The Second Treatise on Civil Government – John Locke

The Foundations of Political Power and the Limits of Government

Chapter I: Of the State of Nature

We are at the opening of the work, where Locke establishes the foundational concept from which all subsequent argument proceeds: the state of nature as a condition of perfect freedom and equality, governed by a law of nature that binds every person prior to any political institution.

The state of nature, Locke writes, is “a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.” This is not a state of license, however. Though every man is free to do as he wishes with his own person and property, he has no liberty to destroy himself or any creature in his possession unless a nobler purpose than mere preservation requires it. The state of nature is governed by a law of nature — and this law, reason itself, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions. The reason for this is that all men are the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker, all servants of one sovereign Master, sent into the world by His order and about His business. They are His property, and no one may destroy what belongs to another without that other’s consent.

Because all men are equal in this fundamental sense — each possessing the same faculties, sharing in the same community of nature — there is no natural subordination among them that would authorize one man to harm another. Each person is bound to preserve himself, and by the same obligation, when his own preservation is not in competition, he ought to preserve the rest of mankind. To enforce this law of nature, every man in the state of nature has the executive power of the law of nature, the right to punish offenses against that law to a degree proportional to the transgression, sufficient to make reparation and deter future violations. Without this power, the law of nature would be in vain, as ineffective as the laws in a state without a judge to enforce them. An innocent man may destroy any thing that threatens his life, for the fundamental law of nature is the preservation of mankind. A thief who merely takes property does not entitle the injured party to kill him, for the thief’s force is not absolute; but a robber who threatens life itself may be treated as a wild beast.

This clarifies what the state of nature is not: it is not a state of war, though Locke immediately distinguishes the two. The state of nature is a condition of peace, goodwill, mutual assistance, and preservation. Men living together according to reason without a common superior on earth to judge between them is properly the state of nature. But when force, or a declared design of force, is used upon the person of another without authority, that is a state of war. The difference is crucial: the state of nature can exist where there is no common judge, but the state of war exists when there is no such judge and one party has declared enmity. Locke thereby establishes that political society arises precisely to remedy the inconveniences of the state of nature — the lack of an established, settled, known law, the lack of a known and indifferent judge, and the lack of a power to back and support the sentence when right — not to escape from a condition of natural chaos.

Chapter II: Of the State of War

We move to Locke’s distinction between the state of nature and the state of war, a distinction necessary to understand why men leave the former for political society and what they hope to gain.

“The state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and therefore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design upon another man’s life, puts him in a state of war with him against whom he has declared such an intention.”

Force without right upon a man’s person creates a state of war, both where there is and where there is not a common judge. For when force is used without authority, the injured party retains the right to war against the aggressor, because there is no appeal on earth to a common superior who can decide between them. In such a condition, the injured party may kill the aggressor, just as he may kill a wolf or a lion — because the aggressor has declared himself an enemy to all mankind by violating the fundamental law of nature. The reason is that the aggressor has renounced reason, the common rule and measure God has given to mankind, and has declared war against the whole species by violence and oppression.

The crucial point is that the state of nature and the state of war are not the same condition, though some writers have confounded them. The state of nature is one of peace and goodwill, and it can exist alongside the absence of a common judge. The state of war exists when there is a declared design of force and no common superior to appeal to for remedy. When men live together under a government, they are not in the state of nature, but they may still be in a state of war if the government itself turns tyrannical. For wherever there is no authority to appeal to for decision between parties, or where the supposed authority itself becomes the aggressor, the state of war returns. Locke gives the example of a thief: if a thief steals my purse and I cannot appeal to the law, I may kill him, because the thief has put himself into a state of war with me. But if I can appeal to the law, I must do so and not kill him myself.

The remedy for the state of war is the establishment of political society with an authority to judge and decide disputes. Men leave the state of nature and enter into commonwealths precisely to avoid the state of war — not because the state of nature is itself war, but because it is liable to degenerate into war when there is no common judge. The institution of government provides that common judge, and by this means the state of war can be ended whenever it arises between subjects of the same commonwealth, for the injured party can appeal to the law. But those who are not under a common judge remain, in relation to each other, in the state of nature and potentially in the state of war.

Chapter III: Of Slavery

Locke now addresses the subject of slavery, which he defines as a condition that cannot be legitimate because it violates the fundamental law of nature concerning human liberty and self-preservation.

The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man in society is to be under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth, nor under the dominion of any will or restraint of any law but what that legislative shall enact according to the trust reposed in it. Freedom, then, is not license: it is the condition of being under a rule that one has consented to. Slavery, by contrast, is the condition of being under absolute, arbitrary, despotical power.

