About the Work
Rights of Man is a political treatise written by Thomas Paine, addressed initially to George Washington, whom Paine credits with helping to establish the principles of freedom that the work defends. The book is structured as a direct and sustained response to Edmund Burke’s pamphlet attacking the French Revolution and the National Assembly. Paine wrote the work while in Paris, having promised French friends of the Revolution that he would answer Burke’s publication, which he saw as a flagrant misrepresentation and an outrageous abuse of the French Revolution and an imposition on the world.
The book is presented in two parts. The first part is a point-by-point rebuttal of Burke’s arguments, combined with a narrative account of the early events of the French Revolution. The second part is a more systematic treatise on the principles of government, society, and constitutions, concluding with detailed proposals for economic and social reform. The work also includes prefaces addressed to both English and French editions, as well as a dedication to the Marquis de la Fayette. Throughout, Paine writes in a combative and rhetorical style, frequently quoting Burke’s own words in order to dismantle them, and appealing to reason, nature, and the rights of man as the ultimate authorities on political questions.
Context
The book emerges from the immediate political ferment of the late eighteenth century. Paine explains that he had once considered Burke a friend to mankind due to Burke’s role in the American Revolution. However, Burke made a violent speech in the English Parliament against the French Revolution and the National Assembly while Paine was in Paris. This prompted Paine to write his response. Paine had hoped for better from Burke, noting that almost three years prior he had given Burke a letter from the private Secretary of the Archbishop of Thoulouse, whom Paine had met in the spring of 1787, expressing shared sentiments against war between England and France.
Paine distinguishes between foreign peoples and their governments, arguing that the French cause is that of all Europe, but that governments oppose it. He specifically identifies the English government, led by the Elector of Hanover (called King of England) and Minister Pitt, as no friend to the Revolution, while asserting that the English nation itself is favourably disposed toward it. He notes that English newspapers are in government pay and that the government prosecutes truth as libel. Paine also mentions the government’s search for a foe, such as Russia, to justify taxes, having raised money through the American war, Dutch business, and what he calls the Nootka humbug.
The work is also situated within the broader context of the American Revolution, which Paine treats as a transformative event that demonstrated the practical possibility of government founded on the rights of man. The American war provided French officers and soldiers with direct experience of freedom in practice, and the publication of American events in France connected military events with revolutionary principles. Paine traces the intellectual preparation for the French Revolution to the writings of French philosophers such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Abbé Raynal, Quesnay, and Turgot, who diffused political inquiry despite operating under the constraints of despotism.
Structure of the Book
The book opens with a dedication to George Washington, followed by prefaces to the English and French editions. The first part of the work is largely devoted to answering Burke’s pamphlet. Paine attacks Burke’s abuse of Dr. Price and two English societies, and challenges Burke’s reliance on parliamentary clauses from 1688 that purported to bind posterity forever. Paine argues that no generation can bind posterity and that every age must be free to act for itself. He contrasts M. de la Fayette’s declaration of rights with Burke’s musty records and recounts the events of the French Revolution, including the crisis before the Bastille, the attack on the fortress itself, and the expedition to Versailles in October 1789.
The first part also includes a chapter on natural and civil rights, in which Paine argues that reasoning from antiquity is flawed and that one must go back to man’s creation. He distinguishes between natural rights, which appertain to man in right of existence, and civil rights, which arise from natural rights deposited in the common stock when individual power is defective. He then discusses the three sources of government: superstition, power, and reason, and defines what a constitution is, arguing that England lacks a true constitution because it arose from conquest rather than from the act of the people.
The second part of the book is more systematic. It begins with an introduction applying Archimedes’ principle to reason and liberty, followed by chapters on society and civilisation, the origin of the present old governments, and the old and new systems of government. Paine then addresses the question of constitutions in detail, using America as a fresh example of how a people can constitute a government. He reviews the taxation progress in England since the Norman conquest and proposes a detailed plan for economic reform, including the abolition of poor-rates, provision for poor families, support for the aged, and a progressive tax on estates. The book concludes with a discussion of the national debt, a critique of Mr. Pitt, and proposals for reducing government expenses.
Detailed Section-by-Section Summary
George Washington, Addressed
Thomas Paine opens by addressing George Washington directly, presenting his treatise as a defense of the very principles of freedom that Washington’s virtue helped to establish. He expresses his hope that the Rights of Man will become universal and that the New World will serve to regenerate the Old.
Preface to the English Edition
Paine explains that he had once considered Burke a friend to mankind, owing to Burke’s support during the American Revolution. However, while Paine was in Paris, Burke made a violent speech in the English Parliament against the French Revolution and the National Assembly. Paine, having promised his French friends he would respond, saw Burke’s pamphlet as a flagrant misrepresentation and an outrageous abuse of the Revolution. He had hoped for better, recalling a letter he had given Burke from the private Secretary of the Archbishop of Thoulouse, which expressed shared sentiments against war between England and France. Paine also mentions a rumored pension for Burke, hoping he might contradict it.
Preface to the French Edition
Paine distinguishes foreign peoples from their governments, asserting that the French cause is the cause of all Europe, though governments oppose it. He notes that the English government, led by the Elector of Hanover and Minister Pitt, is no friend to the Revolution, while the English nation is favorably disposed. He criticizes the English government for paying newspapers, prosecuting truth as libel, and seeking a foe like Russia to justify taxes, having raised money through the American war, Dutch business, and the Nootka affair.
The Attack on Burke’s Pamphlet
Paine attacks Burke’s pamphlet as an unprovoked and abusive attack on France and the National Assembly. He notes that Burke abuses Dr. Price and two English societies, and quotes parliamentary clauses from 1688 that bind posterity forever. Paine argues that no generation can bind posterity—every age must be free to act for itself, and the living, not the dead, must be accommodated. He contrasts M. de la Fayette’s declaration of rights with Burke’s musty records, recounting de la Fayette’s farewell to Congress in 1783. Paine argues that the French revolted against despotic principles, not Louis XVI, and describes the plot by Count d’Artois to crush the National Assembly, with Count de Broglio commanding troops.
The Crisis Before the Bastille
The narrative describes the period immediately preceding the fall of the Bastille. The new ministry had just taken office on July 12, two days before the Bastille fell. Parisians, unarmed and undisciplined, faced an army of nearly thirty thousand men under Broglio. The French guards sympathized with the national cause but were outnumbered, and their officers sided with Broglio. The Prince de Lambesc, commanding German cavalry, struck an old man with his sword, provoking cries of “To arms!” throughout the city. Citizens attacked the cavalry with stones, the French guards joined them, and the cavalry retreated at night.
