Social Contract – John Locke

A Philosophical Inquiry into the Foundations of Political Authority and the Rights of Individuals

Of the State of Nature

We begin at the very foundation of Locke’s political philosophy: his account of the condition in which human beings exist prior to the establishment of civil government. This section establishes the original moral and political condition of mankind, from which all subsequent arguments about government derive their force.

Locke opens by declaring that “To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider what state all men are naturally in.” This state of nature, as Locke presents it, is “a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.” It is crucial to note that this is not a state of license. The state of nature is governed by a law of nature, which “obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.” This law of nature is not imposed by any human legislator; it is discoverable through reason and reflects the fact that all human beings are the workmanship of one omnipotent maker, God, and are therefore His property, not to be destroyed by others.

Because all men are equal in this state, each individual has the executive power of the law of nature. Locke explains that every person has the right to punish those who transgress the law of nature, and to be the executioner of that law. The purpose of this punishment is both restraint and reparation: to restrain offenders from doing further harm, and to secure reparation for the damages suffered by the injured party. However, Locke acknowledges a significant difficulty: in the state of nature, every man is judge in his own case, and “self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends” while “ill-nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others.” This inherent bias and the lack of a common, established, known law and an indifferent judge are precisely the inconveniences that will later drive men to form civil society.

Here Locke is doing something critically important: he is not describing an actual historical period but establishing a moral baseline. The state of nature is a condition of perfect freedom and equality under God’s law, but it is also a condition of unavoidable instability because each person must judge and execute that law for themselves. The very perfection of the state—its freedom from arbitrary human authority—creates its fatal flaw: the absence of a settled, impartial authority to resolve disputes. This tension between natural freedom and natural insecurity is the engine that drives the entire argument for political society.

“The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.”

Of the State of War

Having established the state of nature, Locke immediately distinguishes it from the state of war, which is a fundamentally different condition. This distinction is essential because critics of Locke’s theory—most notably Thomas Hobbes—had conflated the two, arguing that the state of nature is necessarily a state of war. Locke insists they are separate and explains how each arises.

The state of war, Locke writes, “is a state of enmity and destruction.” It begins when one person declares “by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design upon another man’s life.” When a man attempts to get another man into his absolute power, he puts himself into a state of war with that person. Locke reasons that “he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with him; for it is to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life.” The logic is stark: if someone seeks absolute power over you, they have put themselves beyond the constraints of reason and the law of nature, and you have the right to treat them as a threat to your very existence. This right to kill an aggressor is not merely self-defense; it is the execution of the law of nature against one who has declared himself an outlaw from reason.

The crucial distinction between the state of nature and the state of war lies in the presence of a common judge. In the state of nature, there is no common judge on earth to appeal to, but men live together according to reason, without a common superior. The state of war, however, arises when “force is used, without right, upon a man’s person” and there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief. Locke emphasizes that “to avoid this state of war is one great reason of men’s putting themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature.” For where there is an authority, a common judge with power to decide between contending parties, the state of war ceases as soon as the injured party can appeal to that authority.

Locke’s distinction here is subtle but decisive. He refuses to accept the Hobbesian collapse of the state of nature into the state of war. The state of nature can be peaceful—and indeed, rationally conducted, it should be. But it is always vulnerable to the state of war because there is no impartial authority to prevent or resolve conflict. The moment someone uses force without right, the state of war begins, and it continues until the aggressor is subdued or until an appeal can be made to a common judge. This is why civil society, with its established laws and indifferent judges, is not a loss of freedom but a rescue from the perpetual threat of war. The civil state does not eliminate the state of war; it provides a mechanism to end it and prevent its recurrence.

Of Slavery

Locke now turns to the concept of slavery, which he must reconcile with his claim that all men are born free and equal. His treatment is brief but absolute, and it establishes a limit that no legitimate political authority can cross.

Locke defines “the natural liberty of man” as being “free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule.” The “liberty of man, in society,” by contrast, is to be under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth, and under no dominion of any will but what that legislative enacts according to the trust placed in it. True slavery, Locke argues, is the condition of being subject to the absolute, arbitrary power of another. He writes that “the natural freedom of man is to be free from any superior power on earth,” and that “this freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined with, a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his preservation and life together.”