Locke argues that a man cannot, by his own consent, enslave himself to another. For a man, having by nature power over his own life and liberty, cannot by any compact transfer that which he does not have — he cannot give another power over his life when he does not have the power to take his own life. The only circumstance in which a man may forfeit his life to another is when he commits an act deserving death. In such a case, the person who has the right to take his life may delay doing so and instead make use of his labor. This is not true slavery, but rather a kind of despotic power derived from justice — the criminal forfeits his right to life by his crime, and the victor may use him as he pleases. But this ceases to be slavery if the master’s right is limited: for if a compact is made between them, the slave’s life is no longer at the master’s absolute disposal, and the condition becomes a compact of service, not slavery.

Genuine slavery, Locke declares, is “nothing else but the state of war continued between a lawful conqueror and a captive.” For if once a compact enters between them, and the captive is allowed to have his life and liberty upon certain conditions, the state of war ceases, and the relation becomes one of service under agreement. True slavery is therefore the condition of being under absolute, arbitrary power, and it can never be justified by consent, because no man can consent to give another absolute power over his life. Slavery is directly contrary to the law of nature, which aims at the preservation of mankind, and to civil society, which is established for the protection of life, liberty, and property.

Chapter IV: Of Property

We arrive at one of the most celebrated chapters in political philosophy, where Locke explains how property — the right to own things — arises in the state of nature prior to the institution of government, and what limits that right.

God, Locke begins, has given the earth to all men in common. The earth and all that is on it belongs to mankind collectively, and no one has originally a private dominion over any part of it. Yet the earth is given for the support and comfort of human life, and there must be some means by which the common goods become individually appropriated, or they would be useless. Reason makes it clear that “the fruit or venison which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e., a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his life.”

The means by which this appropriation occurs is labor. Though the earth and all inferior creatures are common to all men, every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself. The labor of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever he removes out of the state that nature has provided and left it in, he has mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. By removing an object from the common state nature placed it in, he has annexed something to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this labor, being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no man but he can have a right to what that labor is once joined to, at least where there is enough and as good left in common for others.

This is the great original law of property: that labor gives title. But Locke immediately notes a limit — the sufficiency limitation. A man may appropriate only so much as he can use before it spoils. For what is beyond his use belongs to others. “Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy.” And if a man takes more than he can use, he takes what belongs to others, for that surplus is wasted. The same limitation applies to land: a man may enclose and cultivate as much as he can use, but if the land he has taken lies waste, it is still common, and others may use it.

The invention of money changes this situation fundamentally, as Locke will later explain. But for now, the foundation is clear: property in the state of nature is based on labor, limited by use, and governed by the law of nature that forbids waste and requires leaving enough for others.

Chapter V: Of Paternal Power

Locke now examines paternal power (which he carefully distinguishes from political power), arguing that the power parents have over children is temporary and based on the child’s need for protection and guidance during minority.

The power of parents over children arises from the natural condition of human birth. Children are born into a state of equality with all other men, but not into a state of perfect equality, because they are not born with full use of reason. The law of nature, which is reason, does not bind a child until he has reason to understand it. The child’s parents, therefore, have a temporary power to govern and direct his actions until he reaches the age of reason, at which point he becomes as free as any other man. This power is “nothing but that which the children’s imperfection of age requires.”

Locke is careful to distinguish this from political power. The power of a father over his child is not absolute, nor does it extend to the child’s life or property. It is a power to educate, to direct, to preserve, and to protect — but it ends when the child attains maturity. At that point, the child is as free as his father, subject only to the law of nature and to any government he has consented to. Paternal power, therefore, cannot be the foundation of political power, because it is temporary and limited. A father has no right to rule his adult son, and kings cannot claim to be fathers of their people in any sense that gives them political authority.

The mother, Locke adds, equally shares in this power over children. The term “paternal” is misleading but conventional; the power is really parental, belonging to both mother and father. This shared authority undermines any argument that political power is derived from a father’s natural authority over his children. There is no single natural ruler in the family; the power is divided and temporary.

Chapter VI: Of Political or Civil Society

We come to the core transition in Locke’s argument: how men move from the state of nature into political society, and what civil society actually is.

“Whenever therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political or civil society.”

The key feature of political society is the establishment of a common authority with legislative and executive power to judge disputes and enforce the law. In the state of nature, every man has the executive power of the law of nature. In political society, each man gives up this power to the community, which then acts through laws made by consent. The community becomes the judge, the arbiter, the enforcer. And with this, each man also gives up his natural right to punish offenses, transferring that right to the legislative power.

This transfer is what creates political society. Wherever there is no such common authority, men remain in the state of nature with respect to each other. Locke gives the example of a Swiss and an Indian in the woods of America: though they live under different governments, they are in a state of nature toward each other because there is no common judge between them. The same is true of the prince of a country and a foreigner: they are in a state of nature because they have no common authority to appeal to.

The purpose of entering political society is to avoid the inconveniences of the state of nature: the lack of a known, settled, established law; the lack of a known and indifferent judge; and the lack of a power to enforce the law. In civil society, these three deficiencies are remedied. The legislative power makes known laws, the executive power enforces them, and the community itself — or its representatives — acts as the judge. This is the whole of political society: the union of individuals under a common authority, with each surrendering his natural executive power to the public for the sake of peace, order, and the protection of property.