The Attack on the Bastille
The citizens discovered through intercepted correspondence that the Mayor of Paris was betraying them and that Broglio would reinforce the Bastille that evening. They seized arms from the Hospital of the Invalids and marched on the Bastille, carrying the fortress within hours. This enterprise broke up the new ministry, and Broglio dispersed his troops and fled.
Response to Burke on Violence
Paine argues that Burke never mentions the plot against the National Assembly, and that the exiles Burke champions fled because their plot miscarried. The National Assembly brought none to the scaffold, though four or five persons were killed by the populace, including the Governor of the Bastille and the Mayor of Paris. Their heads were carried on spikes—a punishment learned from governments. Paine cites Damien, torn to pieces by horses in France, and notes that the “mob” class committed burnings in London in 1780.
The Expedition to Versailles
The Garde du Corps, at an entertainment on October 1, tore off the national cockade and replaced it with a counter-cockade. On October 5, women and men in disguise collected at the Hotel de Ville and set off for Versailles. M. de la Fayette followed with twenty thousand Paris militia, sending expresses to the King. He arrived between ten and eleven at night, mediated between parties, and the King signed the Declaration of the Rights of Man. At daybreak, a Garde du Corps fired from a palace window, killing a Paris militiaman. The people rushed into the palace, and de la Fayette again interposed, with the Garde du Corps adopting the national cockade. The crowd shouted “Le Roi à Paris,” and the King accepted. M. Bailly, Mayor of Paris, congratulated the King, calling it “un bon jour,” which Burke censured, but Paine defends, noting the affair spanned two days.
Natural and Civil Rights
Paine argues that reasoning from antiquity is flawed; one must go back to man’s creation. Man’s only title is “Man,” and every generation is equal in rights to preceding ones. The Mosaic account establishes the unity and equality of man. Natural rights appertain to man in right of existence, while civil rights arise from natural rights deposited in the common stock when individual power is defective. Three conclusions follow: civil rights grow from natural rights; civil power is the aggregate of natural rights collected to a focus; and this aggregate cannot invade retained natural rights.
Government’s Three Sources
Governments arise from superstition, power, or reason. Government is not a compact between governors and governed; rather, individuals in their sovereign right compact with each other to produce government.
Constitution Defined
A constitution is antecedent to government, a real visible thing, the act of the people constituting government, containing principles, organization, powers, elections, and limits. Burke cannot produce the English Constitution, as England arose from conquest, not society. Burke’s claim that France had a good constitution when the three Orders met confuses a convention with a constitution. The present National Assembly is the “personal social compact”—delegates of the nation in its original character, authorized to form a constitution.
Burke’s Astonishment and the Mental Revolution
Paine quotes Burke expressing wonder at the French Revolution as a crisis of all Europe. Paine argues Burke does not understand the Revolution; it is not a creation from chaos but the consequence of a prior mental revolution in France—the mind of the nation changed before the new order followed. He traces the growth of the Revolution through the despotism of Louis XIV and the lethargy of Louis XV, with signs of liberty appearing only in the writings of French philosophers like Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Abbé Raynal.
The American Influence
The dispute between England and the American colonies broke out, and France engaged in war—the nation sought liberty while the ministry sought retaliation on England. French officers and soldiers went to America, learning the practice and principles of freedom. The publication of American events in France connected military events with revolutionary principles. Count Vergennes was not a friend of America, but the Queen of France gave the American cause fashion at court. Franklin, a philosopher, made his society universal. Vergennes resisted publication of American constitutions but yielded to public opinion; the constitutions were to liberty what a grammar is to language.
The Marquis de la Fayette and the Notables
The Marquis de la Fayette served in America as an American officer, entering into discussions on government principles. After the war, French officers returned, joining practice to theory. M. Neckar was displaced in May 1781, and under M. Calonne’s extravagant administration, revenue became unequal to expenditure. The nation seized this to bring forward a Revolution. Taxes were raised by the King framing edicts sent to Parliaments for registration. M. Calonne revived the project of an “Assembly of the Notables,” who met in 1787—the first practical step toward Revolution. All 140 members were nominated by the king, and Calonne arranged them into seven committees, but his plans deceived him and became his overthrow.
La Fayette’s Stand
The Marquis de la Fayette was placed in the second committee, presided by Count D’Artois. La Fayette made a verbal charge against Calonne for selling crown lands, and when asked if he would render the charge in writing, he replied he would. Calonne was soon dismissed by the King and set off to England. La Fayette, from American experience, knew more of civil government than most members. Disputes arose between D’Artois and La Fayette, with La Fayette proposing to accommodate expenses to revenue, abolish the Bastille, and suppress Lettres de Cachet. On new taxes, La Fayette said taxes could only be raised by a National Assembly freely elected by the people. When D’Artois asked if he meant the States-General, La Fayette replied he did, and went further, saying the king should agree to establish a constitution.
The Archbishop of Thoulouse and the Parliaments
The Assembly agreed to recommend two new taxes to be enregistered by the Parliament. The Archbishop of Thoulouse was appointed to administer finances and made Prime Minister. He arrived to more state-authority than any minister since the Duke de Choiseul, but turned out a despot, sank into disgrace, and became a Cardinal. The minister sent the edicts for the two taxes to the Parliaments, and the Parliament of Paris returned answer that with…
Observations on the Declaration of Rights
Paine analyzes the French Declaration of Rights, noting that the first three articles contain the whole Declaration in general terms, while articles four through six define what the first three express generally, and articles seven through eleven declare principles for constructing laws conformable to those declared rights. He acknowledges that some good people in France and elsewhere question whether article ten sufficiently guarantees the right intended, and he observes that it diminishes religion’s divine dignity by making it subject to human laws, presenting it like light obscured by a cloudy medium. Articles twelve onward are substantially contained in the preceding principles, but France’s situation—undoing wrong while establishing right—required more particularity. During the National Assembly’s consideration, some members remarked that a Declaration of Rights should be accompanied by a Declaration of Duties, which showed reflection but erred by not reflecting far enough: a Declaration of Rights is by reciprocity a Declaration of Duties, since whatever is my right as a man is also another’s right, making it my duty to guarantee as well as possess. The first three articles are the basis of Liberty, individual and national, and the Declaration is worth more than all laws and statutes yet promulgated. The declaratory exordium shows a nation opening its commission under its Creator’s auspices—a scene so new it rises into a “Regeneration of man.” Present European governments are scenes of iniquity; England’s own inhabitants call it a market where corruption is common traffic. The French Revolution is traduced because it stares corruption in the face; opponents cry “It has gone too far”—too far for them. The Revolution receives homage from opposition; truth has established it. Paine closes with M. de la Fayette’s apostrophe: “May this great monument, raised to Liberty, serve as a lesson to the oppressor, and an example to the oppressed!”