For Locke, a man can only enter into slavery by his own fault—by committing an act that deserves death. He explains that “a man, who has forfeited his life by some act that deserves death, may be delayed of his life when he is in the power of him to whom he has forfeited it, and by him be made to serve him that has taken him, without harming him.” This is not, properly speaking, a compact or agreement; it is a state of continued war between a lawful conqueror and a captive who has forfeited his life. The conqueror has the power to kill the captive but chooses instead to delay the execution and use his labor. The captive, having no claim to life, has no claim to freedom. However, Locke insists that if the captive ever makes a compact with the conqueror, “that compact gives him a title to his life” and thus to his freedom, for “no man can, by compact, transfer to another that which he has not in himself, a power over his own life.”

Locke’s position on slavery is therefore extremely narrow. No legitimate contract or consent can establish slavery, because a man cannot sell himself into absolute, arbitrary power—he does not have the right to destroy himself, and therefore cannot transfer such a right to another. The only slavery Locke acknowledges is the continued detention of a person who has forfeited his life by unjust aggression. This is a state of war sustained by the conqueror’s decision to delay execution, not a legitimate social relationship. Locke’s argument here is a direct rejection of any theory of government that claims subjects are like slaves to their ruler. No man can consent to be governed by absolute, arbitrary power, and any government that attempts to exercise such power places itself in a state of war with its own people.

Of Property

This is perhaps the most famous and influential chapter of Locke’s entire work, and it is the longest and most argumentatively dense section so far. Locke must explain how, in a state of nature where God has given the earth to all mankind in common, any individual can come to have private property. His answer transforms the foundation of political thought.

Locke begins with a fundamental premise: “God has given the earth to the children of men, given it to mankind in common.” But if everything is held in common, how can anyone legitimately take anything for their exclusive use? Locke’s answer is that every man has a property in his own person. “Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself.” From this self-ownership follows the labor theory of property: “The labor of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.” When a man mixes his labor with something in the common state of nature, he joins to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. The labor removes the thing from the common state and establishes a right in it that excludes the common right of other men.

Locke provides a concrete example: “He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself.” The question is what gave him a right to them. Locke answers that it was the labor of gathering them. “His labor has taken them out of the hands of nature, where they were common, and left nothing in common but the earth itself.” The labor is so clearly the property of the laborer that no one else can have a right to what is once joined to it. Yet Locke immediately introduces a crucial limitation: appropriation is only legitimate so long as “there is enough, and as good left in common for others.” This sufficiency limitation ensures that no one’s appropriation harms another. In the early state of nature, with abundant land and few people, this condition is easily satisfied.

The invention of money changes everything. Locke argues that before money, there was no incentive to accumulate more than one could use, because perishable goods would spoil. “If he gathered a heap of acorns or apples that would spoil and rot,” he had taken more than his share and had “invaded his neighbor’s share.” But with the introduction of money—”a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or decay”—men could exchange their surplus for something durable. This consented-to invention of money, by mutual agreement among men, allowed for larger accumulation of property without waste. Locke states that “the desire of having more than men needed” was introduced by “the consent of men” to the use of money, which “made it lawful for a man to have a greater possession than he could make use of.”

Locke’s argument here is revolutionary. He grounds property rights not in government or law, but in natural right—in the labor of the individual body. Government’s role is not to create property but to protect it. However, the natural right to property is not unlimited; it is bounded by the sufficiency condition and the spoilage proviso. Money, by eliminating the spoilage problem, effectively removes the main limit on accumulation, while the sufficiency condition becomes less relevant as land becomes scarce and private ownership becomes the norm. This creates a tension in Locke’s theory that has been debated for centuries: does his labor theory justify the vast inequalities of commercial society, or does it contain resources for criticizing them?

“Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself. The labor of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.”

Of Paternal Power

We move into a chapter that examines the nature of parental authority, a topic Locke uses to dismantle a major rival to his political theory: the claim that political power derives from the patriarchal power of fathers.

Locke begins by sharply distinguishing paternal power from political power. The common error, he argues, is to confuse the authority parents have over children with the authority a magistrate has over citizens. Paternal power is fundamentally different because it is grounded in the imperfection and nonage of children — their lack of reason and maturity. Parents have power over children not because they own them, but because they have a duty to preserve, nourish, and educate them until they reach the age of reason. This power is therefore temporary and expires when the child becomes capable of governing themselves by their own understanding.