Chapter VII: Of the Beginning of Political Societies

We now move into Locke’s account of how actual political societies come into existence, tracing the transition from the state of nature to civil government through the mechanism of consent.

Locke begins by distinguishing the beginning of political society from the forms of authority found in families or natural relationships. He argues that the only way anyone can be brought out of the state of nature and subjected to the political power of another is by his own consent. “Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent.” This is the foundational principle: legitimate government rests on the agreement of free individuals to unite into a community.

The actual process, as Locke describes it, works as follows. When any number of men have, by their consent, made one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude for the rest. “For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority.” Locke explains that this is necessary because a community that can only act by unanimous consent would be incapable of functioning — it would dissolve just as quickly as it formed. Therefore, every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic, puts himself under an obligation to submit to the determination of the majority.

Locke then addresses the historical objection that no such original contract can be found in the records of ancient governments. He responds that the beginning of political societies is obscured by time and that we must look to the natural conditions of early human societies. In the early state of nature, men were not yet corrupted by ambition or luxury; they lived in small, family-based groups where the father naturally exercised authority. These patriarchal kingdoms were the first forms of government, but Locke insists that even here, consent was the foundation — the children consented to their father’s rule because they saw its benefits, and when families grew into larger communities, the same principle of consent continued to operate, though often implicitly rather than explicitly.

“And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free and under no other ties than he was in before in the state of nature.”

This argument serves to ground all legitimate political authority in the voluntary agreement of individuals. Locke is not claiming that every person in every government has personally signed a contract, but rather that the legitimacy of any government depends on whether it could have arisen from such consent and whether those subject to it have, by their continued presence and acceptance of its benefits, given their tacit consent. The original compact is therefore both a historical hypothesis and a moral standard: it explains how political society began, but it also defines the conditions under which government can claim authority over free persons.

Chapter VIII: Of the Ends of Political Society and Government

This chapter directly addresses the purpose that justifies the creation of political society — the inconveniences of the state of nature that drive men to unite under government.

Locke restates the three great defects of the state of nature that make civil government necessary. First, there is no established, settled, known law received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong. The law of nature exists, but it is not written down or publicly known, and men are biased by their own interests, leading them to misapply it. Second, there is no known and indifferent judge with authority to determine controversies according to the established law. Each man is judge in his own case, and passion and revenge tend to carry him too far. Third, there is no power to execute and support the sentence when it is just — those who are strong enough to resist the judgment of others can do so with impunity.

These three defects — the lack of a settled law, the lack of an impartial judge, and the lack of executive power — are what men seek to remedy when they enter civil society. “Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature, being but in an ill condition while they remain in it, are quickly driven into society.” Locke emphasizes that the great and chief end of men uniting into commonwealths and putting themselves under government is the preservation of their property — where “property” means not just their material possessions but their lives, liberties, and estates.

Locke then draws a crucial distinction: in the state of nature, each man has the executive power of the law of nature, meaning he may punish offenses against the law. But when he enters political society, he gives up this power to the public, reserving only so much as is necessary for the execution of the laws. He also gives up the power of determining what is right and wrong according to his own judgment, submitting instead to the legislative power of the society. The community now becomes the umpire — it has the power to determine all controversies and to inflict punishments for injuries done to any member of the commonwealth.

“For no man, in civil society, can be excepted from the laws of it: for if any man may do what he thinks fit, and there be no appeal on earth, for redress or security against any harm he shall do; I ask, whether he be not perfectly still in the state of nature, and so can be no part or member of that civil society; unless any one will say the state of nature and civil society are one and the same thing, which I have never yet found any one so great a patron of anarchy as to affirm.”

This chapter makes clear that political society is a remedial institution — it exists not to create new rights but to secure the rights that already belong to men in the state of nature. The transition from nature to civil society is not a transformation of human nature but a transfer of powers: the individual surrenders his personal executive power to the community, and the community, acting through its government, takes on the responsibility of protecting the lives, liberties, and properties of all. The ends of government are therefore strictly limited: government exists to preserve the peace and secure the possessions of those who have consented to its authority, and any exercise of power beyond these ends is illegitimate.

Chapter IX: Of the Forms of a Commonwealth

Locke now turns to the constitutional question: what form should civil government take once it is established? His answer is carefully calibrated between absolute monarchy and pure democracy.

Locke begins by noting that the form of government depends on where the legislative power resides. If the legislative power is placed in the hands of one man, it is a monarchy; if in the hands of a few select men and their heirs, it is an oligarchy; if in the hands of the community as a whole, it is a democracy; and so on. However, Locke spends remarkably little time classifying these forms. His deeper concern is the proper structure and limitation of legislative power itself.