Miscellaneous Chapter
Paine reserved observations to avoid interrupting his argument, noting that Mr. Burke’s book is “all Miscellany”—he stormed the French Revolution with “a mob of ideas.” When a man in a wrong cause lacks polar truth, he is lost; memory fails him, invention betrays him. Burke asserted hereditary rights and that a nation cannot form its own government, yet said “Government is a contrivance of human wisdom.” If so, hereditary succession cannot be part of it, for wisdom cannot be made hereditary; committing government to an idiot’s wisdom cannot be wise. Burke must show every hereditary successor was a Solomon. Burke guarded himself by making government a “monopoly of wisdom,” placing the nation as fools on one side and his government of wise men on the other, proclaiming men have a RIGHT that their WANTS be provided for by this wisdom. Burke’s “computing principle” language means government is governed by no principle—arbitrary power. Burke has not shown where wisdom originated or by what authority it began; it is usurpation. A monarchical reasoner never traces government to its source. Burke labored at the Regency Bill but lacked boldness to name William of Normandy—”the son of a prostitute, and the plunderer of the English nation.”
The Revolutions of America and France have thrown a beam of light over the world. Ignorance once dispelled cannot be re-established; man cannot be made un-know his knowledge. Counter-revolution requires obliterating knowledge, which is impossible. Burke is suspected of being a pensioner in a fictitious name. Burke says the King holds his crown “in contempt of the choice of the Revolution Society,” who have not a single vote for a king. Paine cares not who is King—Cherokee chief or Hessian hussar—but the doctrine is abominable. The Revolution Society includes citizens of all denominations and members of both Houses of Parliament; if no right to vote exists in any character, no right exists in nation or Parliament. England always has a Foreign House of Kings—now the House of Brunswick, “one of the petty tribes of Germany.” Parliament’s right is only a right in trust, by delegation from a small part of the Nation; the Nation’s right is original, as universal as taxation. Paine recalls the Earl of Shelburne’s speech: the form of government is wholly at the Nation’s will—if it chooses a Republic, it may say to a King, “We have no longer any occasion for you.” Burke’s contempt doctrine is saying too much even to the humblest individual whose labor contributes to the million sterling yearly given the King. A Brunswick soldier told Paine: “in my country, if the prince says eat straw, we eat straw.”
Burke told the French that English experience teaches liberties can only be perpetuated by hereditary crown. Paine asks who is to take them away. La Fayette says: “For a Nation to be free, it is sufficient that she wills it.” Facts are against Burke: Charles I and James II endangered liberties through hereditary government. When nations fall out about freedom, the party sustaining defeat obtains the prize of knowledge. Paine considers hereditary succession under two heads: a Family establishing itself (universally despotism), and a Nation establishing a particular Family. The second becomes despotism on reflection: it precludes succeeding generations’ consent, and preclusion of consent is despotism. A person in slavery is aggravated to reflect he was sold by his parent. The first generation acts as a free agent selecting its ruler; it lives under a government of its own choice, not hereditary government. Hereditary succession follows only on the first parties’ death. The first generation changes from Legislator to Testator, attempting to bequeath government—a will it has no authority to make. Rights of men are neither devisable, transferable, nor annihilable, but descendable only; no generation can cut off the descent. Wrongs cannot have a legal descent.
On French and English Money
Paine argues France possesses more gold and silver than England—over four times the quantity, and considerably greater proportionally by population. England’s funding system multiplies paper currency, substituting it for specie and enabling export of gold and silver; extending paper to small notes could eliminate money entirely. Paine cites Neckar’s treatise on finance administration: Lisbon and Cadiz receive South American gold and silver, distributing it across Europe. Neckar shows importation of five million sterling annually, averaged over fifteen years (1763–1777), totaling 1,800 million livres (seventy-five million sterling). From the Hanover succession (1714) to Chalmers’s publication (seventy-two years), imports would reach 360 million sterling. If British foreign commerce is one-sixth of Europe’s total, Britain should draw sixty million; allowing waste and accident as Neckar does for France leaves fifty-two million. Added to the sum at the Hanover succession, Britain should hold at least sixty-six million sterling, but had only twenty million—forty-six million below proportion. England loses about three-quarters of a million yearly through unseen leakage, supplied by paper.
French Insolvency vs. English
The late French Government was insolvent because the nation refused support; England’s government differs only in that people submit to taxation without inquiry. The Crown was insolvent in May 1777, applying to the nation for £600,000 in private debts. Pitt and Burke erred in confounding the French nation with the French Government. Burke’s “chasm” speech is dismissed—natural France and its means remained; only despotism’s extinction left a chasm. Creditors trusted the Nation as real pay-master, not the Government—disturbing Burke because the precedent is fatal to governments attaching the monied interest. The National Assembly treated creditors as creditors of the Nation, not the Government. The present government paid off much capital by lessening expenses and selling monastic and ecclesiastical estates. The priesthood had kept bequests for themselves; the National Assembly ordered sale for the whole nation, providing decently for priests. Annual interest will be reduced at least six million sterling by paying off over one hundred million capital; with three million less in expenses, France merits imitation. While Burke talked of bankruptcy, the Assembly paid capital; while English taxes rose nearly a million yearly, French taxes lowered several millions. Burke writes as a courtier, not as Frenchman or Englishman; all Courts share the “caterpillar principle,” agreeing to plunder while appearing to quarrel.
