About the Work
“Letter to the Earl of Shelburne” is a political pamphlet written by Thomas Paine under the pseudonym “Common Sense,” dated Philadelphia, October 29, 1782. The work is structured as an open letter addressed directly to Lord Shelburne, responding to a speech attributed to Shelburne that had been printed in both British and New York newspapers. The pamphlet is a pointed examination and rebuttal of Shelburne’s stated position on American independence, which Shelburne had articulated in response to a speech by the Duke of Richmond dated July 10th. Paine describes the speech’s expressions as “new and singular” and “enveloped in mysterious reasoning,” and he publishes his examination to give them “a free and candid examination.” The work closes with a postscript noting that a manuscript copy of the letter was sent to Lord Shelburne by way of headquarters in New York, accompanied by a pamphlet addressed to the Abbe Raynal, intended to convey the principles and sentiments of America.
Context
The pamphlet is situated in the final phase of the American Revolutionary War, roughly eight years into the conflict. Paine references the enormous costs of the war, citing the expense of an hundred million pounds sterling and the loss of two British armies. He also notes the recent diplomatic developments, including negotiations for a general peace that had commenced at Paris. A key document within the pamphlet is a letter dated August 2nd, written by General Carleton and Admiral Digby to General Washington, which stated that the House of Commons resolution of February 27th had been placed in Washington’s hands, that negotiations for a general peace had begun at Paris, and that Mr. Grenville was invested with full powers to treat with all parties at war. Crucially, the letter indicated that His Majesty had commanded his ministers to direct Mr. Grenville that the independence of the Thirteen United Provinces should be proposed by him in the first instance, rather than making it a condition of a general treaty. Paine uses this letter as a benchmark against which to measure the subsequent conduct of the British ministry, accusing them of faithlessness and treachery for not following through on these authorized declarations.
Structure of the Book
The pamphlet is organized as a continuous argumentative letter, divided into several distinct movements. It opens with Paine quoting Shelburne’s speech in full, establishing the target of his critique. The subsequent sections systematically dismantle Shelburne’s claims, moving from a general rebuttal of his doctrine on independence, to a mockery of his proposed mission to Congress, to a detailed accounting of the war’s futility, and finally to a comparison of Shelburne’s current proposals with the earlier promises made by Carleton and Digby. The work concludes with a postscript explaining the transmission of the letter. The structure follows a rhetorical progression from exposing the absurdity of Shelburne’s position, to demonstrating the practical impossibility of his proposals, to condemning the dishonesty of the British government.
Detailed Section-by-Section Summary
Part 1: Paine opens by addressing Lord Shelburne directly, explaining that he is responding to a speech printed in newspapers, which itself was an answer to the Duke of Richmond’s speech of July 10th. He quotes Shelburne’s speech in full. In it, Shelburne denies any inconsistency in his principles, asserting he still holds the same views on American independence he “at first imbibed.” He maintains that whenever Parliament acknowledges American independence, “the sun of England’s glory is set forever,” an opinion he attributes also to Lord Chatham. Though the cabinet majority supports independence, Shelburne says he acquiesces while dissenting, and the matter will go to full parliamentary debate. He argues that American independence would ruin England and that a peace “patched up with France” would allow that enemy to trample England. He expresses a wish that he had been deputed to Congress to plead both countries’ causes as an orator, convincing Congress that signing independence would mean their liberties were “gone forever.” He insists peace must be honorable, not humiliating, and that though England is impoverished by war, France is poor too, and the enemy’s resources are exhausted. He claims England abounds with brave men willing to fight, and that humiliation should not be Britain’s language. He is unafraid of his words reaching America, where many still think as he does, perceiving “ruin and independence linked together.”
Paine then begins his rebuttal, declaring Shelburne “a total stranger to the mind and sentiments of America,” wrapped in “fond delusion” that something less than independence might be accepted. Paine finds Shelburne’s doctrine extraordinary—that independence, which Paine calls “the sublimest of all human conditions,” could be seen as a loss of liberty. He invokes past humiliations America suffered: mild petitions met with haughty insults, demands for unconditional submission, and threats of destruction. He argues that changes in ministry are irrelevant, for governments can change again, and that “the guilt of a government is the crime of a whole country.” England’s sin has struck America’s heart; character cannot be restored to life, and forgiveness is impossible.