“The power, then, that parents have over their children, arises from that duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their offspring, during the imperfect state of childhood.”

Locke presents this power as a form of trust rather than sovereignty. Children are born free in the sense that they have a right to freedom, but they are not actually free because they lack the faculties to exercise that right. The father’s command serves as a stand-in for the child’s own reason until that reason develops. This is why Locke insists that the child’s subjection to the father ends at adulthood — unlike political subjection, which is permanent and requires consent. The father’s authority is also shared with the mother: Locke explicitly rejects the notion that paternal power belongs solely to the father, calling it parental power to emphasize that both parents have an equal claim to the care and direction of their children. This is a deliberate break with the patriarchal theorists like Sir Robert Filmer, who argued that all political authority descends from Adam’s absolute fatherhood.

The significance of this chapter is that it severs the analogy between family and state. If political power were truly a form of paternal power, then all subjects would be perpetual children, which contradicts the natural equality and freedom of adults. Locke shows that parental authority, far from being a model for absolutism, is actually a temporary and limited trust aimed at the child’s eventual independence. By grounding paternal power in the child’s need rather than the father’s right, Locke clears the ground for his central claim: that legitimate political power arises only from the consent of equal adults.

Of Political or Civil Society

This chapter marks the transition from the natural condition to the artificial structure of civil society. Locke defines what it means for human beings to leave the state of nature and enter into a political society.

Locke begins by distinguishing several forms of human association. A family is not yet a political society, because its authority is based on procreation and ends with maturity. A master-servant relationship is also not political, because it is a contractual arrangement about labor and wages, not about the power of life and death. Even a commonwealth of independent individuals who merely live near each other without a common judge is still a state of nature. What makes a group a political society is the establishment of a common established law and a judicial authority with the power to decide controversies and execute sentences. Without this, each person remains the judge and executor of the law of nature, which is precisely the inconvenience that drives people out of the state of nature.

Locke’s definition is precise: political society exists where men have “given up each his executive power of the law of nature” to the public. In doing so, they resign their natural right to judge and punish offenses, and they submit their private judgments to the legislative power of the community. This act of surrender is what creates a civil society — a unified body capable of making and enforcing laws for the common good. Locke insists that this transfer is not absolute: individuals give up only the power necessary for the preservation of themselves and others, not their fundamental rights to life, liberty, and property.

“Those who are united into one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another.”

The crucial implication is that absolute monarchy is not a form of civil society at all. Because the absolute monarch retains the executive power of the law of nature over all subjects, while being himself exempt from any common judge, he remains in a state of nature with respect to his subjects. The subjects have no appeal against his injustice — they must trust his will alone. This makes absolute monarchy “inconsistent with civil society,” because it leaves one person above the law.

This chapter establishes the core architecture of Locke’s political theory. Civil society is born from the voluntary surrender of natural executive power to a public authority. This creates a legislative that makes standing laws and an executive that enforces them. The key innovation is that political power is not a natural right but a fiduciary trust — it exists only for the preservation of the members. When the government violates that trust, the society retains the ultimate power to resist or replace it.

Of the Beginning of Political Societies

Locke now turns to the historical question: how do political societies actually come into being? His answer is a decisive rejection of patriarchalism and a defense of the consent theory.

Locke argues that all legitimate political societies begin with the express consent of individuals to unite and form a community. He imagines a state of nature where free, equal, and independent men voluntarily agree to join together for their mutual preservation and convenience. This original agreement is not a surrender of all rights, but a compact to create a body politic that will act by the majority — since a unified body requires a single direction, the only possible mechanism is that the majority’s decision binds the whole. Locke emphasizes that anyone who does not explicitly consent to join remains in the state of nature and cannot be bound by the society’s laws.

Locke is aware that historical records rarely show such explicit founding contracts. He responds by pointing to the origins of Rome and Venice, which began as voluntary associations of free men. More importantly, he argues that even if we lack historical evidence, reason shows that consent must be the only legitimate origin of government — because men are naturally free, and no one can be subjected to the political power of another without his own agreement. The idea of a tacit consent — implied by living under a government’s jurisdiction and enjoying its benefits — is introduced later to explain how existing governments can bind those born under them.

“Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent.”

Locke also uses this chapter to dismantle the patriarchal claim that government began with fatherly authority. He grants that the first rulers were likely fathers, but he insists that their authority was based on the consent of their children and descendants, not on natural paternal right. The first monarchies were elective, not hereditary — families chose the wisest or most experienced member to lead them. Over time, this consent became habitual, but the origin remains the same: government is founded on the agreement of the governed.

This chapter is crucial because it establishes that political obligation is voluntary. No one is born a subject of any particular government. Every adult must, at some point, consent to be governed, either explicitly by becoming a member of a commonwealth or tacitly by using its roads and receiving its protection. Consent is the only legitimate foundation of political power, and this principle undercuts all claims to hereditary or divine right.

Of the Ends of Political Society and Government

Having explained how political society begins, Locke now examines why it begins — the end or purpose for which men abandon their natural freedom and enter civil society.

The state of nature, while governed by the law of nature, has three great defects. First, it lacks an established, settled, known law that is universally accepted and authoritative. The law of nature is plain to reason, but men are biased by their own interests and ignorant of it, so they disagree about what it requires. Second, it lacks a known and indifferent judge with authority to settle disputes according to that law. In the state of nature, each man is his own judge, and his passion and revenge often lead him to overpunish or underpunish. Third, it lacks a power to execute the just sentence, making it difficult to enforce judgments against those who are stronger or more cunning.

These three inconveniences make the state of nature unsafe and insecure for the enjoyment of one’s property — where property includes life, liberty, and estate. The great and chief end of men uniting into commonwealths and putting themselves under government is the preservation of their property. To achieve this, they willingly give up their natural executive power and submit to a legislative power that will make known laws applied by impartial judges and backed by the community’s force.

“The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property.”

Locke is careful to note what is not surrendered. Individuals do not give up their natural rights to life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness. They give up only the power to judge and execute the law of nature, and they do so only to the extent necessary for the better preservation of themselves and others. The legislative power is a fiduciary trust — it can never have the right to destroy, enslave, or impoverish its subjects. The end of government is the public good, and any government that acts against that end violates the trust that created it.

This chapter completes the theoretical foundation of Locke’s politics. The state of nature is not a war of all against all, but it is inconvenient and dangerous. Civil society remedies these defects by providing law, judges, and enforcement. The purpose of government is not to rule but to serve — to protect the natural rights that men possessed before government existed. This sets the stage for Locke’s critique of tyranny and his defense of revolution, which follow in the later chapters of the book.

Of the Forms of a Commonwealth

We are now in the theoretical core of the work, where Locke moves from the purposes of government to its structural forms. This chapter classifies the types of political societies that can be constituted and establishes which forms are legitimate.

Locke begins by stating that the majority, having the power to create a commonwealth, may “continue the legislative power in themselves” or place it in the hands of “one hereditary man” or “several hereditary men” — or any combination thereof. The key distinction is not how many people rule, but where the legislative power resides. The legislative power is “the supreme power of the commonwealth” because it makes the laws that bind everyone, including the executive. Locke identifies three legitimate forms: perfect democracy, where the legislative power belongs to “the society of men” who make laws collectively; oligarchy, where the legislative is placed in the hands of a few select men and their heirs; and monarchy, where it is placed in one man and his heirs. Monarchy itself is subdivided into elective monarchy and hereditary monarchy. However, Locke immediately warns that these names do not capture the full reality of governance, because the legislative power can be “placed in more than one” and still be legitimate if its foundations are properly constituted.

Locke then introduces a crucial distinction that structures his entire political theory: between the legislative power and the executive power. The legislative is the power that creates laws; the executive is the power that enforces them. These must be separated because “the same persons who have the power of making laws” should not also “have the power to execute them.” If they did, they would be tempted “to exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make” and to “suit the law, both in its making and execution, to their own private advantage.” This separation is not merely practical — it is a constitutional principle designed to prevent tyranny. However, Locke acknowledges that even this separation is insufficient unless there is a third power: the federative power, which governs relations with foreign nations. The federative power is concerned with “war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all transactions with all persons and communities without the commonwealth.” While essentially executive in nature, it operates according to “prudence and wisdom” rather than fixed positive laws, because foreign affairs cannot be governed by predetermined rules.