Conclusion: Reason vs. Ignorance
Government by election and representation (republic) rests on Reason; hereditary succession (monarchy and aristocracy) rests on Ignorance, since talents cannot descend hereditarily. Mixed government’s moving power is Corruption—buying up reason to satisfy the hereditary part. In mixed governments there is no responsibility: the King can do no wrong (like idiots and the insane), the Minister shelters under a parliamentary majority secured by places, pensions, and corruption, and that majority justifies itself. The Cabinet acts as the supposed King; mixed government becomes “Government by Committee” where advisers, actors, approvers, justifiers, responsible and non-responsible persons are identical. In a well-constituted republic, representation is equal and complete; parts share one natural source; nothing needs corrupting by compromise. Taxes in republics need no apology—if necessary they are advantageous. There is but one element of human power: man himself. Monarchy, aristocracy, democracy are “creatures of imagination.” Revolutions of America and France show opinion changing; revolutions are not mechanically calculable. Sovereignty appertains to the Nation only; a Nation has an inherent indefeasible right to abolish any inconvenient form of government. Every citizen is a member of Sovereignty, owing obedience only to laws. Paine quotes three articles: (I) Men are born and always continue free and equal in rights; civil distinctions founded only on public utility. (II) The end of political associations is preservation of natural and imprescriptible rights: liberty, property, security, resistance of oppression. (III) The nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; no individual or body can hold authority not expressly derived from it.
Henry IV’s European Congress Plan
Henry the Fourth of France proposed about 1610 a plan for abolishing war: an European Congress (a “Pacific Republic”) of delegates acting as a Court of arbitration. Had it been adopted, English and French taxes would each be at least ten million sterling annually less. War is lucrative to old Governments—every war ends with added taxes and revenue, furnishing pretence for places and offices. Republics avoid war because their government admits no interest distinct from the Nation’s; Holland existed nearly a century without war. Man is not man’s enemy except through false systems of Government. Hereditary governments are declining; revolutions on national sovereignty and representation are approaching; an European Congress to patronise free government is nearer in probability than the American and French revolutions once were.
Dedication to M. de la Fayette
Paine addresses Lafayette after nearly fifteen years’ acquaintance in difficult American situations and consultations in Europe. Their only difference was timing—Paine thinks principles practicable sooner than Lafayette’s fourteen or fifteen years. Mankind is always ripe to understand true interest if clearly presented. After the American revolution Paine felt disposed to sit quietly, but principle, not place, as the energetic cause of action makes a man everywhere the same. He has resolved to labour fast, wishing Lafayette to hasten his principles.
Introduction: The Place to Stand
Paine applies Archimedes’ principle of mechanical powers to Reason and Liberty: “Had we a place to stand upon, we might raise the world.” The American revolution presented in politics what was only theory in mechanics; no reform could begin in Asia, Africa, or Europe due to tyranny and antiquity of habit. Freedom had been “hunted round the globe”; reason was considered rebellion; fear made men afraid to think. Truth only needs “the liberty of appearing”; the sun needs no inscription; American governments displayed themselves and despotism felt a shock. American independence mattered not merely as separation from England but as a revolution in principles and practice of government; she made a stand “not for herself only, but for the world.” Even the Hessian, hired to fight against her, may bless his defeat; England may rejoice in its miscarriage. America was the only spot where universal reformation could begin; its first settlers were emigrants from different European nations, retiring from governmental persecutions, meeting as brothers. Cultivation of a wilderness produced a state of society that countries harassed by government neglected; man becomes what he ought; must go back to Nature for information. If Asia, Africa, Europe had begun on similar principles, they would be far superior; a spectator knowing nothing of the world would take old countries to be new struggling settlements, not realizing their misery was the consequence of government. The greedy hand of government thrusts into every corner of industry; invention exercised to furnish new pretences for revenue and taxation. Revolutions are to be expected; they are “the Order of the day.” All monarchical governments are military; war is their trade; plunder and revenue their objects; peace has not security of a day. Former revolutions changed persons and measures, not principles; what we now behold is a “counter revolution”—man recovering rights of which conquest and tyranny dispossessed him. Government founded on moral theory, universal peace, indefeasible hereditary Rights of Man, is revolving from west to east. Danger: attempting revolutions before principles are understood; government arrogates to itself all prosperity while avoiding its errors. Need to discriminate between effects of government and those of society and civilisation.
Of Society and Civilisation
Great part of order among mankind is not effect of government but originates in principles of society and natural constitution of man; existed prior to government. Mutual dependence and reciprocal interest create the chain of connection; common interest regulates concerns and forms law; society performs for itself almost everything ascribed to government. Nature made man’s wants greater than his individual powers, forcing him into society as gravitation acts to a centre; she implanted social affections essential to happiness. Government is no farther necessary than to supply the few cases where society and civilisation are not competent. For upwards of two years from commencement of American War, several American States had no established forms of government, yet order and harmony were preserved. Abolition of formal government does not dissolve society; it brings it closer together; society begins to act. Formal government is “more in name and idea than in fact”; safety depends on principles of society and civilisation. The more perfect civilisation is, the less occasion for government; old governments’ expenses increase in proportion they ought to diminish. All great laws of society are laws of nature; trade and commerce are laws of mutual and reciprocal interest. Government often disturbs natural propensity to society; the riots and tumults in England proceeded not from want of government but government was the generating cause. The riots of 1780 had no other source than prejudices government had encouraged. Excess and inequality of taxation throw masses into poverty and discontent; real cause of riots is always want of happiness. America confirms these observations: made up of people from different nations, languages, modes of worship, yet by constructing government on principles of society and rights of man, all parts unite; taxes are few because government is just. A metaphysical man like Mr. Burke would have tortured his invention to discover how such a people could be governed. American Revolution led to discovery of principles and laid open imposition of governments; all previous revolutions worked within atmosphere of a court. Government is “nothing more than a national association acting on the principles of society.”
Of the Origin of the Present Old Governments
Such governments could only have commenced by total violation of every sacred and moral principle; obscurity of their origin implies iniquity. Origin of American and French governments will be remembered as honourable; Flattery has consigned the rest to the tomb of time. In early ages, a banditti of ruffians overran countries; the chief contrived to lose the name of Robber in that of Monarch; hence origin of Monarchy and Kings. The origin of England’s monarchy is best recorded; the hatred from Norman invasion and tyranny outlived the contrivance to obliterate it; not a village has forgotten the curfeubell. Bands of robbers parcelled out the world, quarrelled; a second plunderer succeeded the first; “ruffian torturing ruffian”; conqueror considered conquered as property. Plunder assumed the softer name of revenue; power originally usurped they affected to inherit. Such governments produce continued system of war and extortion; no stamina to engraft reformation; remedy is to begin anew on ground of the nation. Kings, courts and cabinets present baseness of heart and hypocrisy of countenance; man naturally is not up to the character. If governments had originated in right principle, the world would not be in wretched condition; the farmer has no inducement to war with another farmer; war is the “Ph” of government.
