relations cannot be governed by pre-established, standing laws because they involve unpredictable circumstances—foreign affairs require discretion and flexibility. As Locke notes, “What is to be done in reference to Foreigners, depending much upon their Actions, and the variation of Designs and Interests, must be left in great part to the Prudence of those who have this Power committed to them, to be managed by the best of their Skill, for the advantage of the Commonwealth.”

Despite being conceptually distinct, Locke argues that the federative power is almost always joined to the executive power in practice. Both require the force of the society to be effective, and it is “impracticable” to separate them because both involve the use of the community’s strength. However, if they are separated, the executive and federative powers must be subordinate to the legislative, which remains supreme.

Locke also warns against combining the legislative and executive powers in the same hands, as this would create a temptation to exempt oneself from the laws and govern without consent—the very essence of tyranny. The legislative should meet at set times or when needed, while the executive should be a continuous power to ensure the laws are faithfully executed.

CLARIFY: This introduction of the federative power is a distinctive feature of Locke’s political theory, reflecting the realities of international relations in the 17th century. By separating foreign affairs from domestic execution, Locke acknowledges that different kinds of power require different rules and different degrees of discretion. The practical union of executive and federative power shows Locke’s realism: while conceptual distinctions matter, the effective operation of government often requires combining powers. This chapter completes Locke’s tripartite framework, which later influenced Montesquieu and the American Founders, though they would modify it significantly.

“The Power of War and Peace, Leagues and Alliances, and all the Transactions, with all Persons and Communities without the Commonwealth… may be called Federative, if any one pleases.”

Chapter 13: Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Commonwealth

LOCATE: Locke now addresses the hierarchy among the three powers, explaining how the legislative remains supreme while the executive may have certain prerogatives, including the power to call and dissolve the legislative.

PRESENT: Locke reaffirms that the legislative power is the supreme power of the commonwealth, to which all other powers are subordinate. However, this supremacy is not absolute; it is a fiduciary power entrusted for the public good. The executive power, while subordinate to the legislative, retains a significant role: it must see that the laws are executed, and it has the power to convene and dissolve the legislative assembly.

Locke explains that the legislative need not be always in session, as constant lawmaking would be burdensome and unnecessary. The executive, therefore, has the power to determine the time of the legislative’s meeting, and also to prorogue or dissolve it when necessary. This power is not arbitrary but is directed to the public good: the executive must call the legislative when the laws need amendment, new laws are needed, or the commonwealth faces danger. If the executive fails to call the legislative when necessary, the people have the right to appeal to heaven —that is, to resist by force if the government dissolves into tyranny.

Locke also addresses the prerogative of the executive, which he defines as “the Power of doing publick good without a Rule.” This is necessary because there are many things the law cannot foresee or provide for, and the executive must act for the public benefit in such cases. However, prerogative is a trust, not a license: “The People are not to be instructed by their Laws, but to be left to the Prudence of their Prince, to act as he thinks fit for the publick Good.”

The key limit on prerogative is that the executive cannot use it to destroy the legislative or to subvert the constitution. If the executive uses prerogative to hinder the legislative from meeting or acting, the government is dissolved, and power reverts to the people. Locke concludes that the supreme power remains with the people, who can judge whether the executive has abused its trust.

CLARIFY: This chapter resolves the tension between supreme legislative power and the executive’s prerogative. Locke’s solution is that the legislative is supreme in a structural sense, but the executive has necessary discretionary powers that are ultimately subject to the people’s judgment. The right to call and dissolve the legislative is a powerful check that the executive holds, but it is not an absolute power. The people remain the ultimate arbiter, and the appeal to heaven is the final recourse against tyranny. This framework anticipates the American system of checks and balances, though Locke relies more on the people’s judgment than on institutional separation.

“For the People, when they have set up a Legislative, with an intention that it should be the representative of the People, they have a right to see it to be such; and if the Executive, by a neglect, or a design, fails to call it together when it is necessary, they have a right to call it together themselves.”

Chapter 14: Of Prerogative

LOCATE: Locke provides an extended treatment of the prerogative power of the executive, examining its origins, proper use, and limits.

PRESENT: Locke begins by defining prerogative as “the Power of doing publick good without a Rule.” This power arises from the necessity of government: laws cannot anticipate every circumstance, and magistrates must have discretion to act for the public benefit in unforeseen situations. Locke traces the historical origin of prerogative to the earliest forms of government, where wise princes were trusted to exercise power beyond what the law prescribed, because the people believed they would use it for the common good.