“The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands; for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others.”

This passage establishes the principle of non-delegation — the legislative power is a trust, not a property, and cannot be alienated by those who hold it. The people entrust the legislative with lawmaking authority, but that authority cannot be reassigned to others without the people’s consent. This is the foundation of constitutional limits on government: the legislative has no right to create a subordinate legislative or to give its power away. The only legitimate source of legislative authority is the original grant from the people, and any attempt to transfer that authority is a violation of trust and a dissolution of government.

Of the Extent of the Legislative Power

This chapter is the heart of Locke’s theory of limited government. The legislative, though supreme, is not absolute. Locke enumerates the boundaries of legislative authority with precision, showing that the legislative is itself bound by natural law and the purposes for which government was created.

The legislative power, Locke argues, is “not, nor can possibly be, absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people.” This is because it is “but the joint power of every member of the society” given up to the person or assembly that makes laws. Since no one in the state of nature had arbitrary power over others — only the power to preserve the innocent and punish offenders according to the law of nature — no one can transfer arbitrary power to the government. The legislative’s authority is limited to what is “necessary for the good of the society.” Moreover, the legislative cannot use “absolute arbitrary power” because it cannot give itself more power than the people had in the state of nature. Locke drives this point home: “Nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself; and nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another.”

The legislative is further limited by its purpose. It must govern by “promulgated established laws” that are “not to be varied in particular cases.” It must “govern by promulgated standing laws, and not by extemporary decrees.” These laws must be designed for “no other end ultimately but the good of the people.” The legislative cannot “raise taxes on the property of the people without the consent of the majority, given by themselves or their deputies.” This is a fundamental protection: property cannot be taken without consent, which is the basis of representation and popular sovereignty. Finally, the legislative “cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands,” as already established. These four limits — no arbitrary power, governance by standing laws, no taxation without consent, and non-delegation — define the boundaries of legitimate legislative authority.

“The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent; for the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires that the people should have property.”

Locke’s argument here is foundational to liberal constitutionalism. Because the purpose of government is to preserve property (which includes life, liberty, and estates), the legislative that destroys property defeats its own reason for existence. Taxation without consent is a form of theft, not governance. This does not mean no taxation is possible — but it must be approved by the people or their representatives. The legislative, then, is not sovereign in the absolute sense; it is a trustee bound by the terms of its trust. The people remain the ultimate sovereign, and the legislative’s authority is conditional on its fidelity to the law of nature and the public good.

Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of the Commonwealth

Locke returns to the separation of powers he introduced earlier, now developing it in greater detail. This chapter examines how these powers relate to one another and why their separation is necessary for the preservation of liberty.

The legislative power is the supreme power of the commonwealth, but it is not permanent. Locke argues that the legislative should meet only “at certain times” or when summoned by the executive, because “it is not necessary that the legislative should be always in being.” The legislative is the deliberative body that makes laws; it does not need to be constantly active because laws are made to govern ongoing conduct, not to be made anew every day. However, the executive power must be “perpetually existing” because there must always be someone to enforce the laws and “see to the execution of the laws that are made.” This perpetual executive ensures that the laws are applied consistently and that the commonwealth does not lapse into anarchy between legislative sessions.

The federative power, which Locke describes as “the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all transactions with all persons and communities without the commonwealth,” is distinct from the executive in its object — it concerns foreign relations rather than domestic enforcement. Yet in practice, Locke recognizes that these two powers are “almost always united” in the same hands. The federative power requires “the strength and force of the society” to be effective, and it would be impractical and dangerous to have separate authorities for domestic and foreign affairs. However, the federative power is “much less capable of being directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws than the executive,” because foreign affairs involve unpredictable circumstances that require discretion and prudence. Despite this union, Locke insists that the two powers are “really distinct in themselves” and that understanding this distinction is crucial for preventing abuses of power.

“The legislative power is that which has a right to direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it.”