Of the Old and New Systems of Government
Old governments assume power for self-aggrandisement; new systems delegate power for common benefit. The old supports itself through war; the new promotes peace as the true means of enriching a nation. The old encourages national prejudices; the new promotes universal society for universal commerce. The old measures prosperity by revenue extorted; the new proves excellence by small taxes required. Paine addresses this chapter to Abbé Sieyès, not Burke, having promised to discuss monarchical government with him. He will “occasionally take Mr. Burke in my way.” Burke’s talk of “old and new whigs” is dismissed as “childish names and distinctions.” Though the new system is most ancient in principle, founded on original inherent Rights of Man, tyranny and the sword suspended those rights for centuries, so “new” serves better for distinction. The old is hereditary (in whole or part); the new is entirely representative, rejecting hereditary government on two grounds: (1) as an imposition on mankind, (2) as inadequate for government’s purposes. Hereditary government cannot be proved by any right to begin; no man or body of men has authority over posterity in personal rights. Even if we ourselves returned to existence, we could not take from ourselves rights we would then possess. All hereditary government is tyranny—an heritable crown means mankind are “heritable property,” inherited “as if they were flocks and herds.” Government ought to be always in full maturity, superior to accidents affecting individual man. Hereditary succession is subject to all such accidents, making it “the most irregular and imperfect of all systems.” The Rights of Man is called a levelling system, but hereditary monarchy is truly levelling—”mental levelling”—admitting every character to same authority, putting vice and virtue, ignorance and wisdom on same level. Kings succeed “not as rationals, but as animals.” Government through passions and accidents appears as childhood, decrepitude, dotage, “a thing at nurse, in leading-strings, or in crutches,” reversing nature’s order by putting children over men. If nature decreed virtue and wisdom always appertain to hereditary succession, objection would be removed; but nature “disowns and sports with” the system—successors are below average understanding: one a tyrant, another an idiot, a third insane, some all three. Sieyès is quoted: “If it be asked what is my opinion with respect to hereditary right, I answer without hesitation, That in good theory, an hereditary transmission of any power of office, can never accord with the laws of a true representation. Hereditaryship is, in this sense, as much an attaint upon principle, as an outrage upon society. But let us refer to the history of all elective monarchies and principalities: is there one in which the elective mode is not worse than the hereditary succession?” Paine replies that debating which is worse admits both are bad; Sieyès’s preference condemns what he prefers; such reasoning “amounts to an accusation upon Providence” for leaving man only two evils. Making any office hereditary that requires wisdom proves monarchy useless; hereditary succession presents monarchy as an office “any child or ideot may fill.” A king requires only “the animal figure of man—a sort of breathing automaton.” This superstition “cannot long resist the awakened reason and interest of man.” Burke is a stickler for monarchy “not altogether as a pensioner, if he is one, which I believe, but as a political man.” Burke holds contemptible opinion of mankind, considering them “a herd of beings that must be governed by fraud, effigy, and show.” Paine credits Burke for complimenting America—that Americans were more enlightened than English or Europeans, so “imposition of shew” was unnecessary there. Though unnecessary (representative system rejects both), Paine decides contrary to Sieyès on hereditary versus elective monarchy: civil wars from contested hereditary claims are more numerous, dreadful, and longer than those from election. All French civil wars arose from hereditary system—claims or imperfection of form admitting regencies. England’s contests between York and Lancaster lasted a whole century; those of 1715 and 1745 were similar. The succession war for Spain’s crown embroiled almost half Europe. Holland’s disturbances generate from hereditary Stadtholder. A “government calling itself free, with an hereditary office, is like a thorn in the flesh.” Foreign wars also trace to hereditary succession creating permanent family interest in dominion and revenue. Poland, though elective, has had fewer wars than hereditary ones, and made “a voluntary essay” at reform. The representative system takes society and civilisation for basis; nature, reason, experience for guide. Nature cannot be controlled in distributing mental powers; the rule remains secret. Fixing hereditaryship of wisdom is as ridiculous as of beauty. Wisdom is “like a seedless plant”—reared when it appears, not voluntarily produced. It changes place continually, visiting “in rotation every family of the earth.” As the republic of letters produces best literature by giving genius fair chance, representative government produces wisest laws by collecting wisdom where found. Hereditary governor is as inconsistent as hereditary author. Homer and Euclid’s sons, if they left works unfinished, could not complete them. Descendants of famous men show “total reverse of character”; mental faculties flow in channels then forsake them. Man accepts for king or legislator “a person whom he would not elect for a” constable.
Of Constitutions
A constitution is not an act of government but of a people constituting a government; without a constitution, government is “power without a right.” All power is either delegated as a trust or assumed as usurpation, and time does not alter their nature. America offers a fresh example of this principle, a “beginning of a world,” where the origin of government can be observed directly. The thirteen separate states each formed their own government after the Declaration of Independence, then formed a federal government for matters concerning the whole, interstate relations, and foreign affairs.
Pennsylvania’s process illustrates the proper method. At the dispute’s commencement, the twelve counties elected committees, and Philadelphia’s committee proposed a conference. These committees, lacking the power to form a constitution, only recommended that each county elect six representatives to a convention. This convention, with Benjamin Franklin as president, published a proposed constitution for public consideration, then adjourned. Upon reassembly, knowing the general approbation, it was signed, sealed, proclaimed on the people’s authority, and deposited as a public record. The constitution included a declaration of rights, the form of government, and provisions for courts, juries, elections, and public money accounting. It was a law to the government, unalterable at its discretion, but provided for a revising convention every seven years. It served as a “political bible” for its members.
The federal constitution’s origin was similar. Congress, initially a deputation from provincial legislatures, issued only recommendations, yet was obeyed more faithfully than any European government, showing that government’s strength lies in national attachment. The act of confederation was proposed and concluded in 1781; it was not congress’s act, as a body cannot give power to itself, but the states concentrating powers in congress. In both instances, there was no compact between people and government; the compact was people with each other. Government is a trust, resumable by the people, having no rights but duties.
Changes to both constitutions were necessary, as state powers were too great and federal powers too little—a defect in distribution, not principle. After public discussion, a deputation met at Annapolis, recommending a full convention. That convention met at Philadelphia in May 1787, with General Washington, then a private citizen, as president. It published the proposed constitution, directed each state to elect a ratifying convention, and stipulated that nine states’ ratification would begin the new government. Some conventions ratified by large majorities; in the Massachusetts convention, the majority was nineteen or twenty in about three hundred, and objecting members declared they would give practical support despite voting against. After nine states concurred, the old federal government was taken down, and Washington became president. The author remarks that Washington’s services shame kings—he accepted no pay as commander-in-chief or as president. Pennsylvania then altered its own constitution via a new convention.