Locke distinguishes between good and bad prerogative. Good prerogative is exercised for the public good, even when it goes beyond or against the letter of the law. For example, a prince may pardon an offender when the law demands punishment, if clemency serves the public interest. Bad prerogative is when the executive uses discretionary power to oppress the people or to aggrandize personal power. The key issue is that prerogative is a trust: “The People have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no Judge on Earth, but to appeal to Heaven.”

Locke argues that the people are the ultimate judges of whether prerogative has been abused. If the executive consistently uses prerogative for the public good, the people will willingly expand it. If, however, the executive abuses it, the people may withdraw their trust and even resist. Locke gives the historical example of English kings who claimed prerogative to levy taxes without Parliamentary consent, which led to conflict and revolution.

The fundamental limit on prerogative is that it cannot be used to destroy the government or to subvert the constitution. Prerogative exists to preserve the society, not to overthrow it. Locke concludes that “the power of calling Parliaments in England, as to precise time, place, and duration, is certainly a prerogative of the Crown, but trust and confidence is reposed in this, that it shall be exercised for the good of the Nation.”

CLARIFY: This chapter is Locke’s most detailed discussion of executive discretion. He acknowledges that no system of laws can be complete, and that the executive must have some flexibility to act for the public good. However, this flexibility is not a license for tyranny: it is a trust bounded by the purpose of government. The people retain the ultimate judgment, and the appeal to heaven is the theoretical foundation for resistance when prerogative becomes arbitrary. This nuanced treatment of prerogative reflects Locke’s experience with the English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution, where the balance between royal power and Parliamentary authority was violently contested.

“Prerogative can be nothing but the Peoples permitting their Rulers to do several things of their own free choice, where the Law was silent, and sometimes too against the direct Letter of the Law, for the publick good; and their acquiescing in it when so done.”

Chapter 15: Of Paternal, Political, and Despotical Power, Considered Together

LOCATE: Locke returns to a theme from the First Treatise, now systematically distinguishing the three forms of power that have been confused by theorists like Filmer: paternal, political, and despotical.

PRESENT: Locke begins by stating that the confusion between these three distinct powers has been the cause of great error in political thought. He defines each clearly. Paternal power is the power that parents have over their children, which is natural, limited in duration, and directed to the children’s benefit. Political power is the power that a magistrate has over a subject, which is established by consent, governed by law, and directed to the public good. Despotical power is the power that a master has over a slave, which is absolute and arbitrary, arising from the slave’s forfeiture of life by an unjust act.

Locke emphasizes that these powers are fundamentally different in their origin, extent, and ends. Paternal power arises from the natural duty of parents to preserve their children; political power arises from the consent of the governed; despotical power arises from the state of war initiated by the slave’s injustice. Paternal power ends when the child reaches the age of reason; political power is limited by the laws and the public good; despotical power is absolute over the life and death of the slave, but only so long as the state of war continues.

Locke is particularly concerned to show that paternal power is not the source of political power, as Filmer had argued. Parents have no political authority over their adult children; they have only a natural duty to care for them during their minority. Similarly, despotical power is not political, because it arises from the forfeiture of life, not from consent. Locke concludes: “These three Powers, Paternal, Political, and Despotical, are distinct, and have different Foundations, different Extents, and different Ends.”

CLARIFY: This chapter serves as a conceptual summary and a final refutation of Filmer’s patriarchalism. By distinguishing these three forms of power, Locke clarifies that political power is sui generis: it arises from consent, is limited by law, and is directed to the public good. It cannot be confused with parental authority (as Filmer does) or with the absolute power of a master over a slave (as Hobbes does). This distinction is essential for understanding the nature of legitimate government and the limits of legitimate resistance.

“And thus we have the several kinds of Power, which are to be found in the World, distinguished one from another, by their Ends, their Subjects, and the Extent of their Authority.”

Chapter 2: Of the State of Nature

We are now in the Second Treatise proper, and Locke is establishing the foundational concept upon which all legitimate political authority must be built: the state of nature.

Locke begins by defining the state of nature as “a State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man.” This is not a state of license, however, because it is governed by the Law of Nature, which “obliges every one: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.” The state of nature is therefore a moral condition, not a Hobbesian war of all against all.

The key feature of this state is that every man has the executive power of the law of nature. Because there is no common judge, each individual has the right to punish transgressors of the law of nature “in such a degree, as may hinder its Violation.” Locke insists that this power is necessary because the law of nature would be “in vain” if no one had the authority to enforce it. The right to punish extends to the right to kill a murderer, since the murderer has declared “a War against all Mankind” and therefore forfeits his own life. This executive power is held by every individual in the state of nature, and it is this power that individuals will later consent to surrender to the community.