Paine then addresses Shelburne’s proposed pleading before Congress. He argues that England, having sought America’s destruction for over seven years, now cringing to solicit protection adds disgrace to disappointment. He uses the metaphor of a criminal owing life to the injured party, suggesting such a criminal is more executed by living than dying. A thousand pleadings would fail, for honor, interest, and heart would plead against him. Americans think differently and cannot feel as Shelburne feels. Paine emphasizes that America has been the seat of war while England has seen nothing of it. Americans see burnt houses, walk over dead loved ones, and remember British brutality; their villages evoke suffering and loss. Shelburne’s reasoning, Paine concludes, applies to nothing.
On the subject of parliamentary debate, Paine argues the question of acknowledging independence is “so very simple” it scarcely needs debate—it is the only way out of an expensive, ruinous war with no object, and without acknowledgment there can be no peace. He closes this section by critiquing Shelburne’s metaphor of the setting sun, suggesting it should have been left out entirely, with England’s failure to acknowledge independence ascribed to the influence of—(the text breaks off).
Part 2: Paine continues his critique, arguing that Shelburne’s expression, if true, is a confession of disgrace and gives America a high sense of sovereign importance. He recalls that Mr. Wedderburne, around 1776, used a similar idea: that relinquishing America is like desiring a giant to shrink into a dwarf. Paine mocks the English for implying that without America their sun is set, asking if America was the giant and England only her dwarf in waiting. He notes the reversal: those who once said America could not live without England now declare they cannot exist without America, even from their first minister of state. He asks if they, who threatened to bring America to their feet, now bow to America, and whether they have lost all idea of independence themselves. He calls weeping over lost America childish, saying a more consistent conduct would be to bear it and show England can preserve her independence without America.
Paine observes that Lord Shelburne thinks something may yet be done, but what it is remains obscure. Paine declares arms offer no hope, citing nearly eight years of experience, the expense of an hundred million pounds sterling, and the loss of two armies. He states the British have lost their interest in America with the disaffected; thousands ruined by adhering to them must quit settlements and be conveyed to cultivate the deserts of Augustine and Nova Scotia, ending all hope of aid. He contrasts America’s ability to carry on war for ten years for less than England’s one year of war and government costs, asserting Americans can pay better and are defending their own property and rights. He describes the British army in America as living an easy, indolent life, fattening on folly and spoils, while the laboring farmer, working tradesman, and necessitous poor in England sweat to feed them. The army, removed from the eye of its country, cuts and carves for itself with none to call it to account.
Addressing Shelburne’s claim that England will be ruined if America is independent, Paine retorts that England is already ruined since America is already independent, and that making England a mere creature of America pays too great a compliment to America. He calls the declaration a rhapsody of inconsistency: calling the war ruinous yet continuing it to avoid ruin is incomprehensible; independence cannot ruin England after the war if it does not affect her before. He argues it is a new doctrine that a nation is ruined by peace, commerce, and fourteen or fifteen millions a-year less expenses; true economy would save the whole charge of a silly, foolish, headstrong war. He asks if the capture of one army after another will satisfy Lord Shelburne, listing past delusions: currency failing, armies disbanding, provinces revolting, generals’ opinions, Lord Chatham’s views, 20,000 Russians and 20 Russian ships, the empress abused, the Emperor of Germany bribed with a million, and the King of Prussia doing wonderful things. He notes this year’s new folly: Lord Shelburne wishes to be sent to Congress, thinking something may be done, despite Congress’s repeated declarations, supported by all America, that they will not hear any proposals until the unconditional and unequivocal [text cuts off].