Little inconvenience occurred in forming or altering these constitutions; the interest of the greater number favors right over wrong. Governments were not actors in changing constitutions; the right of judging and acting belongs to those who pay, not those who receive. A constitution is the nation’s property, antecedent to and distinct from government. In France, the word “nation” is used instead of “people.”
England, however, lacks a constitution. Every society has one except that nation. Dr. Johnson and similar writers placed controlling power in government’s discretion, not in a constitution. The final controlling power and original constituting power are one. England’s government began as tyranny under William of Normandy. Magna Charta was only compelling government to renounce assumptions, a “re-conquest,” not a constitution. The restrictions under the Edwards, Henries, and Stuarts were limitations on assumed power, not a constitution. The Bill of Rights was a bargain among government parts to divide powers and privileges, giving the nation only the right of petitioning—more a “bill of wrongs.” Since the Hanover succession, a “despotic legislation” arose. Election without representation is “candidates for despotism.” The English constitution is a “productive machine of taxation”: French taxes under the new constitution are not quite thirteen shillings per head, while English taxes are forty-eight shillings and sixpence per head.
The Misnomer of Executive Power and the Progress of Taxation
The crown is a misnomer when called the “executive power”—formerly the crown acted as judge executing laws, making the current “judicial” power what was once “executive,” rendering one term redundant and one office useless. The crown now signifies neither judge nor general; laws govern, not men.
Reviewing taxation progress in England since the Norman conquest, taxes decreased for four hundred years, reduced three-fourths from £400,000 to £100,000. Ancestors “would not be imposed upon” and restricted monarchical usurpation to “a republican economy of taxes.” The last three hundred years show an astonishing increase; with army, navy, and revenue officer pay unchanged for a century while taxes rose tenfold, the increase is attributed to “extravagance, corruption, and intrigue.” The Revolution of 1688 and Hanover succession brought “continental intrigues” and foreign wars. The French revolution is credited with breaking up this system, lessening taxes for both England and France. The author proposes an alliance of England, France, and America.
Taxes for the year ending Michaelmas 1788 totaled £15,572,970, with over one million in new taxes added since, totaling approximately £17,000,000. About nine millions pay National Debt interest; nearly eight millions cover current expenses. The million claimed for debt reduction is dismissed as “paying with one hand and taking out with the other.” France possessed national domains for paying debt; England must reduce current expenses by four or five millions annually. The National Debt, though heavy in interest, keeps alive capital useful to commerce; gold and silver stand at twenty millions when they should be sixty, due to “foreign intrigue, foreign wars, foreign dominions.”
The English Government, not the nation, is likely unfriendly to the French Revolution. The clamour of “French intrigue, arbitrary power, popery, and wooden shoes” formerly allured the nation into taxes; those days are past. An alliance between England, France, and America would lessen national expenses; fleets and armies could be reduced “ship for ship.” Governments must be fitted to “a common and correspondent principle”—confidence cannot exist with hostility or mystery opposed to candour.
Expenses might return to the wasteful times of Charles the Second, when England and France were allies. Parliament then settled the peace establishment at £1,200,000. Under Elizabeth, taxes were but half a million. The annual expenditure might be reduced to one million and a half—still six times America’s government expenses, though England’s civil internal government costs less than America’s equivalent. The author urges nations to be rational, not “governed like animals, for the pleasure of their riders.” No office merits more than ten thousand pounds yearly. Public money comes from “hard earnings of labour and poverty.” Congress could not offer General Washington a million a year; his honour is different. England has spent almost seventy millions maintaining “a family imported from abroad”; even physicians’ bills sent to the public. Jails are crowded, taxes and poor rates increased. Reformation must come “from the nation, and not from the government.”
A Plan for the Relief of the Poor
An estimate shows £500,000 sufficient for government expenses, exclusive of navies and armies. Three hundred representatives suffice; they may meet in one house as in France. Revenue officers are paid from monies they collect. Chiefs in offices like the post-office and exchequer “do little more than sign their names three or four times a year.” Taking one million and a half as a sufficient peace establishment, a surplus of over six millions remains from current expenses.
Trade and taxes cannot be suddenly separated: articles on hand carry duties, and duties charged in gross cannot be divided to relieve consumers purchasing by pint or pound. The last duty on strong beer and ale was three shillings per barrel—removal would lessen purchase only half a farthing per pint.
Poor-rates are a direct tax every housekeeper feels. Sir John Sinclair states the national amount at £2,100,587, much expended in litigations tormenting the poor. Birmingham’s poor-rates are £14,000 yearly for its seventy thousand souls. When taxes were low, the poor maintained themselves; there were no poor-rates. A laboring man with wife and two or three children pays between seven and eight pounds yearly in taxes—at least a fourth of yearly earnings—disguised in article prices.
The first practical relief is to abolish poor-rates entirely, remitting taxes to the poor of double the amount—four millions annually from surplus taxes. The poor benefit two millions, housekeepers two millions—equal to reducing the National Debt by one hundred twenty millions, or the whole American War expense. England contains seven million souls; one-fifth needing support equals one million four hundred thousand. One hundred forty thousand will be aged poor. One million two hundred sixty thousand remain; at five souls per family, two hundred fifty-two thousand families are rendered poor from children’s expense and taxes. The author proposes paying every poor family four pounds yearly per child under fourteen, requiring parents to send children to school for reading, writing, and common arithmetic; parish ministers of every denomination certify jointly. This relieves parental poverty and banishes ignorance.
The Progressive Tax and the Abolition of Primogeniture
A progressive tax table drops odd shillings. An estate cannot produce more than 12,370l. clear of land tax and progressive tax. An estate of 23,000l. yearly, divided into five estates of 4,000 each and one of 3,000, is charged only 1,129l. (five percent), but if held by one possessor, charged 10,630l.
Though enquiry into the origin of estates is unnecessary, their continuation concerns the nation. The law created the evil and should remedy it. Primogeniture ought to be abolished as unnatural, unjust, and harmful to the country. It cuts off younger children from proper inheritance, loading the public with their maintenance; violates election freedom through overbearing influence; and wastes national property—large parks and chases kept unproductive while grain production falls short of consumption. The aristocratical system’s evils are so great that many aristocrats themselves should wish it abolished. Every aristocratical family has “family beggars” hanging round it, eventually ending in almshouses, workhouses, prisons. “The peer and the beggar are often of the same family. One extreme produces the other.”