The legislative power, Locke argues, is the supreme power of the commonwealth — it is the soul that gives form, life, and unity to the body politic. All other powers of government are subordinate to it. But this does not mean the legislative power is absolute. Locke immediately imposes four limitations. First, the legislative power cannot be arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people — it must govern by promulgated established laws, not by extemporary decrees. Second, the legislative cannot assume to itself a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws and known authorized judges. Third, the supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent — for the preservation of property is the end of government, and no man’s property can be taken from him without his consent. Fourth, the legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands — it is a delegated power that cannot be alienated.

“The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be.”

Locke then introduces a distinction between the legislative and executive powers. The legislative is not always in session — it meets to make laws and then dissolves. But there must be a power that is always in being to see to the execution of the laws that are made. This is the executive power. Furthermore, Locke recognizes a third power — the federative power — which is the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all transactions with persons and communities outside the commonwealth. However, the federative power is, in practice, usually joined with the executive, since both require the force of the society to be effective.

This separation of powers is not the same as Montesquieu’s later tripartite system, but it lays the groundwork. Locke’s concern is to prevent any single person or body from holding both the power to make laws and the power to execute them, for this would create a temptation to exempt themselves from the laws and to govern arbitrarily. The legislative is supreme, but it is fiduciary — a trust held on behalf of the people, who retain the ultimate power to alter or dissolve the government if it acts against their interests.

Chapter X: Of the Extent of the Legislative Power

Here Locke specifies in greater detail the boundaries within which the legislative power must operate — a negative definition of legislative authority that functions as the first systematic account of limited government.

Locke begins by restating the supreme yet bounded nature of legislative power. Though the legislative is the supreme power in every commonwealth, it is not, nor can possibly be, absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people. The reason is that the legislative power is nothing but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person or assembly which is the legislator. Since no man in the state of nature has arbitrary power over himself or others — he can only do what the law of nature permits — he cannot transfer to the government a power he does not possess. Therefore, the legislative can have no more power than what the law of nature grants, which is limited to the preservation of mankind.

Locke then lists four specific limits on legislative authority. First, it must govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, not by extemporary decrees. “For all the power the government has, being only for the good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws; that both the people may know their duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law; and the rulers too may be kept within their bounds, and not be tempted, by the power they have in their hands, to employ it to such purposes as they thought fit.” Second, these laws ought to be designed for no other end ultimately but the good of the people. The legislative is a trust, and all laws must be directed toward the public welfare. Third, the legislative cannot raise taxes or take property without the consent of the people or their representatives. Since the end of government is the preservation of property, any taking of property without consent would defeat that end. Fourth, the legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands — it is a delegated authority that must remain in the hands to which the people have entrusted it.

“These are the bounds which the trust that is put in them by the society, and the law of God and nature, have set to the legislative power of every commonwealth, in all forms of government.”

Locke also addresses what happens when the legislative power violates these bounds. The answer is that the people — who originally created the government and remain the ultimate source of authority — have the right to dissolve or alter the legislative when it acts contrary to its trust. This is not a recipe for rebellion, Locke insists, but a fundamental principle of legitimate government: the people are the final judges of whether their trust has been betrayed, and they retain the power to remove or replace the government that violates the conditions of its establishment. This chapter thus establishes the doctrine of popular sovereignty as the corrective to arbitrary power: the legislative is supreme within its sphere, but that sphere is limited by law, and the people are the ultimate guardians of those limits.

Chapter XI: Of the Legislative Power

We are now in the central institutional chapter of the work, where Locke defines the nature, scope, and limits of the legislative power — the supreme power in any commonwealth.

Locke begins by restating a fundamental principle: “The first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power.” This legislative power is not absolute or arbitrary, but is “a delegated power from the people” and therefore must operate within specific bounds. The legislative cannot be arbitrary, for it is itself a creation of the people’s trust: its power extends only as far as the people consented to when they formed the commonwealth. The legislative cannot assume authority beyond what is necessary for the public good.

Locke then enumerates four specific limits on the legislative power. First, the legislative must govern by promulgated standing laws, not by arbitrary decrees. “They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the countryman at plough.” This is the rule of law — the requirement that government operate through general, known, and stable rules that apply equally to all. Second, these laws must be designed for “no other end ultimately but the good of the people.” The legislative power exists for a purpose, and that purpose constrains how it may be exercised.

Third, the legislative cannot raise taxes on the property of the people without their own consent. “It is a power that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects.” The power to tax is not an inherent right of government but a grant from the people, and it must be exercised through representatives chosen by the people or by the people themselves. Fourth, the legislative cannot transfer its power to any other body. “The legislative neither can nor ought to transfer the power of making laws to any one else, or place it any where but where the people have.” This is because the legislative power is a trust, and trusts cannot be delegated to others without the consent of those who established the trust.