“And were it not for the corruption, and vitiousness of degenerate Men, there would be no need of any other; no necessity that Men should separate from this great and natural Community, and by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided Associations.”

The state of nature is thus a real, existing condition — it is not merely a hypothetical construct. Locke argues that “all Princes and Rulers of Independent Governments” are in a state of nature with respect to each other, and that there is no common judge between them. This demonstrates that the state of nature is not a state of war, but rather a condition where men live together according to reason without a common superior. The state of war is something different: it begins when someone “declares a sedate settled Design upon another Man’s Life,” or when force is used without right. The state of nature can degenerate into a state of war, but it is not identical to it. Locke’s purpose here is to establish that legitimate government arises from a state of peace and equality, not from conquest or natural domination.

Chapter 3: Of the State of War

Locke now draws the crucial distinction between the state of nature and the state of war, a distinction that Filmer and Hobbes had collapsed. The state of war, Locke explains, “is a State of Enmity and Destruction” that begins when one man uses force without right against another. This occurs when someone “attempts to get another Man into his Absolute Power” because doing so “puts himself into a State of War with him” — the victim has no reason to trust that an aggressor who would take his liberty would stop short of taking his life.

The right to kill an aggressor arises from this state of war. Locke argues that “one may destroy a Man who makes War upon him” because such an aggressor “has quitted Reason, which God gave to be the Rule betwixt Man and Man, and the common bond whereby humane kind is united into one fellowship and societie.” The aggressor has “declared War against all Mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a Lyon or a Tyger, one of those wild Savage Beasts, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security.” This right extends to anyone who attempts to enslave another, because the would-be enslaver “thereby puts himself into a State of War with him.”

“And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another Man into his Absolute Power, does thereby put himself into a State of War with him; It being to be understood as a Declaration of a design upon his Life: For I have reason to conclude, that he who would get me into his Power without my consent, would use me as he pleased when he had got me there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it.”

The crucial difference from the state of nature is this: in the state of nature, men live together according to reason without a common superior, and the law of nature provides a moral framework for their conduct. In the state of war, force is used without right, and the only law that applies is the law of self-preservation. Locke insists that the two states should not be confused: “Men living together according to reason, without a common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge between them, is properly the State of Nature. But force, or a declared design of force, upon the Person of another, where there is no common Superior on Earth to appeal to for relief, is the State of War.” The purpose of civil society is precisely to provide “a common Judge with Authority” who can end the state of war and restore the peace of the state of nature. This distinction is essential for Locke’s theory of legitimate resistance: when a ruler uses force without right against his subjects, he puts himself into a state of war with them, and they regain their natural right to defend themselves.

Chapter 4: Of Slavery

Locke addresses the concept of slavery directly, distinguishing it from legitimate forms of subjection. True slavery, Locke argues, is “the State of War continued, between a lawful Conquerour, and a Captive” — it is not a condition that can arise from consent, because no rational being can consent to his own destruction. The slave is in a condition where “he is not to be governed by declared Laws, but by the will of a Conquerour.”

Locke defines slavery as “nothing else, but the State of War continued, between a lawful Conquerour, and a Captive.” He argues that a man cannot “by Compact, or his own Consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the Absolute, Arbitrary Power of another, to take away his Life, when he pleases.” The reason is that “no body can give more Power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own Life, cannot give another power over it.” Since each person has an inalienable right to self-preservation, no one can validly contract away that right.

“This is the perfect condition of Slavery, which is nothing else, but the State of War continued, between a lawful Conquerour, and a Captive.”

The only legitimate form of “slavery” is the condition of a captive taken in a just war who has forfeited his life to the conqueror. The conqueror may choose to delay the execution of that sentence, and during that delay the captive is in a state of slavery. But this is a temporary condition, not a permanent status, and it does not give the conqueror any right over the captive’s property or family. Locke’s purpose here is to argue that no man can legitimately claim absolute power over another by conquest, inheritance, or consent. The defender of absolute monarchy cannot appeal to the idea that subjects have consented to be slaves, because such consent would be invalid. This argument directly undercuts Filmer’s claim that Adam had absolute power over his descendants and that this power could be inherited by monarchs.

Chapter 5: Of Property

This is one of the most celebrated chapters in the *Second Treatise*, and Locke uses it to establish a theory of property that is prior to government and limits what government can do. Locke begins with the premise that “God, as King David says (Psal. cxv. 16.) has given the Earth to the Children of Men; given it to Mankind in common.” The earth and its fruits were originally given to humanity in common, but this common possession cannot satisfy the needs of individuals unless there is a way to appropriate particular parts of it for private use.

