About the Work
Prospects on the War and Paper Currency is a political pamphlet written by Thomas Paine, the author of Common Sense, A Letter to the Abbé Raynal, A Letter to the Marquis of Lansdown, and Rights of Man. The text presented is from the second edition, corrected, printed for James Ridgway of Yorke-Street, St. James’s. The pamphlet was originally written in 1787, during one of Prime Minister Pitt’s armaments, specifically the one directed against Holland. The edition includes an “Advertisement” dated June 30th, 1793, which frames the work for its contemporary readers. The core of the pamphlet is a warning to the people of England against being seduced into war, with a particular focus on the consequences such a conflict would have on the nation’s credit and financial stability.
Context
The pamphlet was composed in 1787, a period of significant European political tension. The immediate trigger for its writing was an armament ordered by the British minister, Mr. Pitt, against Holland. Paine’s stated object in writing was to prevent the people of England from being drawn into a war by clearly laying out the disastrous consequences it would have for the country’s credit and economy. The “Advertisement” added in 1793 notes that the minister in question had, by that time, succeeded in his “grand project” after three expensive armaments within seven years, which the publisher argues proves Paine’s predictions to have been well-founded. The person bringing the pamphlet forward in 1793 states it is a duty to both Mr. P—— and the People of England to present it, so that the public may judge what credit is due to “such a great Judge” of “the wild theories of Mr. Paine.” This framing places the work in a direct political debate about the wisdom of British foreign policy and the reliability of Paine’s predictions. The preface also discusses British politics in relation to the American war, using the metaphor of Julius Cæsar passing the Rubicon as a figurative river, suggesting that England is on the “proccable side of the Rubicon” but that hopes of peace are less clear than they were before the late dispute.
Structure of the Book
The book is structured as a single, continuous political argument rather than being divided into formal chapters. It opens with a title page and an “Advertisement” that provides context for the pamphlet’s original writing and its republication. This is followed by a Preface that sets the political scene and introduces the central metaphor of the Rubicon. The main text then proceeds as a sustained essay, beginning with a critique of the current political situation and the ministry’s actions, moving through a historical review of England’s wars and their financial costs, and culminating in a series of arguments about the true nature of national greatness, the folly of treaties, and the dangers of paper currency. The argument builds logically from a specific contemporary crisis to broader principles of political economy and wise governance.
Detailed Section-by-Section Summary
The opening section, comprising the title page and Advertisement, establishes the pamphlet’s provenance and purpose. It identifies Thomas Paine as the author and notes that the work was written in 1787 in response to a specific political event: an armament by Mr. Pitt against Holland. The Advertisement, dated 1793, retrospectively validates Paine’s warnings, noting that the minister had since engaged in three expensive armaments within seven years. The publisher’s framing suggests that the republication is intended to allow the public to judge the accuracy of Paine’s predictions against the subsequent actions of the ministry.
The Preface expands on the political context, focusing on British politics in the aftermath of the American war. It uses the metaphor of Caesar crossing the Rubicon to describe the nation’s precarious position, suggesting that while England is on the safer side of this figurative river, the prospects for peace are not as certain as they once were. The preface advises taking a clear view of the prospect, consistent with the maxim that anyone who engages in war should first sit down and count the cost. It introduces the central figure of the young, ambitious minister, who is described as fond of himself and deficient in experience. The preface argues that judgment differs from genius, and that national affairs are unsafe without experience. It criticizes the use of illustrations from the “war before last” to decorate the present minister’s character, arguing that these have been overdone. The management of that earlier war must have been bad to have done less, considering the means, the opportunity, and the money available. The preface notes that Great Britain fought France singly, as Spain did not join until nearly the end, and that the troops raised and paid by the American Colonies were sufficient to turn the scale. It also mentions that France had not attended to naval affairs as she has since, and that the capture of French sailors before any declaration of war, while justifiable on policy, was ranked among clandestine arts and assured an unfair advantage.