The laws of England are hostile to younger children and the poor. Laws regulating workmen’s wages are unjust—why not leave workmen free to bargain as lawmakers let their farms? Personal labour is the poor’s only property. Legal wages stay stationary while everything else progresses; lawmakers lay on new taxes, increasing living costs by one law while removing means by another. Lawmakers limit the poor’s pittance while indulging themselves with at least 12,000l. yearly of unacquired property.
Summary of the Proposed Articles
The first eight articles propose: (1) abolition of two millions poor-rates; (2) provision for 252,000 poor families at four pounds per child under fourteen, plus 250,000l. for education of 1,030,000 children; (3) six pounds annually for poor persons aged fifty to sixty; (4) ten pounds annually for life for those aged sixty; (5) twenty shillings for 50,000 births; (6) twenty shillings for 20,000 marriages; (7) 20,000l. funeral expenses for travelling workers; (8) employment for casual poor in London and Westminster. A second enumeration proposes: (9) abolition of house and window tax; (10) three shillings weekly for life to 15,000 disbanded soldiers plus proportionate officer allowances; (11) increased army pay of 19,500l. annually; (12) same for disbanded navy; (13) abolition of commutation tax; (14) progressive tax plan to extirpate primogeniture and aristocratical influence.
One million surplus taxes remains. Inferior revenue officers’ salaries have been under fifty pounds yearly for over one hundred years; ought to be seventy. About 120,000l. would improve them. This was proposed almost twenty years ago, but the treasury-board balked; instead the King applied to parliament for his own salary raised 100,000l. yearly, and everything else was laid aside.
Common justice questions whether one man should have twenty or thirty pounds yearly and another ten thousand. The author notes he is not a Presbyterian, so the “cant cry” about church and meeting cannot be raised against him. Courtiers keep people disputing about church and meeting while living on tax spoils. “Every religion is good that teaches man to be good.”
All calculations suppose 16.5 millions of taxes paid into exchequer after collection costs; actually nearly seventeen millions. Scotland and Ireland taxes are expended locally; if any part reaches the English exchequer it might be remitted—not 100,000l. yearly difference.
The National Debt and Mr. Pitt
In 1789 interest, exclusive of tontine, was 9,150,138l. After paying interest, abolishing house/window tax, commutation tax, poor-rates, and making all provisions, one million surplus remains. The present scheme of paying off the national debt is “ill-concerted, if not a fallacious job.” The burden consists in yearly taxes for interest, not the capital amount. The debt is not reduced one farthing to the public by all millions paid; it would require more money now to purchase the capital than when the scheme began.
The author was in America when Pitt was appointed. The coalition shocked him—”impudence in Lord North; want of firmness in Mr. Fox.” Pitt was a “maiden character in politics,” not initiated into court intrigue. Resentment against the coalition served as friendship to him; ignorance of vice was credited for virtue. Commerce and prosperity rose with peace, yet credited to him. He became “the knight-errant of modern times,” ransacking Europe and India for adventures, advertising for enemies, increasing taxation. Change of ministers amounts to nothing—”the defect lies in the system.”
The debt is “that offspring of the Dutch-Anglo revolution, and its handmaid the Hanover succession.” It is too late to enquire how it began; creditors advanced money. Reforms should be in current expenses, not the interest portion. Remitting poor taxes relieves them; striking off mentioned taxes recovers the “mad American war” expense. Stockholders should consider debt property subject to taxes—this would give it popularity and security. Tax the interest by progressive ratio, lessening public taxes as interest diminishes.
Main Arguments
The central argument of Rights of Man is that no generation can bind posterity. Paine insists that every age must be free to act for itself, and that the living, not the dead, must be accommodated. He argues that Burke’s reliance on parliamentary clauses from 1688 is null and void because the rights of men are neither devisable, transferable, nor annihilable, but descendable only. No generation can cut off the descent of rights, and wrongs cannot have a legal descent.
Paine argues that government is not a compact between governors and governed, which would put effect before cause. Instead, individuals in their sovereign right compact with each other to produce government. Government arises from one of three sources: superstition, power, or reason. The only legitimate source is reason, which is the common interest of society. Governments that arise from power, such as that of William the Conqueror, claim Divine Right and unite Church and State, but they are founded on conquest and tyranny.
A constitution, Paine argues, is antecedent to government. It is a real visible thing, the act of the people constituting government, containing principles, organization, powers, elections, and limits. Burke cannot produce the English Constitution because England arose from conquest, not society, and has never regenerated itself. The present National Assembly in France, by contrast, is the personal social compact—delegates of the nation in its original character, authorized to form a constitution.
Paine argues that the French Revolution was not a creation from chaos but the consequence of a prior mental revolution in France. The mind of the nation changed before the new order followed. The Revolution was the result of a long process of intellectual preparation, aided by the experience of French officers and soldiers in the American war. The French revolted against despotic principles, not against Louis XVI personally; the Monarch and Monarchy were distinct.
On the question of hereditary government, Paine argues that it cannot be proved by any right to begin. No man or body of men has authority over posterity in personal rights. All hereditary government is tyranny, because an heritable crown means mankind are heritable property, inherited as if they were flocks and herds. Hereditary succession is also inadequate for the purposes of government, because government ought to be always in full maturity, superior to accidents affecting individual man. Hereditary succession is subject to all such accidents, making it the most irregular and imperfect of all systems.
Paine argues that government by election and representation rests on reason, while hereditary succession rests on ignorance, since talents cannot descend hereditarily. Mixed government, which combines monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, is driven by corruption—buying up reason to satisfy the hereditary part. In mixed governments there is no responsibility: the King can do no wrong, the Minister shelters under a parliamentary majority secured by places, pensions, and corruption, and that majority justifies itself.
Key Concepts
Natural and Civil Rights: Paine distinguishes between natural rights, which appertain to man in right of existence, including intellectual rights and rights of mind, and civil rights, which arise from natural rights deposited in the common stock when individual power is defective. Three conclusions follow: civil rights grow from natural rights; civil power is the aggregate of natural rights collected to a focus; and this aggregate cannot invade retained natural rights.
The Three Sources of Government: Governments arise from superstition (priestcraft, oracles), power (conquerors claiming Divine Right), or reason (common interest of society). Only the third is legitimate.