The crucial move is Locke’s argument that every man has a property in his own person. “Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his.” From this premise, Locke derives the right to private property: when a man “mixes his Labour with” something that is common, he “thereby makes it his Property” and “excludes the common right of other Men.” The labour of the individual’s body removes the object from the common state and annexes to it something that belongs to the individual alone.

“Though the Water running in the Fountain be every ones, yet who can doubt, but that in the Pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labour hath taken it out of the hands of Nature, where it was common, and belong’d equally to all; and thereby hath appropriated it to himself.”

Locke introduces two important limitations on this right of appropriation. The first is the sufficiency limitation: a man may appropriate only so much as leaves “enough, and as good” for others. The second is the spoilage limitation: a man may not take more than he can use before it spoils, because “nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy.” These limitations applied in the original state of nature, but Locke explains that the invention of money changed the situation dramatically. Money, being durable and not subject to spoilage, allowed men to accumulate wealth beyond their immediate needs without violating the spoilage limitation, because they could exchange perishable goods for durable metal. Once men consented to the use of money, they could legitimately acquire large estates by labour and exchange, and the sufficiency limitation no longer applied in the same way.

Locke’s theory of property serves several purposes in his overall argument. It establishes that property rights are natural and prior to government — they are not created by law but are discovered and protected by law. It also provides a justification for the inequality of wealth that exists in civil society, since this inequality arises from the voluntary consent to money and the differential application of labour. Most importantly, it creates a limitation on governmental power: the legislative cannot take a man’s property without his consent, because property is a natural right that predates and limits political authority.

Chapter 16: Of Conquest

Locke now turns to a topic that directly addresses Filmer’s claims about the origin of political power in conquest. Conquest, Locke argues, “is as far from setting up any Government, as demolishing an House is from building a new one in the place.” A conqueror may have a right to the life and liberty of those who made an unjust war against him, but this right extends only to those who were actually involved in the aggression, not to their innocent descendants or to those who were not parties to the war.

Locke distinguishes between a just war and an unjust war. In a just war, the conqueror has a right to reparation for the damages suffered and to security against future aggression. But “the Conquerour gets no Power by his Conquest over those that conquered with him” — his allies remain free. Nor does the conqueror gain any power over the wives and children of those he has conquered, because “they had no hand in the War, nor aided the conquered in his unjust Acts.” The conqueror’s power extends only to those who actually fought against him and who forfeited their lives by their aggression.

“But if it be objected, that the Subjects of a Conquerour, like the Subjects of an Usurper, are set free from their Allegiance, by such a Conquest: I answer, That this, in the mean time, I am not speaking of; but of a Conquerour, that has not a Title to the Throne, and so is an Usurper.”

Locke further argues that even in a just war, the conqueror has no right to the property of the conquered beyond what is necessary for reparation. “The Law of Nature,” Locke writes, “gives no Right to the Conquerour, to take away the Goods of the Conquered, any further than they are necessary to make Reparation for the Injury, and Damages sustained in the War.” The reason is that every man’s property is his own, and the conqueror cannot claim a natural right to another man’s goods simply because he has defeated him in battle. The descendants of the conquered retain their right to their inheritance, because they “had no hand in the War” and therefore cannot be punished for it.

The purpose of this chapter is to demolish the claim that conquest could be a legitimate source of political authority. Filmer had argued that all government ultimately derives from the right of conquest, but Locke shows that conquest gives only a limited and temporary power over the actual aggressors, not a permanent right to rule over a free people. No conqueror can claim that his descendants have a right to rule over the descendants of the conquered, because the original conquest gave no such right even to the conqueror himself. This argument complements Locke’s theory of consent by showing that the only legitimate origin of government is the voluntary agreement of free individuals.

Chapter 17: Of Usurpation

Locke defines usurpation as the “taking of the Government out of the hands of him, who has the Right to it, and putting it into the hands of him, who has no Title to it.” Usurpation is distinguished from conquest in that it occurs within a civil society — it is the seizure of power by someone who has no rightful claim to it, not the subjugation of a people by an external enemy.

Locke argues that usurpation “can be no more a Title to the Government, than Conquest, and is as far from being a Right, as that is.” The usurper may exercise power, but “the People are not obliged by any Compact to obey him” because they never consented to his authority. The usurper’s power is “mere Force” and carries no moral obligation. However, Locke introduces an important qualification: if the people “acquiesce” and “by a long succession of time, and a course of submission, give their consent” to the usurper’s rule, then “the Government may be said to be settled in him” by the tacit consent of the people.