Part 3: Paine argues that America’s independence is already recognised, and these declarations are sufficient answer to any British overtures. England receiving anything from America after “insults, injuries and outrages” would show such meanness that America would despise her for accepting it. Lord Shelburne coming to solicit anything would be a disgrace; offering it would be the greatest disgrace to England. England asking or owing anything to America’s bounty would make her appear a “wretch”; the name of Englishman already has enough “blots.” Paine employs a striking metaphor: even Lucifer would scorn to reign in heaven by permission, yet an Englishman would creep for only an entrance into America. He questions whether being a doorkeeper in a land of liberty is better than being an English minister of state. Any expected “something” from America would only bring new disgraces, contentions, and quarrels.
Paine asserts that Americans have long thought and spoken freely and contemptuously of English authority. A person with English authority attempting to exercise it in America would have “the life of a toad under a harrow,” be seen as an interloper, and be no more than the “Mungo of a farce.” Such a station would be one of degradation, placing England in a more contemptible situation than any during the war. America has too high an opinion of itself to yield obedience to “outlandish authority”; England would be the last country to yield to, being treacherous, with her character gone—”we have seen the funeral.” England loves to fish in troubled waters; mingling with America is like a foolish dotard taking a bride who despises him, kissing the hand that boxes his ears. The thought is as servile as the war is wicked; the last scene of the drama is as inconsistent as the first. Since America is gone, the only act of manhood is to let her go; Shelburne had no hand in the separation and will gain no honor by temporising politics.
Paine then introduces the letter from General Carleton and Admiral Digby to General Washington, dated August 2nd. The letter stated that the House of Commons resolution of 27th February last had been placed in Washington’s hands; a mail arrived bringing important information; negotiations for a general peace had commenced at Paris; Mr. Grenville was invested with full powers to treat with all parties at war and was then at Paris; His Majesty had commanded his ministers to direct Mr. Grenville that the independence of the Thirteen United Provinces should be proposed by him in the first instance, instead of making it a condition of a general treaty. Comparing present measures with that letter, Paine asks what the word of the king, his ministers, or Parliament is good for; they appear a confederated body of faithless, treacherous men, whose assurances are fraud and language deceit. The writer says Britain sports with her own character and is to be held by nothing but the bayonet or the halter.
Paine returns to the metaphor of the setting sun, saying that saying the sun of Great Britain will set when she acknowledges American independence, when not doing it is the “unqualified lie of government,” is language of ridicule and jargon of inconsistency. Thousands in America predicted the delusion, seeing it as a trick of treachery to draw attention from the only system of finance by which America can be called sovereign and independent. Others credited the assurance, thinking men with characters to establish would not begin with a lie. The former ministry’s prosecution of the war was savage and horrid; since then it has been mean, trickish, and delusive—one went into revenge, the other into low contrivance; between both, scarcely a man in America, Whig or Tory, does not despise or detest Britain’s conduct. Lord Shelburne’s management is a caution never to regard British assurances; the perfidy stands in the public papers of New York with the names of Carleton and Digby affixed. It is a proclamation that the king of England is not to be believed, that lying is the governing principle of the ministry, holding the House of Commons up to public infamy. After the authorized declarations in Carleton and Digby’s letter, Shelburne ought, from every motive of honor, policy, and prudence, to have fulfilled them; it was the least atonement to America and the greatest kindness to themselves, saving millions by a general peace and losing as many by continuing the war. The pamphlet is signed “Common Sense,” Philadelphia, Oct. 29, 1782, with a postscript explaining the manuscript copy is sent to Lord Shelburne by way of head-quarters to New York, inclosing a late pamphlet addressed to the Abbe Raynal.
Main Arguments
The central argument of the pamphlet is that American independence is an accomplished fact, already recognized by Britain’s own authorized declarations, and that any further British overtures or proposals for something less than independence are delusional, disgraceful, and dishonest. Paine argues that Shelburne is fundamentally ignorant of American sentiment, believing that Americans might accept something less than full independence when they have already achieved it. He contends that the war has been ruinous and futile, costing an hundred million pounds sterling and two armies, with no hope of success through arms. He further argues that Britain’s conduct has been consistently treacherous, from the savage prosecution of the war to the mean and trickish management of peace negotiations, and that the British government’s word cannot be trusted. The letter from Carleton and Digby, which promised that independence would be proposed in the first instance, stands as evidence of British faithlessness when subsequent measures contradicted those promises. Paine’s overarching argument is that the only honorable and sensible course for England is to acknowledge independence fully and seek peace, rather than pursuing delusional schemes for reconciliation on lesser terms.