This passage clarifies that all three powers — legislative, executive, and federative — are subordinate to the legislative’s authority to set the ends and means of governance. The legislative directs the force of the commonwealth; the executive applies that force domestically; the federative applies it abroad. But this hierarchy does not make the legislative absolute, because it is itself bound by natural law and the trust of the people. Locke’s separation of powers is designed to prevent any single body from accumulating too much authority, but it is important to note that he does not advocate for a strict separation of powers in the modern sense. The executive has the power to summon and dissolve the legislature, and the legislature controls the executive through its power of lawmaking. This creates a system of checks and balances that preserves liberty while maintaining effective governance.

Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Commonwealth

This chapter addresses a crucial question: if the legislative is supreme, what happens when it violates its trust? Locke answers by showing that the legislative is subordinate to the people, who retain the ultimate authority to judge and replace their government.

Locke begins by reiterating that the legislative power is the supreme power of the commonwealth while the government exists. It is “sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it” — but this supremacy is conditional. The legislative cannot “be forfeited by the community” as long as it acts within its trust. However, the legislative is “only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends,” and when “there is a manifest breach of trust, the people have a right to remove or alter the legislative.” This right of resistance is not a right to rebellion in the ordinary sense; it is a constitutional mechanism that restores the original trust. The people, as the original source of all political authority, retain “the supreme power to remove or alter the legislative” when it acts against the public good.

Locke then introduces a distinction between the dissolution of government and the dissolution of society. The government can be dissolved by internal rebellion or foreign conquest, but society itself — the community of people who have agreed to form a commonwealth — persists unless the people themselves cease to exist. The dissolution of government occurs when the legislative is “altered” in ways contrary to the original trust, or when the executive “acts contrary to the laws” and sets up a “private will” against the public good. In such cases, the power returns to the people, who have “the right to resume their original liberty” and establish a new government. But Locke is careful to argue that this right of resistance does not lead to constant rebellion. The people will not act rashly; they are “slow to leave their old constitutions” and will only act when “the mischief is grown general, and the ill designs of the rulers become visible.”

“The community may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power, but not as considered under any form of government, because this power of the people can never take place till the government be dissolved.”

This passage reveals the paradoxical foundation of Locke’s political theory: the people are sovereign, but their sovereignty is latent until the government disintegrates. The people do not rule directly; they authorize rulers to rule for them. But this authorization is revocable. The people retain the supreme power to judge whether the government has violated its trust, and to act upon that judgment by replacing the government. This is not anarchy — it is the restoration of constitutional order. The people’s power is the ultimate check on government abuse, the guarantee that government remains accountable to those it governs. This theory of popular sovereignty and the right of revolution was revolutionary in its time and remains the foundation of democratic constitutionalism.

Of Tyranny

We are now in the final chapters of Locke’s *Second Treatise*, where he addresses the pathologies of government — the circumstances under which legitimate authority becomes corrupted and the remedies available to the people. This chapter defines tyranny not as any particular form of government, but as the abuse of power regardless of the form.

Locke begins by giving a precise definition: tyranny is “the exercise of power beyond right, which nobody can have a right to.” It is not merely the exercise of power, but the exercise of power without authority. A tyrant is not distinguished by the number of rulers — one man, a few, or many can all be tyrants if they govern by their own private will rather than by the laws established for the public good. Locke writes that “wherever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to the harm of another.”

The key distinction Locke draws is between the exercise of power according to law and the exercise of power according to private will. A prince who governs by established laws, even if those laws are imperfect, is not a tyrant. But the same prince who sets aside the laws and governs by his own arbitrary will becomes a tyrant immediately. The form of government does not matter — “a tyrant” is “one who makes use of his power, not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private separate advantage.”

Locke illustrates this with examples. A king who imposes taxes on the people without their consent, who hinders the legislative from assembling, who alters the electoral system without authorization, who delivers the people into foreign subjection — such acts are not mere errors of judgment but acts of tyranny. These are not simply bad policies; they are attacks on the constitutional order itself. The tyrant treats the people as property to be used for his own ends rather than as free persons whose good is the end of government.

“Wherever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to the harm of another.”

What Locke means here is that the rule of law is the boundary between legitimate authority and tyranny. When rulers cross that boundary and act without legal warrant, they cease to be magistrates and become private persons acting without authority — indeed, they become enemies of the people. The law is not merely a convenience but the essential medium through which legitimate power operates. To act without law is to act without right, and to act without right against others is to enter a state of war with them.