These limits are not merely prudential recommendations; they are constitutive of what it means to have legitimate legislative power. A legislative that exceeds these bounds ceases to be a proper legislative and becomes instead a form of tyranny. Locke is careful to note that these limits apply even to the supreme power in the commonwealth: “The legislative is the supreme power in every commonwealth,” but it is supreme only within the bounds of the fundamental law of nature and the terms of its trust.

“The legislative power is that which has a right to direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it.”

This chapter thus completes Locke’s account of the legislative as both supreme and limited. The legislative is supreme because it makes the laws that govern all other powers, but it is limited because it exists only by the people’s trust and for the people’s good. The legislative cannot rule arbitrarily, cannot take property without consent, cannot delegate its authority, and must always act for the public benefit. These restrictions are not external impositions but internal to the very concept of legitimate political authority.

Chapter XII: Of the Executive Power

Locke now turns to the second major power of government: the executive power, distinct from the legislative in function and scope.

The executive power is “the power of executing the laws” that the legislative has made. Locke distinguishes it from the legislative because the two functions require different qualities. The legislative need not be in constant session — it meets periodically to make laws — but the execution of those laws must be continuous. “Because the laws, that are as constantly to be executed, and whose force is always to continue, may be made in a little time; therefore there is no need that the legislative should be always in being, having always a power to supersede the execution of their laws when they please.” The executive, by contrast, must exist perpetually to enforce the laws and maintain order.

Locke introduces a further distinction: the federative power, which is the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all transactions with persons and communities outside the commonwealth. The federative power is distinct from the executive, though Locke notes that they are “always almost united” in practice because both require the use of the public force. The executive handles internal enforcement of laws; the federative handles external relations. Both depend on the same armed force, and assigning them to different hands would risk “disorder and ruin.”

The executive operates within a crucial constraint: it is subordinate to the legislative, which is the supreme power. “The executive power, placed any where but in a person that has also a share in the legislative, is visibly subordinate and accountable to it.” The executive must execute the laws as the legislative has made them, and it cannot alter or suspend those laws without legislative authorization. However, Locke recognizes that there are circumstances where the executive must act without explicit legal direction — this is the realm of prerogative.

“Where the legislative and executive power are in distinct hands, there the good of the society requires, that several things should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power.”

This chapter establishes the institutional architecture of legitimate government: a legislative that makes the laws, an executive that executes them, and a federative power that manages external affairs. The executive is subordinate to the legislative but must possess sufficient discretion — prerogative — to handle unforeseen circumstances. This separation of powers is not absolute or rigid; the executive may need to act quickly or flexibly, especially in matters of foreign policy. But the fundamental relationship remains: the executive serves the laws made by the legislative, and the legislative serves the people who established it.

Chapter XIII: Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Commonwealth

Locke now examines the hierarchical relationship among the various powers of government, clarifying how they are ordered and what happens when they conflict.

The legislative is “the supreme power of the commonwealth” because it has the authority to make laws that bind all other persons and institutions. The executive and federative powers are subordinate to the legislative — they exist to execute and implement what the legislative has ordained. The executive cannot “prescribe laws” or “refuse to execute” the laws made by the legislative, for that would make the executive superior to the legislative, which would be a violation of the fundamental constitution of the commonwealth.

Yet the legislative is not absolute. It remains “the supreme power” only “in trust” — it is accountable to the people who established it. If the legislative “shall endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people,” then they have forfeited their trust and the people may remove them. The people are the ultimate judges of when their trust has been violated, and they retain the right to “remove or alter the legislative” when it acts contrary to its purpose.

Locke addresses a potential objection: If the people are the judge of the legislative, does this not invite constant rebellion and instability? He responds that “this power in the people” is never exercised “till the inconveniency is so great that the majority feel it, and are weary of it, and find a necessity to have it amended.” The people are slow to act, and they do not change their government lightly. “The people are not so easily got out of their old forms, as some are apt to suggest.” Revolution is not a constant threat but a last resort — a remedy for extreme tyranny, not a response to ordinary political disagreements.

Locke then discusses the relationship between the executive and the legislative when they are in different hands. The executive may have a share in the legislative — as when a king has veto power or the right to call and dissolve legislative assemblies. This is not a superior power in the executive, but a “power to preserve the legislative from being hurt by its own acts” — a check against hasty or improper legislation. The executive’s power to call and dissolve the legislative is “not arbitrary, but limited to that which is necessary for the preservation of the community.”

“The legislative is the supreme power, and all other powers in any members or parts of the society are derived from and subordinate to it.”

This chapter deepens Locke’s account of constitutional government by specifying the hierarchy of powers and the ultimate authority of the people. The legislative is supreme but not absolute; it is a trust, and the people are the final judges of its conduct. The executive has limited powers to check the legislative, but it remains subordinate. The entire structure rests on the consent of the people, who never surrender their ultimate right to judge whether their trust has been violated. This is not a recipe for anarchy but a carefully balanced system where power is distributed, limited, and accountable.