Key Concepts
A central concept in the pamphlet is the idea of independence as “the sublimest of all human conditions,” which Paine contrasts with Shelburne’s view of independence as ruin. Paine develops the notion that England’s guilt is collective—”the guilt of a government is the crime of a whole country”—and that this guilt has permanently alienated America. He introduces the concept of character, arguing that England’s character is gone (“we have seen the funeral”) and cannot be restored. Another key concept is the reversal of dependency: those who once said America could not live without England now declare they cannot exist without America, a reversal that Paine mocks as absurd. He also develops the idea of the war’s expense and futility, contrasting America’s ability to fight for ten years for less than England’s one year of costs. The concept of British faithlessness is central, particularly as demonstrated by the discrepancy between the Carleton and Digby letter and subsequent British conduct. Paine also employs the metaphor of the setting sun, which he critiques as a “rhapsody of inconsistency,” arguing that England’s glory cannot be tied to its dominion over America.
Themes
A dominant theme is the folly of delusion, as Paine repeatedly characterizes Shelburne’s hopes as “fond delusion” and lists a catalogue of past British delusions—currency failing, armies disbanding, provinces revolting, the promised Russians and German bribes—all of which came to nothing. The theme of humiliation and disgrace runs throughout, as Paine argues that England’s cringing solicitation of America is more disgraceful than the war itself, and that any acceptance of something from America would be beneath both nations. The theme of memory and injury is prominent: Paine emphasizes that Americans remember the burnt houses, the dead loved ones, and the brutality of the war, and that this memory makes forgiveness and reconciliation impossible. The theme of treachery and faithlessness is developed through the contrast between the Carleton and Digby letter and subsequent British actions, leading Paine to conclude that lying is the governing principle of the ministry. Finally, the theme of sovereign independence is central, as Paine argues that America has too high an opinion of itself to yield to “outlandish authority” and that England, having lost America, must learn to preserve its own independence without it.
The Author’s Conclusions
Paine concludes that America’s independence is already an established fact, recognized even by Britain’s own authorized declarations, and that there is nothing left to negotiate. He concludes that Lord Shelburne’s proposals are delusional and that any attempt to solicit something from America would bring only further disgrace to England. He concludes that the British ministry is fundamentally faithless, as demonstrated by the contradiction between the Carleton and Digby letter and subsequent measures, and that Britain’s word is to be held by nothing but the bayonet or the halter. He concludes that the only act of manhood left to England is to let America go, and that Shelburne, having had no hand in the separation, will gain no honor by temporising politics. The only honorable course, Paine argues, is to fulfill the promises made in the Carleton and Digby letter, acknowledging independence and pursuing a general peace, which would save millions and end a silly, foolish, headstrong war. The pamphlet ends with the postscript noting that the letter is sent to Shelburne with a pamphlet addressed to the Abbe Raynal, to give some idea of the principles and sentiments of America.
Significance
The pamphlet is significant as a direct intervention by Thomas Paine, writing as “Common Sense,” in the final diplomatic phase of the American Revolutionary War. It represents a forceful articulation of the American position that independence was non-negotiable and already achieved, and it serves as a warning to Britain against any delusional hopes of reconciliation on lesser terms. The work is also significant for its documentation of the Carleton and Digby letter, which Paine uses as evidence of British faithlessness, and for its detailed catalogue of the war’s costs and futility. The pamphlet demonstrates Paine’s rhetorical skill in combining sarcasm, metaphor, and logical argument to dismantle his opponent’s position, and it reflects the broader American sentiment of the period that Britain’s conduct had irrevocably destroyed any possibility of reunion. The work stands as a testament to the moment when the American colonies, having won their independence on the battlefield, were asserting it diplomatically and rhetorically against any lingering British pretensions.