The main text begins with the observation that “Right by chance and wrong by system” are frequent in the political world. It references the past reason for prosecuting the most expensive war England ever knew, using the word “robbed” as a past justification. The text states that England, groaning under taxes, has been led ministerially to the shore of the same delusive and fatal river, without knowing the object or reason. Expensive armaments have been entered into, and fears and alarms have been held forth as if the nation’s existence were at stake, but at last the mountain has brought forth a “French mouse.” The text observes that the people of France are beginning to think for themselves, while the people of England are resigning the privilege of thinking. The affairs of Holland are described as the bubble of the day, with a tax to be laid on shoes and boots for the service of the Stadtholder of Holland, verifying the proverb “Over shoes, over boots.” Though Democritus could scarcely forbear laughing, the text argues that serious argument is preferable to ridicule.
The text then reviews the events of all the wars of England, describing an amazing accumulation of debt and an unparalleled burden of taxes. Sometimes the pretence was to support Austria, sometimes Prussia, another to oppose Russia, but the consequence has always been taxes. A few men have enriched themselves by jobs and contracts, while the multitude bore the burden. Since the year 1738, only fifty years ago, England has gained nothing to recompense her for two hundred millions sterling incurred as debt, under whose annual interest she is groaning. The glare of fancied glory has been held forth, and the shadowy recompense imposed itself upon the foes. Wars that might have been prevented have been madly entered into, ending in debt and discontent. The jealousy every nation feels at the supposed designs of foreign powers fits them to be the prey of Ministers and those whose trade is war. The text recounts a toast heard: “Confusion to the politics of Europe, and may every nation be at war in six months,” given by a man in court to the Ministry for a job.
Considering the calamities of war and the miseries inflicted on the human species, the text calls on man to think and learn that the true greatness of a nation is founded on principles of humanity. Avoiding war when her own existence is not endangered is a higher principle of true honour than engaging in it. Independent of civil considerations, no possible event a war could produce for England could recompense the expense. War has but one thing certain: increase of taxes. The policy of European Courts is so cast that the weight of interfering nations compels even the victors to unequal conditions of peace. Commerce and maritime strength are becoming the rage of Europe, exciting a combined wish to prevent England increasing its comparative strength. The greatness of Lewis the Fourteenth made Europe his enemy, and the same cause will produce the same consequence to any other European Power. A nation is truly wise who, contenting herself with the means of defence, creates no unnecessary enemies by seeking to be greater than the system of Europe admits. The minister who exceeds this line knows little of his business; it is what the poet calls “The point where sense and nonsense join.”
Treaties of alliance are described as a great instance of the folly of calculating upon events. As soon as they have answered the immediate purpose of either party, they are little regarded. If half the money nations lavish on speculative alliances were reserved for their own immediate purpose, it would be more advantageously employed. Monarchs and Ministers contemplate schemes of future greatness, but the great wheel of time and fate revolves, and something never dreamed of blasts the whole. The exhausted nation is “nuzzled into” a state that the text does not complete, but the implication is one of complacency or ruin brought on by these speculative ventures.
Main Arguments
The central argument of the pamphlet is a forceful condemnation of England’s propensity for entering into expensive and unnecessary wars. Paine argues that these wars, often undertaken for flimsy pretexts such as supporting Austria, Prussia, or opposing Russia, have consistently resulted in one certain outcome: an increase in taxes and a massive accumulation of national debt. He points to the staggering sum of two hundred millions sterling incurred as debt since 1738, for which the nation has gained nothing in return. He argues that a few men have enriched themselves through jobs and contracts while the multitude bears the burden, and that the “glare of fancied glory” has been used to deceive the public into supporting these ruinous ventures.
A second major argument is that the true greatness of a nation is not found in aggressive warfare but in principles of humanity. Paine contends that avoiding war when a nation’s own existence is not endangered is a higher principle of true honour than engaging in it. He argues that no possible event a war could produce for England could recompense the expense, and that the only certainty of war is an increase in taxes. He further warns that the growing commercial and maritime strength of England is exciting a combined wish among other European powers to prevent it from increasing its comparative strength, citing the example of Lewis the Fourteenth, whose greatness made Europe his enemy. A wise nation, therefore, should content itself with the means of defence and avoid creating unnecessary enemies.
Paine also argues against the folly of speculative treaties of alliance, stating that they are a great instance of the folly of calculating upon events. Such treaties are little regarded as soon as they have answered the immediate purpose of either party. He suggests that if half the money nations lavish on these speculative alliances were reserved for their own immediate purpose, it would be more advantageously employed. He warns that Monarchs and Ministers contemplate schemes of future greatness, but the great wheel of time and fate revolves, and something never dreamed of blasts the whole.