Chapter XIV: Of Prerogative

Locke now examines a concept that could seem to undermine his entire argument for limited government: the prerogative of the executive to act without or against the law for the public good.

Prerogative is “the power of doing public good without a rule.” Locke acknowledges that in many commonwealths, the executive possesses a “latitude” to act beyond what the law prescribes, especially in situations where the law is silent or where strict adherence to law would cause harm. The law cannot foresee every circumstance, and “many accidents may happen, wherein a strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm.” In such cases, the executive must have the discretion to depart from the law for the sake of the public good.

Locke gives examples: “What is to be done in reference to the public good, when the law is silent? Or, when the law itself is defective, or is not adequate to the present emergency?” In times of war, invasion, or natural disaster, the executive may need to act quickly, without waiting for legislative authorization. The executive may even need to act against the literal words of the law — for example, pulling down a house to prevent a fire from spreading, even though the law prohibits destroying private property.

But prerogative is not a license for tyranny. It is “nothing but the people’s permitting their rulers to do several things of their own free choice, where the law had not expressly directed them, till such time as the public good was thought to require it.” Prerogative is a trust, just like all other governmental powers. It exists for the public good, and when it is exercised for private advantage — when the executive uses prerogative to “oppress the people” — then it becomes “tyranny.”

Locke offers a historical observation: “When the people have found that their kings have used their prerogative for the public good, they have been willing to let it be enlarged.” But when kings abuse their prerogative, the people resist. The ultimate check on prerogative is the people’s judgment: “The people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to heaven.” That is, they may resist tyranny, even when it comes disguised as prerogative.

“Prerogative is nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule.”

This chapter is crucial for understanding Locke’s realism about government. He does not imagine that all situations can be governed by fixed laws. Prerogative is necessary because laws are general and cannot anticipate every circumstance. But prerogative is dangerous because it can be abused. Locke’s solution is not to eliminate prerogative but to keep it tied to its purpose — the public good — and to leave the people as the ultimate judges of its proper use. Prerogative is not an exception to the rule of law but a necessary supplement to it, justified only when it serves the end for which all government exists.

Chapter XV: Of Paternal, Political, and Despotical Power, Considered Together

LOCATE: Locke reaches the final theoretical chapter before his conclusions, where he consolidates the entire argument by distinguishing the three forms of power he has been analyzing throughout the work.

PRESENT: Locke opens this chapter by stating his purpose: to distinguish these three powers “one from another,” since he has often found them “confounded” in other writers’ works. He offers a summary definition of each. Paternal power is “that power which parents have over their children,” being “nothing but that which they have to take care of their offspring, during the imperfect state of childhood.” It is a temporary power that ceases when children reach maturity, grounded in the natural duty of parents to preserve their children until they can preserve themselves.

Political power Locke defines as “that power which every man having in the state of nature, has given up into the hands of the society, and therein to the governors whom the society hath set over itself, with this express or tacit trust, that it shall be employed for their good, and the preservation of their property.” This power, he stresses, can never extend beyond what is necessary for the public good. It includes the power to make laws with penalties, to employ force in executing those laws, and to defend the commonwealth from foreign injury — all directed toward the preservation of society and its members.

Despotical power is “an absolute, arbitrary power one man has over another, to take away his life, whenever he pleases.” This is not a power founded on compact or consent, but on force. It is “the power which the conqueror has over those he has subdued in war.” Locke insists that this power has no foundation in nature or compact, but arises only when a person has forfeited his own life by committing aggression against another, putting himself into a state of war with the person he attacks. The vanquished aggressor’s life lies at the victor’s discretion, but this power extends no further.

Locke emphasizes the decisive distinction: political power is derived from consent and exists for the preservation of the governed; paternal power arises from natural obligation and is limited to the minority of children; despotical power is the result of force and exists only over those who have forfeited their lives by unjust aggression. He warns that confusing these powers leads to “great errors” in political theory, particularly the error of supposing that the authority of a father over his children resembles the authority of a monarch over his subjects, or that conquest gives the same rights as consent.

CLARIFY: This chapter functions as Locke’s systematic taxonomy of power. By distinguishing these three forms so precisely, he demolishes the arguments of absolutists like Filmer, who had conflated paternal and political power to argue for monarchical authority by divine right. Locke’s distinctions clarify the grounding of each type of power: paternal power is natural and temporary, political power is conventional and conditional, despotical power is abnormal and punitive. Only political power, founded on consent and directed toward preservation, can form the basis of legitimate civil society.

Chapter XVI: Of Conquest

LOCATE: Locke here addresses the most serious challenge to his theory of consent-based government — the claim that conquest can give legitimate authority to a ruler.

PRESENT: Locke begins by stating plainly that conquest “is far from establishing any government,” but rather “de facto” destroys government. He proceeds to analyze conquest in terms of just and unjust wars, and what rights a conqueror actually acquires. The key distinction is between a just war — one undertaken in response to actual aggression — and an unjust war of pure aggression.