Of the Dissolution of Government

This final chapter is the climax of Locke’s entire political theory. Here he brings together all the preceding arguments to answer the crucial question: under what circumstances does government dissolve, and what happens to political authority when it does? The chapter is divided into two main parts: the dissolution of government from within and the dissolution of society itself.

Locke distinguishes carefully between the dissolution of government and the dissolution of society. A government can dissolve while society remains intact; the people can then erect a new government. But if society itself dissolves, the people return to the state of nature and must begin anew. The dissolution of society occurs only when the people are conquered by a foreign power and their commonwealth is destroyed.

The dissolution of government from within occurs in several ways. First, when the legislative is altered or destroyed. Since the legislative is the supreme power in any commonwealth, its corruption or destruction brings down the entire government. Locke lists specific acts that constitute such destruction: when the prince hinders the legislative from assembling or acting freely; when the prince alters the electoral system without popular consent; when the prince delivers the people into foreign subjection; when the prince abandons the government entirely, leaving the people without law.

Second, government dissolves when the legislative or the prince acts contrary to their trust. Locke lists the specific violations: usurpation of power by the executive; neglect of the execution of the laws; obstruction of the legislative; betrayal of the commonwealth to foreign powers; and, most fundamentally, any attempt by those in power “to invade the property of the subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the community, masters, or arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.”

“The power that every individual gave the society, when he entered into it, can never revert to the individuals again, as long as the society lasts, but will always remain in the community.”

Locke argues that when the government acts against its trust, the people have the right to appeal to heaven — that is, to resist tyranny by force. This is not a recipe for anarchy but a constitutional principle. The people are the final judges of whether the government has violated its trust. They do not judge lightly; they will not resist for trivial reasons. But when “a long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices” makes clear the design to reduce them to slavery, then they are entitled — indeed, obligated — to defend themselves.

The power that the government holds is a fiduciary power — a trust granted for certain ends. When that trust is betrayed, the power reverts to the people. They may then “erect a new legislative, as they think best, being in full liberty to resist the force of those who, without authority, would impose any thing upon them.” The dissolution of government does not dissolve society; it returns the community to its original right of self-preservation and self-government.

Locke addresses the objection that this doctrine will lead to frequent rebellions. He responds that it is not the people who are turbulent but tyrants who provoke resistance. The people are slow to act, patient under suffering, and will endure much before they rebel. The danger is not too much resistance but too little. If governments are frequently overthrown, it is because they have become oppressive, not because the people are restless. “Great mistakes in the ruling part,” Locke observes, “many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty, will be borne by the people without mutiny or murmur.” Only when the oppression becomes systematic and intolerable will they act.

Locke also addresses the question of who judges whether the government has broken its trust. His answer is that “the people shall be judge.” There is no higher earthly authority to appeal to; the people must judge for themselves, as they must in all cases where there is no superior on earth. This judgment is not arbitrary but is guided by the law of nature and the fundamental ends of political society. The people judge whether the government is accomplishing the purpose for which it was instituted — the preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates.

The final paragraphs of the chapter turn to the dissolution of government by the supreme executive power. Locke argues that when a prince uses his power to set up his own arbitrary will in place of the laws, he puts himself into a state of war with the people. The people are then free to resist him as they would any other invader. The prince who acts thus forfeits his authority and becomes a private person — indeed, an enemy of the commonwealth.

Locke concludes with a powerful statement of popular sovereignty: the people are the ultimate source of political authority, and they never entirely alienate this authority. They entrust it to rulers for the public good, but when rulers betray that trust, the people reclaim their original right to provide for their own safety and security. The power of the people is not anarchy; it is the constitution itself — the fundamental law that stands above any particular government.

This final argument completes the circle of Locke’s political theory. Beginning from the state of nature, proceeding through the social contract and the establishment of government, and ending with the right of resistance, Locke demonstrates that legitimate government is always limited, always conditional, and always accountable to those who create it. The people do not surrender their natural rights when they enter society; they exchange the inconveniences of the state of nature for the protections of civil society while retaining the ultimate authority to judge whether those protections are being provided.