“But if the Usurper be so far in possession, as to have the Obedience of the People, and to be owned by them as their Governour, then the People are commanded in the Scripture to be subject to him, and to pay him Tribute; not because he has a Right to the Government, but because the Providence of God hath placed him in it, and because he hath the Authority of the Sword.”

The key point is that usurpation does not create a right to govern, but it may create a *de facto* authority that the people are obliged to obey, if they have consented to it. This consent can be express or tacit, but it must be actual — the mere fact of being in possession of power does not give a title to it. Locke’s argument here reinforces his overall theory that legitimate political authority arises only from the consent of the governed. The usurper may exercise power by force, but he cannot claim that this force gives him a right to obedience. Only when the people give their consent — either expressly or by a long course of submission that implies consent — does the usurper’s power become legitimate.

Chapter 18: Of Tyranny

Locke now turns to the concept of tyranny, which he defines as “the exercise of Power beyond Right, which no Body can have a Right to.” A tyrant is not distinguished by the form of government he exercises — “it is not the number of those that govern, but the manner of their governing, that makes them Tyrants” — but by the fact that he governs “not for the good of those that are under his care, but for his own private, separate advantage.”

Locke is careful to distinguish between a legitimate ruler who makes mistakes and a tyrant. “Great mistakes are sometimes made by the best Governments,” Locke acknowledges, but these are not tyranny. Tyranny occurs when the ruler “makes not the Law, but his Will the Rule; and his Commands and Actions are not directed to the preservation of the Properties of his People, but the satisfaction of his own Ambition, Revenge, Covetousness, or any other irregular Passion.” The tyrant uses the force of the community not to protect the rights of the people, but to exploit them.

“But if a long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the People, and they cannot but feel what they lie under, and see whither they are going; it is not to be wonder’d, that they should then rouze themselves, and endeavour to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which Government was at first erected.”

Locke emphasizes that the people have a right to resist tyranny, because the tyrant has dissolved the government by his actions. When a ruler acts contrary to the trust reposed in him, he forfeits his authority and puts himself into a state of war with his people. The people then have the right to appeal to heaven — that is, to use force to defend themselves against the tyrant’s aggression. This right of resistance is not a right to rebellion against legitimate authority, but a right to defend against the destruction of that authority. The people are not judging their ruler; they are defending themselves against a public enemy.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical foundation for the right of resistance that was exercised in the Glorious Revolution. Locke argues that tyranny is not a form of government but the corruption of government, and that the people have the right to depose a tyrant and establish a new government that will secure their rights. This right is not a recipe for anarchy, because it can only be exercised when the abuses are “visible” and “long” — it is a last resort, not a regular means of political change.

Chapter 19: Of the Dissolution of Government

This is the final and longest chapter of the *Second Treatise*, and Locke uses it to complete his theory of resistance. He distinguishes between the dissolution of society and the dissolution of government. The dissolution of society occurs when a foreign conquest destroys the commonwealth, returning the people to a state of nature. The dissolution of government, however, occurs without the destruction of society, and it happens when the legislative — the supreme power in the commonwealth — is altered or destroyed.

Locke identifies several ways in which the government can be dissolved from within. The first is when the legislative is altered in its essential form — for example, when a prince sets up his own arbitrary will in place of the legislative, or when he hinders the legislative from assembling in due time. The second is when the legislative is “opposed to the common good” and “endeavours to invade the Property of the Subject” — in this case, the legislative has acted contrary to the trust reposed in it and has thereby dissolved the government. The third is when the executive “neglects and abandons the publick interest” and fails to execute the laws, leaving the legislative unable to function.

“Here it is, that the People have a Right to resume their original Liberty, and, by the Establishment of a new Legislative, (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own Safety and Security, which is the end for which they are in Society.”

Locke addresses the objection that this right of resistance would lead to constant rebellion and instability. He argues that this fear is unfounded, because “the People are not so easily got out of their old Forms as some are apt to suggest.” They will not resist their rulers for light or transient causes — “a long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices” is necessary to make them act. Furthermore, Locke argues that the danger of tyranny is far greater than the danger of resistance: “Revolution” is not to be feared as much as “the Mischief of a Civil War” that can be avoided if the people know they have the right to resist.

Locke concludes by reiterating that the ultimate power to judge whether the government has been dissolved lies with the people. “The People shall be Judge,” he writes, because “there is no Judge on Earth” between them and their rulers. When the government is dissolved, the power devolves back to the people, who may then “provide for their own Safety and Security” by establishing a new legislative. This is not anarchy, but the exercise of the people’s original sovereign power. The *Second Treatise* ends with this affirmation of popular sovereignty, the right of resistance, and the ultimate authority of the people to determine their own form of government.