The Constitution: A constitution is antecedent to government, a real visible thing, the act of the people constituting government. It contains principles, organization, powers, elections, and limits. A government without a constitution is power without a right.
The Declaration of Rights: Paine discusses the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, noting that the first three articles contain the whole Declaration in general terms, articles 4-6 define what articles 1-3 express generally, and articles 7-11 declare principles for constructing laws conformable to declared rights. He argues that a Declaration of Rights is by reciprocity a Declaration of Duties, since whatever is my right as a man is also another’s right, making it my duty to guarantee as well as possess.
The Republic of Letters Analogy: Paine compares representative government to the republic of letters. Just as the republic of letters produces best literature by giving genius a fair chance, representative government produces wisest laws by collecting wisdom where found. A hereditary governor is as inconsistent as a hereditary author.
The Progressive Tax: Paine proposes a progressive tax on estates as a means of extirpating primogeniture and aristocratical influence. An estate cannot produce more than a certain amount clear of land tax and progressive tax. An estate of 23,000 pounds yearly, divided into five estates of 4,000 each and one of 3,000, is charged only five percent, but if held by one possessor, is charged a much higher rate.
Primogeniture: Paine argues that primogeniture ought to be abolished as unnatural, unjust, and harmful to the country. It cuts off younger children from proper inheritance, loads the public with their maintenance, violates election freedom through overbearing influence, and wastes national property by keeping large parks and chases unproductive.
The European Congress: Paine discusses Henry the Fourth of France’s plan for abolishing war through an European Congress, a Pacific Republic of delegates acting as a Court of arbitration. Had it been adopted, English and French taxes would each be at least ten million sterling annually less.
Themes
A recurring theme in the work is the contrast between reason and ignorance as the foundations of government. Paine argues that government by election and representation rests on reason, while hereditary succession rests on ignorance. The revolutions of America and France have thrown a beam of light over the world, and ignorance once dispelled cannot be re-established. Man cannot be made un-know his knowledge, and a counter-revolution would require obliterating knowledge, which is impossible.
Another theme is the distinction between society and government. Paine argues that a great part of the order among mankind is not the effect of government but originates in the principles of society and the natural constitution of man. Society existed prior to government, and government is no farther necessary than to supply the few cases where society and civilisation are not competent. The more perfect civilisation is, the less occasion there is for government. Government often disturbs the natural propensity to society, and the riots and tumults in England proceeded not from want of government but from government being the generating cause.
The theme of regeneration runs throughout the work. Paine describes the French Revolution as a scene so new that it rises into a regeneration of man. The declaratory exordium of the Declaration of Rights shows a nation opening its commission under its Creator’s auspices. Present European governments are scenes of iniquity, and the French Revolution is traduced because it stares corruption in the face. The Revolution receives homage from opposition, and truth has established it.
The theme of war and peace is also prominent. Paine argues that all monarchical governments are military, that war is their trade, and that plunder and revenue are their objects. Peace has not security of a day under such governments. Republics avoid war because their government admits no interest distinct from the Nation’s. Man is not man’s enemy except through false systems of Government. War is lucrative to old Governments, as every war ends with added taxes and revenue, furnishing pretence for places and offices.
The theme of the people as the source of sovereignty is central. Paine argues that sovereignty appertains to the Nation only, and that a Nation has an inherent indefeasible right to abolish any inconvenient form of government. Every citizen is a member of Sovereignty, owing obedience only to laws. The nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty, and no individual or body can hold authority not expressly derived from it.
The Author’s Conclusions
Paine concludes that the French Revolution is a justified and necessary event, the consequence of a prior mental revolution in France. The Revolution is not a creation from chaos but the natural result of the diffusion of political inquiry and the experience of freedom gained through the American war. The French revolted against despotic principles, not against the person of the King, and the National Assembly acted as the personal social compact of the nation, authorized to form a constitution.
Paine concludes that hereditary government is both an imposition on mankind and inadequate for the purposes of government. It cannot be proved by any right to begin, and no man or body of men has authority over posterity in personal rights. All hereditary government is tyranny, and hereditary succession is subject to all the accidents affecting individual man, making it the most irregular and imperfect of all systems. The representative system, by contrast, takes society and civilisation for its basis, and nature, reason, and experience for its guide.
Paine concludes that the English government, unlike the French, lacks a constitution because it arose from conquest rather than from the act of the people. The English constitution, such as it is, is a productive machine of taxation, with English taxes at forty-eight shillings and sixpence per head compared to French taxes under the new constitution of not quite thirteen shillings per head. The English government is likely unfriendly to the French Revolution, but the English nation is favourably disposed toward it.
Paine proposes a detailed plan for economic reform, including the abolition of poor-rates, provision for poor families, support for the aged, and a progressive tax on estates to extirpate primogeniture and aristocratical influence. He argues that the national debt is not reduced one farthing to the public by all the millions paid, and that the present scheme of paying off the debt is ill-concerted, if not a fallacious job. The burden consists in yearly taxes for interest, not the capital amount.
Paine concludes with a call for an alliance of England, France, and America, which would lessen national expenses and allow fleets and armies to be reduced. He urges nations to be rational, not governed like animals for the pleasure of their riders. Reformation must come from the nation, and not from the government. The book ends with the observation that the defect lies in the system, not in individual ministers, and that change of ministers amounts to nothing.
Significance
Rights of Man is significant as a foundational text of modern democratic thought, articulating the principles of popular sovereignty, representative government, and the rights of man in a manner accessible to a broad readership. The work is notable for its systematic critique of hereditary government and its defense of the French Revolution against Burke’s influential attack. Paine’s argument that no generation can bind posterity and that every age must be free to act for itself became a cornerstone of democratic theory.
The work is also significant for its detailed proposals for social and economic reform, including the abolition of poor-rates, provision for poor families, support for the aged, and a progressive tax on estates. These proposals anticipate later developments in social welfare policy and progressive taxation. Paine’s critique of the national debt and his call for an alliance of England, France, and America reflect a broader vision of international peace and cooperation.
The book’s significance lies in its insistence that government must be founded on reason and the rights of man rather than on superstition, power, or corruption. Paine’s contrast between the old systems of government, which assume power for self-aggrandisement, and the new systems, which delegate power for common benefit, articulated a fundamental distinction that shaped subsequent political thought. The work’s conclusion that the defect lies in the system, not in individual ministers, and that reformation must come from the nation and not from the government, remains a powerful statement of democratic principle.