In a just war, the conqueror gains “a right to the life and liberty” of those who actually fought on the unjust side — those who “assisted or concurred in the unjust force.” But this right is limited. The conqueror may take the conquered combatants’ lives if they remain a threat, or may instead spare them and exact reparation for the damages suffered. However, the conqueror cannot claim dominion over the property of the conquered innocent population — the wives, children, and others who did not participate in the aggression. Their property belongs to them by the labor of themselves and their ancestors, and the conqueror’s right extends only to reparation for actual damages, not to absolute possession.

Locke draws a sharp distinction between the rights derived from reparation and those derived from punishment. The right of reparation belongs only to the injured party — the conqueror — and is limited to the value of the damages sustained. The right of punishment, however, belongs to all mankind against aggressors who violate the law of nature. But even here, punishment cannot extend to taking the property of the innocent.

“The conqueror gets no power by his conquest over those that conquered with him in the war, nor over those that were conquered in the war, but only over those that actually assisted, concurred, or consented to the unjust force that was used against him.”

Locke then addresses the fate of governments that are overthrown by conquest. If a conqueror defeats an unjust aggressor and takes over his government, the conqueror still has no right over the people who were subjects under the former government, unless they personally consented to or assisted in the unjust war. The people retain their natural rights. They are not automatically subject to the conqueror simply because he has defeated their former ruler. The conqueror must obtain their consent to be governed — he cannot claim authority by conquest alone.

CLARIFY: Conquest presents a fundamental challenge to consent theory: if force can establish rule, then legitimacy is merely a function of power. Locke refutes this by disentangling the legitimate consequences of just war from the illegitimate claims of mere victory. Conquest gives the conqueror rights only over actual aggressors, and only to the extent of reparation for damages. It does not give him authority over the innocent, nor does it dissolve their natural rights. This preserves the principle that legitimate government always requires consent, never mere force.

Chapter XVII: Of Usurpation

LOCATE: Locke examines the second form of illegitimate power acquisition — usurpation, which is conquest from within rather than from without.

PRESENT: Usurpation, Locke explains, is “the exercise of power, which another hath a right to.” Unlike conquest, which involves an external enemy, usurpation occurs when someone within the society seizes power that does not belong to them by the consent of the people. The usurper takes the place of a legitimate ruler without the people’s consent, or establishes a new form of government that the people have not authorized.

Locke argues that usurpation can never give a right to govern. The usurper’s possession of power is “always a wrong” and remains so “as long as the power is in the hands of one that has no right to it.” However, Locke acknowledges a practical complication: if the people subsequently give their consent to the usurper’s rule — if they “tacitly or expressly” agree to be governed by him — then the government becomes legitimate. Consent can heal the original defect.

But without such consent, usurpation remains mere force. The people are not bound to obey a usurper simply because he has seized power. Their obligation to obey government derives only from their own consent, and that consent has not been given to the usurper. The form of government may be the same, the laws may be the same, but the authority is absent because it lacks the proper foundation.

Locke distinguishes usurpation from tyranny by noting that usurpation concerns the title to power — who holds it — while tyranny concerns the exercise of power — how it is used. A usurper may govern well according to law, but still holds power without right. A legitimate ruler may govern tyrannically, abusing power that is rightfully his. The two defects are distinct and each is sufficient to render a government illegitimate.

CLARIFY: Usurpation attacks the foundation of legitimate government at its source — the consent of the people. By showing that mere possession of power confers no right, Locke reinforces the principle that authority must derive from the governed. But his recognition that subsequent consent can legitimize usurpation shows his pragmatism: governments can be healed over time, and what begins in force may end in legitimacy if the people freely accept the ruler. The key point is that consent, not seizure, is what makes government lawful.

Chapter XVIII: Of Tyranny

LOCATE: Locke now addresses the abuse of legitimate power — tyranny, which concerns the exercise rather than the acquisition of authority.

PRESENT: Locke defines tyranny as “the exercise of power beyond right,” which occurs when a ruler “makes not the law, but his will, the rule” of his government. A tyrant is one who uses the power entrusted to him for his own private advantage rather than for the public good. Locke insists that it is not the number of rulers that determines tyranny — a single ruler, a few, or many can all be tyrants — but the manner in which power is exercised.

The distinguishing mark of tyranny is that the ruler acts “without the law” and “against the law,” using force and power to impose his private will on the people. Locke emphasizes that tyranny is not justified even when the ruler has legitimate title to power. A lawful king can become a tyrant by abusing the authority granted to him. The trust placed in the ruler is betrayed when he acts for his own benefit rather than for the preservation of the people and their property.