Key Concepts
A key concept in the pamphlet is the metaphor of the Rubicon, borrowed from Julius Cæsar. Paine uses this to describe the point of no return in national policy, warning that England is being led to the shore of a “delusive and fatal river” without knowing the object or reason. The nation is on the “proccable side” but risks crossing into a disastrous war. This metaphor frames the entire argument as a warning against a fateful decision.
Another central concept is the distinction between judgment and genius. Paine argues that the young, ambitious minister may possess genius but lacks the judgment that comes only from experience. National affairs are unsafe without this experience, and the minister’s fondness for himself makes him a danger to the nation. This concept underpins his critique of the current leadership.
The concept of “paper currency” is central to the title, though the notes provided focus more on the buildup to it. The argument about the financial consequences of war—the accumulation of debt and the burden of taxes—sets the stage for a discussion of how the nation’s credit is affected. The pamphlet’s title suggests that the war and the state of the paper currency are intimately linked, with the former threatening to destroy the latter. The “French mouse” is another key concept, representing the anticlimactic and disappointing result of the expensive armaments, which were built on fears and alarms that proved to be exaggerated.
Themes
A dominant theme is the critique of ministerial power and the manipulation of public fear. Paine describes how fears and alarms are held forth as if the nation’s existence were at stake, only for the result to be a “French mouse.” He portrays the minister as a young, ambitious figure, fond of himself and deficient in experience, who leads the nation into costly ventures for his own glory. The theme of the people being seduced or resigned from thinking is also present, contrasting the people of France, who are beginning to think for themselves, with the people of England, who are resigning the privilege of thinking.
The theme of financial ruin and the burden of debt is pervasive. Paine reviews the history of England’s wars to show an amazing accumulation of debt and an unparalleled burden of taxes. He argues that the consequence of war is always taxes, and that the nation has gained nothing to recompense her for the two hundred millions sterling incurred as debt. This theme is tied to the idea that a few men enrich themselves through jobs and contracts while the multitude bears the burden, highlighting a class dimension to the critique.
A further theme is the folly of European power politics. Paine describes the jealousy every nation feels at the supposed designs of foreign powers, which fits them to be the prey of Ministers. He argues that the policy of European Courts compels even victors to unequal conditions of peace and that commerce and maritime strength are becoming the rage of Europe, exciting a combined wish to prevent England from increasing its comparative strength. This theme culminates in the argument that a nation is truly wise who, contenting herself with the means of defence, creates no unnecessary enemies.
The Author’s Conclusions
Paine concludes that England’s pursuit of war and territorial or commercial greatness is a profound error that leads only to debt, taxes, and discontent. He concludes that the true greatness of a nation is founded on principles of humanity, and that avoiding war when not absolutely necessary is a higher principle of true honour than engaging in it. He concludes that no possible event a war could produce for England could recompense the expense, and that war has but one thing certain: increase of taxes. He further concludes that the minister who seeks to make the nation greater than the system of Europe admits knows little of his business, and that such ambition will inevitably make Europe an enemy, as it did for Lewis the Fourteenth. He concludes that treaties of alliance are folly, as they are little regarded once they have served their immediate purpose, and that the money spent on them would be better reserved for a nation’s own immediate needs. The exhausted nation, he warns, is “nuzzled into” a state of complacency or ruin by these speculative ventures, and the great wheel of time and fate will inevitably blast the schemes of Monarchs and Ministers.
Significance
The significance of Prospects on the War and Paper Currency lies in its role as a prescient political warning. Written in 1787, it predicted the consequences of the Pitt ministry’s aggressive foreign policy, and the Advertisement of 1793 points out that the minister had indeed succeeded in his “grand project” after three expensive armaments within seven years, proving Paine’s predictions well-founded. The pamphlet is a significant example of Paine’s political activism, applying his characteristic style of clear, forceful argument to the economic and moral costs of war. It stands as a critique of ministerial power, the manipulation of public fear, and the folly of European power politics, arguing for a more restrained and humane approach to national policy. Its republication in 1793, in the midst of the French Revolutionary Wars, gave it renewed relevance as a warning about the dangers of the very conflicts it had foreseen.