Locke addresses the objection that this would lead to frequent rebellion. He responds by distinguishing between those who resist tyranny and those who resist legitimate authority. When a ruler acts tyrannically, he puts himself into a state of war with the people. In such a state, the people have the right to defend themselves. But Locke is careful: this right of resistance does not apply to every act of misgovernment. “Great mistakes” or “wrong steps of a public officer” do not justify rebellion. It is only when there is a “long train of abuses” that reveals a “design to reduce them under absolute power” that the people are justified in resisting.

“Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another’s harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law, and makes use of the force he has under his command, to compass that upon the subject, which the law does not allow, ceases in that to be a magistrate; and, acting without authority, may be opposed as any other man who by force invades the right of another.”

Locke further argues that the people are the final judges of whether the ruler has become a tyrant. No earthly judge stands above the ruler in such cases, for the ruler is the highest magistrate. But the people, who gave the ruler his authority, may judge when that authority has been abused. This is not a prescription for constant rebellion, for the people are “more disposed to suffer than to right themselves by resistance.” They will endure much before rising up. Only when oppression becomes systematic and intolerable will they act.

CLARIFY: The concept of tyranny is central to Locke’s theory of resistance. By showing that the ruler who acts against the law forfeits his authority and becomes a mere private person using force, Locke justifies resistance as self-defense against aggression. The ruler’s power is conditional — it exists only as long as it is exercised for the public good. When it turns against that end, the people may remove it. The burden of proving tyranny is high, but the right to judge is ultimately with the people.

Chapter XIX: Of the Dissolution of Government

LOCATE: In the final chapter, Locke examines how governments end, distinguishing between the dissolution of society and the dissolution of government, and culminating in the right of the people to establish a new government.

PRESENT: Locke begins by distinguishing two ways a government can be dissolved: externally, through conquest; and internally, through the misconduct of the rulers. External conquest dissolves government when the conqueror overthrows the established constitution and imposes his own rule, as discussed in the chapter on conquest. But Locke’s primary concern is internal dissolution, which he divides into several forms.

The first form of internal dissolution occurs when the legislative power is altered from what the people consented to. This happens when: (1) a single person or prince sets up his own arbitrary will in place of the laws enacted by the legislative body; (2) the prince prevents the legislative from meeting at its appointed times or from freely exercising its powers; (3) the prince corrupts the elections of the legislative, altering the method by which representatives are chosen; (4) the prince delivers the people into subjection to a foreign power; or (5) the prince abandons his office, leaving the laws without an executor. In all these cases, the government is dissolved because the legislative — the supreme power — is no longer functioning as the people intended.

The second form of internal dissolution occurs when the legislative or the prince acts contrary to their trust. The legislative may become tyrannical by attempting to seize the property of the people or to exercise arbitrary power over their lives and liberties. The prince may similarly act against the laws and the public good. When those who hold power betray the trust placed in them, the government dissolves because the end for which it was established — the preservation of life, liberty, and property — has been abandoned.

When government is dissolved, power reverts to the people. Locke states this principle explicitly: “When the government is dissolved, the people are at liberty to provide for themselves, by erecting a new legislative, differing from the other, by the change of persons, or form, or both, as they shall find it most for their safety and good.” The people do not dissolve their political society itself — that society continues to exist as a community. Only the government — the particular form and persons exercising authority — is dissolved. The people retain the right to establish a new government on whatever terms they choose.

“The power that every individual gave the society, when he entered into it, can never revert to the individuals again, as long as the society lasts, but will always remain in the community; because without this there can be no community, no commonwealth, which is the contrary of the original state; so when the society hath placed the legislative in any assembly of men, to continue in them and their successors, with direction and authority for providing such successors, the legislative can never revert to the people whilst that government lasts; but whenever they shall be removed or dissolved, it reverts to them.”

Locke addresses the objection that this principle will lead to frequent rebellion. He responds that the people will not rebel lightly — they are slow to act, preferring to suffer rather than to disturb the public peace. Revolutions occur only when there is a “long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices” that make the design of tyranny evident to all. Moreover, the existence of this right of resistance acts as a deterrent: rulers who know the people can resist will be more careful not to provoke them.

Finally, Locke addresses the question of who judges whether the government has been dissolved. He argues that the people are the only proper judges. No earthly court can judge between the ruler and the people, for the ruler is the highest magistrate. But the people, who gave the ruler his power, have the right to judge whether it has been abused. When the controversy reaches the point where the people must judge, an “appeal to heaven” — meaning the right of self-defense — is the ultimate recourse.

CLARIFY: This chapter completes Locke’s political theory by providing the mechanism for legitimate revolution. Government is not permanent — it is a trust that can be dissolved when the trustees betray their charge. When dissolution occurs, power reverts to the people, who remain a united community capable of establishing new government. This is not anarchy but the reconstitution of political authority on proper foundations. The right of resistance is not a license for constant rebellion but a final safeguard against tyranny, justified only in extreme circumstances and always exercised by the people as a whole, not by private individuals. The argument comes full circle: legitimate government begins with the consent of the people and ends when that consent is betrayed, at which point the people may begin anew.